Managing the Uncertainty of the Evolution of Requirements Models by Tran, Le Minh Sang
PhD Dissertation
International Doctorate School in Information and
Communication Technologies
DISI - University of Trento
MANAGING THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE
EVOLUTION OF REQUIREMENTS MODELS
Le Minh Sang Tran
Advisor Committee
Fabio Massacci, Professor John Mylopoulos, Professor
Università degli Studi di Trento Università degli Studi di Trento
Haralambos Mouratidis, Professor
University of Brighton
Ketil Stølen, Professor
University of Oslo, SINTEF ICT
2013

ABSTRACT
“...There are known unknowns: that is to say,
there are things that we now know we don’t know..."
Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense
E
VOLUTION is an inevitable phenomenon during the life time of a long-lived software
systems due to the dynamic of their working environment. Software systems thus
need to evolve to meet the changing demands. A key point of evolution is its uncer-
tainty since it refers to potential future changes to software artifacts such as requirements
models. Thus, the selection of evolution-resilient design alternatives for the systems is a sig-
nificant challenge.
This dissertation proposes a framework for modeling evolution and reasoning about it
and its uncertainty in requirements models to facilitate the decision making process. The
framework provides evolution rules as a means to capture requirements evolution, and a set
of evolution metrics to quantify design alternatives of the system. This enables more useful
information about to what extent design alternatives could resist to evolution. Thus, it helps
decision makers to make strategic moves.
Both evolution rules and evolution metrics are backed up with a formal model, which is
based on a game-theoretic interpretation, so that it allows a formal semantics understanding
of the meaning of the metrics in different scenarios.
The proposed framework is supported by a series of algorithms, which automates the cal-
culation of metrics, and a proof-of-concept Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE)
tool. The algorithms calculate metric values for each design alternative, and enumerate pos-
sible design alternatives with the best metric values, i.e., winner alternatives. The algorithms
have been designed to incrementally react to every single change made to requirements
models in an efficient way.
The proposed framework is evaluated in a series of empirical studies that took place over
a year to evaluate the modeling part of the framework. The evaluation studies used scenar-
ios taken from industrial projects in the Air Traffic Management (ATM) domain. The studies
involve different types of participants with different expertise in the framework and the do-
main. The results from the studies show that the modeling approach is effective in capturing
the evolution of complex systems. It is reasonably possible for people, if they are supplied
with appropriate knowledge (i.e., knowledge of method for domain experts, knowledge of
domain for method experts, and knowledge of both domain and method for novices), to
build significantly large models, and identify possible ways for these models to evolve. More-
over, the studies show that obviously there is a difference between domain experts, method
experts, and students on the “baseline" (initial) model, but when it comes to model the
changes with evolution rules, there is no significant difference.
The proposed framework is not only applicable to requirements model, but also other
system models like risk assessment. The framework has been adapted to deal with evolving
risks in long-lived software systems at a high level of abstraction. It thus could work with
many existing risk-assessment methods.
In summary, the contribution of this dissertation to the early phase of system develop-
ment should allow system designers to improve the evolution resilience of long-lived sys-
tems.
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INTRODUCTION
“...There are known unknowns: that is to say,
there are things that we now know we don’t know..."
Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense
This chapter presents the motivation of this dissertation. It also summarizes the ma-
jor contributions of this work, as well as published/in submission publications on
which the dissertation is built.
T
HE term software evolution has been introduced in 1980 by Lehman in his work[Leh80a;
Leh80b], and was widely adopted since the 90s. In the domain of software systems
[Pro96; Has+05; LL98; Rus+99; ZO97], evolution refers to a process of continually up-
dating software systems in accordance to changes in their working environments such as
business requirements, regulations and standards. Recent studies in software evolution at-
tempt to understand causes, processes, and effects of the phenomenon [AP03; KS99; LaM+08];
or focus on the methods and tools that manage the effects of evolution [Sof05; Sou+11;
Has+05]; or offset their effects in advance. The aim of this dissertation focuses on the last
setting.
A key observation underpinning this dissertation is that while some changes (i.e., evo-
lution) are unpredictable, many others can be predicted albeit with some uncertainty be-
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cause they will be the result of a process. A representative example is Air Traffic Manage-
ment (ATM). The increment in both quantity and complexity of air traffic requires a better
collaboration among ATM systems and actors across air spaces and nations. To address this
requirement, Europe has launched several long-term projects 1 2 and programs 3 4, which
include: introducing new cooperation regulations, ATM business processes; improving ex-
isting ATM systems (e.g., Arrival Management – AMAN, Department Management – DMAN);
introducing new infrastructure for information interchange (i.e., System Wide Information
Management – SWIM[Adm09]), and so on. The requirements of these systems may evolve in
many directions and at different levels from organizational, architectural, to operational as-
pects. Such evolutions are known to be possible, yet unknown whether they would happen:
the known unknowns.
Unfortunately, a company that produces or procures software for these systems cannot
wait until all unknowns in the standardization [old: SWIM standardization] become known.
The process of tendering and organizational restructuring requires a significant amount of
time and planning. Therefore decision makers must essentially bet on the final solution
and possibly minimize the risks that the solution (i.e., design alternative, implementation
choice) would turn out to be wrong and require last minute acquisitions. For instance, while
the European Single European Sky ATM Research Initiative (SESAR) and the United State
Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), in [Pro08; Fed09; Adm09], have listed a number of design
alternatives for SWIM (both architectural and technical), which satisfy different high level
decisions, still there is no means to support the choice of an optimal alternative that could
minimize the risk of wrong local choices.
While many approaches have been proposed to perform the management or consistency
checking on requirements evolution, there has been less effort on delivering an explicit mod-
eling and reasoning framework to assist decision makers to select a good design alternative.
In the realm of requirements evolution, a “good" design alternative is an evolution-resilient
one. An evolution-resilient design alternative, in the context of this dissertation, is under-
stood as a design alternative that has more chances to be operational even if evolution hap-
pens, or requires less modification to be operational due to evolution.
We need to capture what Loucopoulos and Kavakli [LK99] identify as the knowledge
about “what the current state is", “where the desired state to-be is in the future", and “alter-
1http://www.sesarju.eu/
2http://www.swim-suit.aero/swimsuit/
3http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/arrival-manager
4http://www.eurocontrol.int/surveillance/cascade
1.1. CONTRIBUTIONS 5
native designs" for the desired future state. In this respect, it is important to provide a sound
quantitative analysis, which is one of the current weaknesses (see Dalal et al. [Dal+04] for a
discussion) of many existing approaches.
As an effort to bridge the gap, this thesis proposes a framework that provides support for
modeling and reasoning about the uncertainty of requirements evolution, and at the utmost
importance, assisting the decision makers in the selection of a “good" design alternative with
respect to evolution.
1.1 Contributions
The major contribution of this dissertation is a framework dealing with evolution in require-
ments models. The proposed framework includes:
• A set of notions to model the uncertainty of requirements evolution. We propose evolu-
tion rules, which include observable rule and controllable rule, as a mean to capture the
uncertainty in requirements evolution. The former kind captures potential evolution
and its uncertainty. The latter kind captures different design alternatives that fulfill re-
quirements. These evolution rules are used to capture the evolution in requirements
models at high level of abstraction. They could be adapted to different requirements
engineering languages.
• A set of quantitative metrics for reasoning on the evolution uncertainty. With respect
to evolution, we propose three quantitative metrics to assess how well a design alter-
native could be able to resist to evolution. In other word, we measure the probability
by which the implementation of a system using the given design alternative could be
operational when evolution happens. The proposed metrics are based on evolution
rules. Therefore they could be also applied to abstract requirements model.
• A series of algorithm automating the reasoning. To make the proposed framework more
feasible in practice, we develop a series of algorithms that automate the reasoning on
requirements evolution. To maintain the generality of the framework, we propose hy-
pergraph as a means to express requirements models. Based on hypergraph the algo-
rithms enumerate possible design alternatives and calculate their metrics values. Thus
it could help to facilitate the decision making process.
• A prototype of proof-of-concept CASE tool. We implement a prototype of a CASE tool
as a proof-of-concept for the proposed framework. The CASE tool allows users to cus-
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tomize graphical constructs that are used to model requirements models. It also im-
plements the proposed algorithms to perform automated reasoning on requirements
evolution.
• A modeling and reasoning approach on risk evolution. We extend the proposed ap-
proach for requirements evolution to the realm of risk management. We propose a
generic method to select cost-effective countermeasures for software risks based on
risk graph. We then adapt evolution rules to cope with evolution in risk graphs, and
integrate the proposed metrics to the reasoning process to select cost-effective and
evolution-resilient countermeasures for risks in software systems.
1.2 Terminology
Evolution Potential changes make to software artifacts (e.g., requirements models) after de-
ployment of system-to-be.
Evolution uncertainty The uncertainty of whether an evolution actually applies to given
circumstances.
Requirements evolution Potential changes make to requirements after deployment of system-
to-be.
System-to-be The system as it should be when it will be built and operated.
System-to-be-next After deployment of system-to-be, new requirements or problems may
arise. We may need to consider the next system versions are likely to be. The system
versions beyond the system-to-be are the systems-to-be-next.
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized into four parts. The first part focuses on the introductory basics
consisting of following chapters:
• Chapter 1: Introduction . This chapter presents the motivation and the summarize of
major contributions of this dissertation.
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• Chapter 2: Research Roadmap . This chapter discusses the global research questions
that drive the research plan for this dissertation. This chapter also summarizes the pro-
posed framework to deal with requirements evolution, as well as how various artifacts
in later chapters are fitted into the framework.
• Chapter 3: State-of-the-Art . This chapter discusses in detail related works in the field
of requirements evolution. Particularly, it presents different approaches in require-
ments evolution modeling, requirements evolution management, and relevant analy-
sis techniques, such as inconsistency checking, change impact analysis. The chapter
also gives a comparison between the proposed framework and its closed approaches
in the literature.
Referred publication(s): This chapter has been partially published in:
– Michael Felderer, Basel Katt, Philipp Kalb, Jan Jürjens, Martín Ochoa, Federica Paci, Le Minh Sang
Tran, Thein Than Tun, Koen Yskout, Riccardo Scandariato, Frank Piessens, Dries Vanoverberghe,
Elizabeta Fourneret, Matthias Gander, Bjørnar Solhaug, and Ruth Breu. “Evolution of Security
Engineering Artifacts: A State of the Art Survey”. In: International Journal of Secure Software
Engineering (2014). To appear.
• Chapter 4: Application Scenarios . This chapter summarizes the two scenarios that
we employ to illustrate the proposed framework, and to conduct evaluation studies.
The scenarios are both extracted from the ATM domain. The first one, which is taken
from the SecureChange FP7 project, concerns the evolution of both business processes
and support-tools of Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs), particularly, changes in the arrival
management process and the introduction of Arrival Manager (AMAN). The second
scenario is taken from the SWIM project where evolution occurs at the infrastructure
for information interchange and collaboration among ATM systems across airspaces
and nations.
The second part presents the body of framework that is conveyed in following chapters:
• Chapter 5: The Proposed Framework . This chapter presents the framework, which
includes a modeling approach (with evolution rules) and reasoning approach (with
evolution metrics). Evolution rules have two kinds: observable rule to capture the evo-
lution of requirements, and controllable rule to capture the reaction of designers to
address such evolution by various choices to implement a system. This chapter also
presents a game-theoretic interpretation for the semantics of the evolution probabil-
ity. Evolution metrics are Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief, which are
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to assess quantitatively design alternatives, and hence, to facilitate the selection of an
evolution-resilient design alternative.
Referred publication(s): This chapter has been partially published in:
– Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. “Dealing with Known Unknowns: Towards a Game-
Theoretic Foundation for Software Requirement Evolution”. In: Proceedings of the 23th Confer-
ence On Advanced Information Systems Engineering (CAiSE’11). 2011, pp. 62–76
– Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. Dealing with Known Unknowns: a General Approach for
Modeling and Reasoning on Requirements Evolution. Tech. rep. (to be submitted to the Software
and Systems Modeling (SOSYM) journal). University of Trento, 2013
• Chapter 6: Automated Reasoning Support . This chapter presents a set of algorithms
that automates the analysis and the incremental calculation of metrics described in
chapter 5. Requirements models and evolution rules are represented by a hypergraph
structure. The algorithms perform calculation and propagation values from leaf nodes
to the root. The propagated values at the root are used to calculate values of the met-
rics. This chapters also presents the computational complexity of the proposed algo-
rithms with proofs.
Referred publication(s): This chapter under submission, which is part of:
– Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. Dealing with Known Unknowns: a General Approach for
Modeling and Reasoning on Requirements Evolution. Tech. rep. (to be submitted to the Software
and Systems Modeling (SOSYM) journal). University of Trento, 2013
• Chapter 7: Unicorn: Tooling and the First (Self) Evaluation . This chapter provides an
overview about the proof-of-concept CASE tool, namely UNICORN, that implements
the modeling and reasoning described in previous chapters. UNICORN takes advan-
tage on the Eclipse plugin infrastructure platform to enhance its extendability. The
tool is logically organized into two parts, one for modeling and another one for rea-
soning. Both are developed to maximize the extendability. We also discuss a perfor-
mance simulation of the proposed algorithms, as well as a self-evaluation study on a
large example taken from an industrial project.
Referred publication(s): This chapter has been published in:
– Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. “UNICORN: A Tool for Modeling and Reasoning on the
Uncertainty of Requirements Evolution”. In: CAiSE Forum. 2013, pp. 161–168
• Chapter 8: Empirical Evaluation of the Framework with Third-Party . This chapter
presents a series of empirical studies that aim to evaluate the modeling approach of
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the proposed framework. These studies follow the Goal-Question-Metric template and
orient to different types of participants: researchers, domain experts, and students. All
the studies lasted for more than a year. The important outcome from these studies
shows that the proposed framework is effective in capturing requirements evolution
of complex systems.
Referred publication(s): This chapter has been published in:
– Fabio Massacci, Deepa Nagaraj, Federica Paci, Le Minh Sang Tran, and Alessandra Tedeschi. “As-
sessing a Requirements Evolution Approach: Empirical Studies in the Air Traffic Management Do-
main”. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Empirical Requirements Engineering
(EmpiRE’12). 2012, pp. 49–56
– Fabio Massacci, Federica Paci, Le Minh Sang Tran, and Alessandra Tedeschi. “Assessing a Re-
quirements Evolution Approach: Empirical Studies in the Air Traffic Management Domain”. In:
Journal of Systems and Software (2013). Article in press
The third part shows how the proposed framework could be applied on other aspects of
software evolution. Therefore we aim to migrate the proposed framework in requirements
evolution into the realm of security risk management. We choose to adapt the framework
on the risk assessment process as the importance of early risk identification and mitigation
is well known. Since software systems might evolve, their risk pictures consequently might
also evolve. Nonetheless, most major approaches in the field do not explicitly support the
modeling and analysis on the evolution of risks. This drives the focus in the next part of the
dissertation that consists of following chapters:
• Chapter 9: Early Dealing with Evolving Risks in Software Systems . Founded on chapter
5, this chapter presents a risk-evolution approach that adapt the proposed framework
to early deal with evolving risks. The main objective is to assist the decision makers to
select an evolution-resilient countermeasure alternative with respect to evolving risks.
Referred publication(s): This chapter has been partially published in:
– Le Minh Sang Tran. “Early Dealing with Evolving Risks in Long-Life Evolving Software Systems”.
In: Advanced Information Systems Engineering Workshops – CAiSE Workshops. 2013, pp. 518–523
• Chapter 10: Selecting Cost-Effective Risk Countermeasures . This chapter proposes a
risk-graph based method to select cost-effective countermeasure alternative. We ex-
tend the risk graph to incorporate the risk mitigation information. We further apply
the risk-evolution approach in Chapter 9 to the proposed method to enable a more
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
fine-grain risk evolution modeling. Since risk graph is an abstraction of several model-
driven risk analysis techniques, this work provides an evidence that the proposed risk-
evolution approach could work on these risk analysis techniques.
The work in this chapter is supported by the Mobility Program of the NESSoS FP7
project, under the supervision of Prof. Ketil Stølen.
Referred publication(s): This chapter has been partially published in:
– Le Minh Sang Tran, Bjørnar Solhaug, and Ketil Stølen. “An Approach to Select Cost-Effective Risk
Countermeasures”. In: Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVII - 27th Annual IFIP WG
11.3 Conference, (DBSec 2013). 2013, pp. 266–273
Finally, the last part provides discussion with respect to research questions and success
criteria and conclusion for the dissertation:
• Chapter 11: Discussion . This chapter discusses the fulfillment of success criteria, as
well as how the proposed framework relates to the literate. This chapter also proposes
a potential steps to apply the framework in the software development process.
• Chapter 12: Conclusion . This chapter summarizes the major contributions of the dis-
sertation and describes possible future directions based on the results.
1.4 Publications
1.4.1 Publications Reported in the Dissertation
• Le Minh Sang Tran. “Requirement Evolution: Towards a Methodology and Frame-
work.” In: CAiSE Doctoral Consortium 2011. London, 2011
• Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. “Dealing with Known Unknowns: Towards a
Game-Theoretic Foundation for Software Requirement Evolution”. In: Proceedings of
the 23th Conference On Advanced Information Systems Engineering (CAiSE’11). 2011,
pp. 62–76
• Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. Dealing with Known Unknowns: a General Ap-
proach for Modeling and Reasoning on Requirements Evolution. Tech. rep. (to be sub-
mitted to the Software and Systems Modeling (SOSYM) journal). University of Trento,
2013
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• Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. “UNICORN: A Tool for Modeling and Reason-
ing on the Uncertainty of Requirements Evolution”. In: CAiSE Forum. 2013, pp. 161–
168
• Fabio Massacci, Deepa Nagaraj, Federica Paci, Le Minh Sang Tran, and Alessandra
Tedeschi. “Assessing a Requirements Evolution Approach: Empirical Studies in the
Air Traffic Management Domain”. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop
on Empirical Requirements Engineering (EmpiRE’12). 2012, pp. 49–56
• Fabio Massacci, Federica Paci, Le Minh Sang Tran, and Alessandra Tedeschi. “Assessing
a Requirements Evolution Approach: Empirical Studies in the Air Traffic Management
Domain”. In: Journal of Systems and Software (2013). Article in press
• Le Minh Sang Tran, Bjørnar Solhaug, and Ketil Stølen. “An Approach to Select Cost-
Effective Risk Countermeasures”. In: Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVII
- 27th Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Conference, (DBSec 2013). 2013, pp. 266–273
• Le Minh Sang Tran. “Early Dealing with Evolving Risks in Long-Life Evolving Software
Systems”. In: Advanced Information Systems Engineering Workshops – CAiSE Work-
shops. 2013, pp. 518–523
1.4.2 Additional Publications
• Viet Hung Nguyen and Le Minh Sang Tran. “Predicting Vulnerable Software Compo-
nents using Dependency Graphs”. In: International Workshop on Security Measure-
ment and Metrics (MetriSec’10). 2010
• Katsiaryna Labunets, Fabio Massacci, Federica Paci, and Le Minh Sang Tran. “An Ex-
perimental Comparison of Two Risk-Based Security Methods”. In: Proceedings of the
ACM / IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measure-
ment (ESEM). 2013
• Le Minh Sang Tran and Fabio Massacci. An Approach for Decision Support on the Un-
certainty in Feature Model Evolution. Tech. rep. (under submission to CAiSE’14). Uni-
versity of Trento, 2013
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RESEARCH ROADMAP
This chapter presents the high level research questions for the whole dissertation, as
well as success criteria for research questions. The chapter also provides an overview
of the proposed framework in this work to address those questions.
T
HIS chapter characterizes the problem and the global research questions of this dis-
sertation, and the research activities to address these questions. This chapter is orga-
nized as follows. Section 2.1 presents problem characterization and research ques-
tions that drive the rest of the dissertation. Section 2.2 shows the evaluation strategies for
invented artifacts. Section 2.3 briefly discusses the proposed framework in this work. Finally
Section 2.4 summarizes the chapter.
2.1 Problem Characterization and Research Questions
2.1.1 The Need of Managing the Evolution Uncertainty of Requirements
Models
Long-lived systems are built to satisfy a set of mandatory requirements in a period of time,
and operate under assumptions of working environment and context. However, reality might
change and evolve. Nowadays, evolution is an inevitable phenomenon [Set+04] [Lam09b,
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Chap. 6] during the life time of a long-lived software systems due to the dynamic of their
working environments. Consequently, software systems might be unstable or non-operational.
Evolution refers to potential changes in future to software artifacts such as requirements
models. Requirements evolution could be understand as potential future changes to require-
ments models, for example, new requirements might arise, some current requirements may
become obsoleted. Such changes could cause the systems stop working properly and lead to
significant economic loss. Fortunately, we can anticipate possibilities of these changes with
the help of expertise knowledge in the domain. They are known, but which possibilities of
changes could happen is unknown. Hence, a key point of evolution is its uncertainty. Evo-
lution might or might not occur due to some external factors such as changes in regulation,
law, and standards. These factors usually cannot be controlled by either software developers
or stakeholder. The uncertainty of evolution however could be partially predicted with the
aid of domain expertise knowledge, for instance ATM experts could foresee new standards,
regulations in the ATM domain in next few years. The likelihood of occurrence of evolution
thus could be estimated.
As requirements might change and evolve over time, systems might be non-operational
because some mandatory requirements are not satisfied. It is essential for long-lived sys-
tems that they need to be still operational during their lifetime. Requirements evolution thus
should be taken into account during the software development process. However, many ex-
isting requirements modeling languages (e.g., Tropos, KAOS) provide neither notations nor
tools to capture evolution in requirements models.
There are some efforts to extend these original modeling languages to support the evo-
lution in software development [CH11; MD00; FB01]. However, none of them pays attention
to the uncertainty of evolution. Additionally, these studies are still lacking of a systematic
and quantitative reasoning to support decision makers in order to choose a system design
alternative that is more resilient to potential evolution.
An evolution-resilient design alternative, in the context of this dissertation, is understood
as a design alternative that has more chances to be operational even if evolution happens,
or requires less modification to be operational due to evolution.
2.1.2 Research Questions and Success Criteria
The ultimate objective is to provide a framework that leverages on the uncertainty of evo-
lution to aid the selection of evolution-resilient design alternatives. For this objective, we
target following research questions in this dissertation:
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Table 2.1: Success Criteria.
RQ Success Criteria
RQ1
SC1 A modeling approach that is:
SC1.1 Able to effectively capture the requirements evolution and its uncertainty.
SC1.2 Accompanied with a formal semantics of the evolution uncertainty.
SC1.3 Potentially applicable to a variety of requirements and system models.
RQ2
SC2 A reasoning approach that is:
SC2.1 To provide a set of metrics with formal semantics for reasoning about evolu-
tion uncertainty.
SC2.2 Able to automate (with formal analysis and tool-support) the reasoning that
can enumerate and quantitatively assess individual design alternatives.
SC2.3 Able to support the incremental modeling of evolution.
RQ1 How to effectively capture the uncertainty of evolution in requirements models and its
uncertainty?
RQ2 How to perform reasoning about the evolution uncertainty to support decision makers?
To satisfy the above questions, we propose a framework that could capture the require-
ments evolution and evolution uncertainty. The framework provides a quantitative analysis
that support the identification and assessment of design alternatives. To facilitate the evalu-
ation of the proposed framework, in Table 2.1 we identify several success criteria with respect
to research questions. The details are as follows:
Addressing RQ1. The proposed framework should include a modeling approach that is:
• SC1.1 Able to effectively capture the requirements evolution and its uncertainty. The
modeling approach should take into account a key issue in requirements evolution,
identified by Lam and Loomes [LL98], which is multiple change. This issue refers
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to the situation that there are many parallel, competing changes. To address future
changes, a requirements model is revised to a new revision. Due to parallel and com-
peting changes, the new revision could have many variants. When evolution actually
happens, only one variant holds.
An important assumption that drives the modeling approach is that we only consider
predictable changes (i.e., the known) whose occurrences are not sure for 100%, but
could be estimated at some level of uncertainty (i.e., the unknown). We do not take
into account unknown changes that could not be predicted, and their occurrences
are unknown as well. In short, this work focuses on known-unknown evolution, not
unknown-unknown ones, which are analyzed in different direction (see works of Ernst
et al. [Ern+11; Ern+09]).
• SC1.2 Accompanied with a formal semantics of the evolution uncertainty. The evolu-
tion uncertainty is represented as evolution probability. This probability has clearly
not a frequentist because we cannot measure the frequency of an evolution since it
might occur only once. Thus it is necessary to an interpretation of evolution uncer-
tainty to understand the semantics of this uncertainty. Such interpretation and under-
standing are very helpful for elicitation and evaluation of acquired evolution uncer-
tainty.
• SC1.3 Potentially applicable to a variety of requirements and system models. There are
many existing Requirements Engineering (RE) languages for modeling requirements.
The modeling approach does not aim to provide a new RE language, but it should be a
set of notions and concepts that could be able to adapt to a particular RE language and
make it possible to deal with evolution. Evolution might happen not only in require-
ments models, but also in other system models such as product line modeling or risk
assessment. It thus is better that the modeling approach could be adapted to support
the modeling of evolution also for other kinds of artifacts.
Addressing RQ2. The proposed framework should include a reasoning approach that is:
• SC2.1 To provide a set of metrics with formal semantics for reasoning about evolution
uncertainty. It is important that the reasoning approach could facilitate the selection
of evolution-resilient design alternatives. For this purpose, it is necessary to have a set
of metrics that quantitatively estimate to what level of evolution-resilience a design
alternative could be. The metrics should also be backed up with a formal semantics.
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• SC2.2 Able to automate (with formal analysis and tool-support) the reasoning that can
enumerate and quantitatively assess individual design alternatives. Requirements mod-
els are usually big and complex, so does the requirement evolution. It is also important
that the reasoning is automated (fully or partially). Thus the proposed reasoning ap-
proach should include a set of algorithms that enumerate design alternatives, as well
as calculate the metrics for each design alternative.
• SC2.3 Able to support the incremental modeling of evolution. While developing com-
plex software systems, the iteration approach is usually preferred than the legacy wa-
terfall approach. Therefore the process of modeling and reasoning about requirements
evolution could also have several iterations where changes are identified incremen-
tally. The reasoning approach therefore should be support the incremental modeling
of evolution. It should efficiently deal with this incremental behavior rather than start
over the analysis from ground up.
2.2 Strategies for Evaluation
In this section we discuss some evaluation activities that are usually taken into consideration
while evaluating an RE methodology or artifact. These evaluation activities are described as
follows:
E1 Self-evaluation study (sometimes called “case study”): the author(s) of the research
applies the methodology or use the artifact in a complex, real life scenario. The pur-
pose of this study is to show that the artifact can capture most of the important fea-
tures of the scenario. This approach is used in [Bry+09; Sol+07; Erd+13].
E2 Empirical study: the author(s) of the research conduct empirical study(ies) with third
people who apply the methodology or use the artifact in complex, real life scenar-
ios. The purpose of this study is to show how other people could use the proposed
methodology (or artifact) to capture most of the important features of the scenarios.
This approach is used to study other characteristics of the methodology (or artifact)
such as effectiveness, applicability, perceived ease of use, intend to use. This approach
is used in [Ncu+07; MR05; Mai+04; Vil+10].
E3 Formal semantics: the author(s) of the artifact proposes an independently motivated
formal artifacts that can be used to characterize some features of the original artifact.
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Table 2.2: Evaluation activities to fulfill success criteria.
Modeling Reasoning
SC1.1 SC1.2 SC1.3 SC2.1 SC2.2 SC2.3
E1 Self-evaluation study X X X
E2 Empirical study X X X
E3 Formal semantics X X X
E4 Tool construction X X X X
E5 Algorithmic complexity analysis X X
E6 Simulation experimental algorith-
mic analysis
X
The purpose of this evaluation is to show that the mathematical underpinnings of the
original artifact can be explained and characterized by a known framework. This ap-
proach is used in [Jür02; Hau+03; LS06]
E4 Tool construction: the author(s) of the artifact constructs a proof-of-concept tool that
implements the artifact. This is to partially show the applicability of the artifact. It
might be also used to study the empirical applicability of the artifact (e.g., via empirical
simulation). This approach is used in [Dal11; Ali10].
E5 Algorithmic complexity analysis: the purpose of this evaluation activity is to show the
worst case complexity of the approach and to identify the cause of intractability. This
approach is used in [Mas+06].
E6 Simulation experimental algorithmic analysis: the purpose of this evaluation activity
is to provide an approximation to the performance of the proposed algorithms. This
approach is used in [Dal11].
Not all evaluation activities are equally suited or equally accepted to prove the efficacy
and applicability of a research artifact. For example in RE, a Self-evaluation study (E1) and
a Tool construction (E4) are the most popular evaluation techniques followed by a Formal
semantics (E3) and frequently by empirical studies [CF+09].
In contrast, for reasoning techniques Formal semantics (E3) and Algorithmic complexity
analysis (E5) are studied first followed by Tool construction (E4) and Simulation experimen-
tal algorithmic analysis (E6). This diverse preference for evaluation can be explained by the
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diverse expectations of the corresponding artifacts: a modeling artifact is expected to “ease”
the work of the analyst and hence it is crucial for Self-evaluation study (E1) and Empirical
study (E2). On the opposite side, a reasoning algorithm should not be sensitive to the human
pressing the button, but only to the “shape" of the problem (i.e., problem dependence, not
human dependence). In Table 2.2 we have clustered the evaluation activities in two groups
(one for modeling and another one for reasoning).
2.3 Framework Overview
Figure 2.1 presents an overview about the proposed framework and various activities to eval-
uate it. In the figure, the framework artifacts are represented by rectangles, and evaluation
activities are depicted as parallelograms connected to relevant artifacts. The input of the
framework is a requirements model in a particular RE language and anticipated evolution
with its likelihoods of occurrences. The output of the framework is a set of design alterna-
tives quantified by evolution metrics. Below we describe the artifacts of the framework:
• Evolution Rules (see Section 5.1) to serve as concepts and notations to capture the evo-
lution in requirements models at high level of abstraction.
• Game-Theoretic Interpretation (see Section 5.2) for the evolution uncertainty. The evo-
lution uncertainty, which is further referred to as evolution probability, is the belief of
domain experts about the chance to be materialized of evolution in future. It is a kind
of subjective probability. Thus we need a semantics backing up for evolution proba-
bility that could be helpful to facilitate the elicitation and evaluation of these probabil-
ities. This interpretation is also used to provide the semantics of evolution metrics.
• Evolution Metrics (see Section 5.3) that leverages on evolution uncertainty to support
the decision makers in the selection of evolution-resilient design alternatives for the
system. The evolution-resilience is defined as the probabilities to be operational re-
gardless of evolution. The semantics of evolution metrics are also accounted by the
game-theoretic interpretation.
• Hypergraph Requirements Model (see Section 6.1) We employ hypergraph to represent
requirements models. This structure is not a substitution of any existing RE languages,
but it could capture necessary information for the automated reasoning. Thus it could
be transformed from a requirements model expressing in a particular RE language.
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Figure 2.1: The framework overview and associated evaluation activities.
When transforming requirements models into hypergraphs, only requirements and
necessary information about requirements satisfaction are transformed.
• Incremental Algorithms (see Chapter 6 ) to automate the enumeration of design alter-
natives and the calculation of evolution metrics. These algorithms take a hypergraph
requirements model as input.
Figure 2.1 also illustrates various activities to evaluate the proposed framework. The or-
der of evaluation activities in the figure does not represent the actual order of execution of
these activities.
• Provide formal semantics (E3, see Section 5.2–5.4). We have provided a formal seman-
tic for the proposed evolution rules and evolution metrics. This is to ensure that they
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do make sense. We also provided a formal mathematic model to back up the proposed
metrics.
• Perform formal analysis (E5, see Section 6.3, 6.4). To evaluate the algorithms, we de-
scribed a set of mathematical properties and their proof of the algorithms. The details
of properties and algorithms are presented in Section 6.4. To evaluate that the devel-
oped algorithms could be applied to different RE languages, we have proposed several
transformation patterns transforming i*, KAOS, and SysML requirements models to
hypergraphs. We also adapt the proposed framework in i* language to conduct the
empirical studies mentioned above.
• Implement CASE tool (E4, see Chapter 7 ). To further evaluate the framework, we have
implemented a CASE tool, namely UNICORN. The tool consists of a Graphical User
Interface (GUI) for hypergraph requirement model, and an implementation of the al-
gorithms.
• Provide model and case study (E1, see Section 7.4, 7.5). We have conducted a self-
evaluation study to evaluate the proposed framework. We applied the proposed frame-
work to model the evolution in a requirements model of a case study taken from an
industrial project. Notably, here the term “case study”, which is also used by other RE
researchers, is different from the case study used in the field of empirical experiments
(see further Table 3.1).
• Run simulation (E6, see Section 7.4). We have run a simulation on an implementa-
tion of the algorithms. The simulation is to study the empirical performance of the
algorithms with respect to the complexity of input hypergraphs (or the complexity of
requirements models).
• Conduct empirical studies (E2, see Chapter 8 ). To evaluate the high level semantics
of the evolution rules we have conducted an empirical study with domain experts to
obtain their feedback about using evolution rules to model requirements evolution.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we have conducted other
empirical studies with researchers, domain experts, and master students.
• Adapt the framework to evolving risks (E1, see Chapter 9 , 10). We demonstrate the
applicability of the proposed framework in other field of software engineering rather
than RE by apply the proposed framework to deal the evolution of risks in long-lived
system.
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2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the research objective of this dissertation. The objective was re-
fined into three research questions. The focus of the research questions was to propose a
framework that supports modeling and reasoning about the uncertainty of evolution in re-
quirements models; and how to evaluate the proposed framework. Based on the research
questions, we have elaborated an overview of the proposed framework with various artifacts
needed for the framework, as well as different aspects to evaluate it. The next Chapter 3 will
provide a background about different evolution perspectives and summarize studies that are
relevant for this dissertation.
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This chapter provides a background about different evolution perspectives that we
address in this work. The chapter also briefly summarizes relevant studies in the field
of requirements evolution, as well as empirical studies on requirements from which
we learn to conduct evaluation study for the proposed framework. We also briefly re-
view studies in the risk assessment area where we later adapt the proposed framework
to early address evolving risks.
P
AST studies do strongly impact present work. Thus in this chapter we briefly review
recent studies relating to the purpose to understand the status of the art. Based
on this understanding we build the proposed framework. This chapter is organized
as follows. Section 3.1 presents a background about different evolution perspectives. Sec-
tion 3.2 reviews past studies in the field of requirements evolution. Section 3.3 reviews em-
pirical studies on requirements. Section 3.4 review studies in the field of risk analysis. Sec-
tion 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.1 Evolution Perspectives
Evolution in a requirements model is basically studied within a time period. This study pe-
riod may be short (one year), or very long (ten years or more) depending on the life time of
23
24 CHAPTER 3. STATE-OF-THE-ART
the software system. Depended on the scenarios about how to study evolution, we have dif-
ferent evolution perspectives. Lund et al. [Lun+11a, Chap. 15] describe three evolution per-
spectives in risk analysis, including: maintenance, before-after, continuous evolution. Out of
these, the maintenance evolution perspective mostly relates to the outdate of a document
(e.g., requirements model) of an existing system. Since this work mostly focuses on the early
solution of requirements evolution, this evolution perspective is not being considered in this
work.
We can adapt the last two evolution perspectives in the proposed framework to deal with
evolution in requirements models as follows.
• Before-After evolution perspective predicts future contexts by anticipating planned and
unplanned changes in the current requirements models at the end of the study period.
Multiple possibilities of evolutions are considered. Each can have its own likelihood of
occurrence. For example, the ATM 2000+ Strategic Agenda [Eur03] and SESAR Initia-
tive [SES08] have outlined the direction of the ATM developments in a period 2010 to
2020 to have one or more of variants of new queue management tools including Arrival
Manager (AMAN), Departure Manager (DMAN) or Surface Manager (SMAN).
• Continuous evolution perspective predicts the evolution of the current context over
time based on planned gradual changes. In this perspective, the entire study period
is divided into several milestones. At each milestone, potential changes in the require-
ments model are anticipated. Multiple possibilities of evolution are also allowed.
The major difference between this continuous evolution perspective and the one with
similar name described in [Lun+11a, Chap. 15] is that: while the latter considers only one
possibility of evolution at certain time points in future; the former enables multiple possi-
bilities of evolution at certain time points. The former will collapse to the latter if there is
only one possibility of evolution in each time point. Therefore, the definition of continuous
evolution perspective here is the generalization of Lund et al. [Lun+11a]’s one.
Figure 3.1 visualizes the evolution perspectives. In this figure, a requirements model is
depicted as a cloud. Figure 3.1(a) illustrates the before-after evolution perspective where
a requirements model might evolve to one of possibilities models at the end of the study
period. Meanwhile, Figure 3.1(b) exemplifies the continuous evolution perspective. In this
illustration, at time t0 the original requirements model is RM0, which can evolve to one of
RMi at time t1. The evolution continuously happens. And at the end of the study period,
time tn , the origin model could be one of RMk j .
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Figure 3.1: The evolution perspectives of requirements evolution.
3.2 Studies on Requirements Evolution
Lam and Loomes [LL98] present the EVE (Evolution Engineering) framework, which includes
a meta model and a process model to deal with requirements evolution. They classify changes
into the following types:
• Environment change (E-change): these are changes that occur within the environment
where the target software system is working, e.g., the introduction of new laws, changes
in business agreement.
• Requirement change (R-change): these are changes in requirements and derived from
environment changes, e.g., new requirements arrive, current requirements are modi-
fied or deleted.
• Viewpoint change (V-change) also called ‘impact’: these are impacts on the ‘life’ of
stakeholders once R-changes are implemented. For example, the introduction of AMAN
will change the way the arrival sequence is computed (i.e., instead of computed by the
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PLC); the SWIM will change the way of communication from telephone-based to an
ICT-based infrastructure among ATM actors.
• Design change (D-change): these are changes in the design of the system implied by
requirement change, e.g., the introduction or removal of a function, control.
The authors also mention seven key issues that need to be addressed by requirements
evolution studies. Those issues include:
• Modeling evolution: this is the most important and a fundamental issue. This refers to
the way to model, represent, and reason about evolutions.
• Change analysis: this is to study about the nature of change to answer ‘why’ and ‘where
from’ questions about changing requirements.
• Impact assessment approaches: this is to assess the impact of changing requirements
on other domains, such as social, environmental and cultural issues.
• Risk assessment: this refers to risk assessment in relation to requirements changes.
• Multiple change: this is the ability to consider many changes that are parallel, and
possibly competing. These changes may be originated from environmental changes.
• Extended traceability: this is concerned with establishing relationships between engi-
neering artifacts during software maintenance.
• Tool support: this is concerned with tool to provide support for requirements evolution
such as change management tool, traceability tool, and so on.
We can broadly classify relevant studies about requirements evolution into impact of evo-
lution, and reaction on evolution with respect to their major contributions. Studies on the
impact of evolution aim at identifying potential consequences on artifacts (such as models,
specifications) and violation of consistency or security properties. Studies on the reaction to
evolution propose reactions to requirements evolution. Bellow we briefly review the related
studies.
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3.2.1 Studies on Impacts of Evolution
Russo et al. [Rus+99] propose an analysis and revision approach to restructure requirements
to detect inconsistency and manage changes. The main idea is to allow evolutionary changes
to occur first, and then in the next step, verify their impact on requirements satisfaction.
The restructuring includes three activities: (1) decomposing the specification into parts, (2)
representing those parts within viewpoints (in four templates: hierarchic tree, input-output
flow, data-flow diagram, state transition diagram), and (3) enriching the viewpoints with
rules that express relationships between different specification fragments. The impact anal-
ysis includes steps to check consistency and completeness, tracking changes in the original
requirements specification. However, their approach is manually performed.
Hassine et al. [Has+05] present an approach to change impact analysis, which refers to
identify potential consequences of a change, or estimate what needs to be modified to ac-
complish a change. Their approach applies both slicing and dependency analysis at the Use
Case Map specification level to identify the potential impact of requirements changes on
the overall system. The resulting output includes scenarios and components that subject
to change. Chechik et al. [Che+09] and Lin et al. [Lin+09] focus on change propagation.
Chechik et al. [Che+09] assist users in propagating changes across requirements, design,
and implementation artifacts. They use the UML model-based approach and provide auto-
mated propagation for changes between requirements and design models via relationships
between them. The relationship between models are formalized by OCL rules. The auto-
mated change propagation between models localizes the regions in models that should be
modified. However, the work is limited to activity diagrams and sequence diagrams of UML
language. Lin et al. [Lin+09] capture requirements changes as series of changes in specifi-
cations. They propose algorithms for managing all possible atomic requirements changes
to a sequence-based specification. The algorithms address atomic requirements changes
and push them through changes in specifications, maintain old specifications over time and
evolved into new specifications with least rework.
Fabbrini et al. [Fab+07] work on requirements expressed in natural language. They ad-
dress the inconsistency between requirements that belong to different evolutionary stages
(or evolution steps). Their approach employs Formal Concept Analysis theory to verity the
requirements consistency. Requirements of different evolutionary stages have a traceability
link to others. By checking the inconsistency, they may detect the error in evolution from
one requirement in a stage to another requirement in a different stage.
The authors in [Pro12; Ber+11] present the SECMER methodology for requirements evo-
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lution management developed in the context of the SecureChange project 1. The methodol-
ogy addresses the before-after evolution perspective and provides support for:
• Modeling requirements evolution: requirements models of the ‘before’ or ‘after’ situa-
tion are depicted in the Si* language.
• Change management based on evolution rules: security properties are modeled as
patterns by Si* language. Any changes made to the requirements model is checked
with the argument validity to detect the violations or fulfilment of security properties.
If a security property is violated, an alert prompting human intervention is automati-
cally issued with possibly suggested corrective actions.
• Argumentation-based security analysis: this provides evidence if a security property is
preserved by evolution or not.
3.2.2 Studies on Reaction on Evolution
Apart from the above approaches that aim to manage requirements evolution (such as check-
ing inconsistency, propagating changes, and change impact) at design time. There exists a
number of approaches aiming to support the system evolution driven by requirements evo-
lution [Bri+06; ZO97; Sou+11; Ern+11]. Some of these works focus on the design phase while
others target the deployment and execution phases.
Brier et al. [Bri+06] present a manual change analysis process in which a situation ‘before-
the-change’ is changed into a situation ‘after-the-change’. They adopted the diagrammatic
notation from Problem Frame to model these situations. The approach however did not go
further with any specific reasoning for change rather captures the part of before model that
is changed.
Zowghi and Offen [ZO97] work at meta level to capture intuitive aspects of managing
changes to requirements models. Their approach involves modeling requirements models
as theories and reasoning changes by mapping changes between models.
Among the work focusing on run-time, Souza et al. [Sou+11] propose a systematic method
for adaptive software system. In this approach, the dynamic behavior of the system is gov-
erned by of a set of (in)equations called qualitative differential constraints. The authors char-
acterize the controllability space for a software system defined in terms of a requirements
model, variation points, control variables and indicators. All of these are correlated with
qualitative differential constraints.
1http://www.securechange.eu/
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Table 3.1: Overview of Research Methodology
Evaluation Method Description
Case Study Monitor a phenomenon in its real context
Experiment Investigate a testable hypothesis
Survey Collect standardized information from a specific population
Ethnography Study a community and community’s members social interactions
Action Research Study the experience while solving a problem
Assertion Use ad-hoc evaluation techniques
Lessons Learned Examine qualitative data from complete projects
Benchmarking Test performance running several tests
Screening Feature-based evaluation done by a single individual
Effects Analysis Use expert opinion to assess the quantitative effects of methods/tools
Project Monitoring collect and store data during project development
Field Study Monitor and collect data about different projects simultaneously
Literature Research Analyze papers and other documents publicly available
Legacy Data Examine data from completed projects trying to identify trends
Ernst et al. [Ern+11] focus on unknown-unknown evolution, i.e., evolution that we do
not know what it is, and when it happens. Instead of finding a solution anticipating evolu-
tion, the authors in [Ern+11] study a class of algorithms using AI Truth Maintenance Systems
(ATMS) to find new solutions that use as much as possible of the old solution (i.e., maximize
familiarity), and minimize the number of tasks that need to be implemented (i.e., minimize
effort).
3.3 Studies on Empirical Evaluation
In order to have a glance on the types of empirical studies so that we can learn to conduct
the evaluation for the proposed framework (see Chapter 8 later), we first overview the exist-
ing empirical research methodologies and introduce a set of terms in the field of empirical
research. Then, we discuss the works reporting empirical studies on requirements evolution.
3.3.1 Empirical Research Methodologies
Different taxonomies [RH09; Eas+07; Kit96; ZW98; Bas+86] have been proposed to classify
empirical research methodologies in software engineering. In Table 3.1 we summarize the
major research methodologies from the taxonomies in [RH09; Eas+07; Kit96; ZW98; Bas+86].
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Runeson and Host [RH09] identify four classes of empirical research methods: case study,
which is an empirical inquery that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-
life context; survey that is a collection of standardized information from a specific population
by means of a questionnaire or interview; experiment is an investigation of a testable hypoth-
esis when one or more independent variables are manipulated to measure their effect on
one or more dependent variables; action research aims to solve a real-world problem while
simultaneously studying the experience of solving the problem. Easterbrook et al. [Eas+07]
also count ethnographic studies among the major research methodologies. Ethnographic re-
search studies based on field observations a community of people to understand how the
members of that community make sense of their social interactions. Kitchenham [Kit96]
also consider case study, experiment and survey as classes of empirical research methodolo-
gies, but it also identify screening, effects analysis, and benchmarking as classes of research
methods. Screening is a feature-based evaluation done by a single individual who not only
determines the features to be assessed and their rating scale but also does the assessment.
Effects analysis is a method that uses expert opinion to assess the quantitative effects of dif-
ferent methods and tools. Benchmarking is a process of running a number of standard test-
s/trials using a number of alternative tools/methods (usually tools) and assessing the relative
performance of the tools in those tests.
Zelkowitz and Wallace [ZW98] enrich the taxonomies proposed in [RH09; Eas+07; Kit96]
with new classes of empirical research methodologies: project monitoring, assertion, and
field study, literature research, legacy data, and lessons learned. Project monitoring focus on
the collection and storage of data that occurs during project development. An assertion is
an experiment where the designer of a new technology is both experimenter and subject
of study2. A field study monitors and collects data about different projects simultaneously.
Literature research analyzes papers and other documents publicly available. Legacy data
is method that examines data from completed projects trying to identify trends. Lessons
learned examine data from complete projects to identify qualitative aspects that can be used
to improve further developments.
3.3.2 Empirical Studies on Requirements Evolution
Below we briefly review studies that are closely related to the empirical studies, which are
later described in Chapter 8.
2A subject of study is an agent that is studied and collected data on.
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Villela et al. [Vil+10] present on quasi-experiment in the field of Ambient Assisted Liv-
ing to study the adequacy and feasibility of PLEvo-Scoping method [Vil+08]. That method is
based on a software evolution model to help requirements engineers and product managers
identify the unstable features of an embedded system and their potential needed adapta-
tions. It allows to identify and prioritize likely future adaptation needs and to select solu-
tions to deal with them. Their quasi-experiment follows the Goal-Question-Metric template
[BR88] and involves three kinds of roles: method expert, stakeholder, and domain expert.
The quasi-experiment took place in the form of two two-days workshops where two groups
consisting of three domain experts applied PLEvo-Scoping. The first part of each workshop
was dedicated to the presentation of the application domain, and the quasi-experiments
task. Both quantitative and qualitative measures were used to evaluate the adequacy and
the feasibility of the method. However, due to the small number of subjects, the authors
were not able to perform any statistical tests.
McGee and Greer [MG11] conducted a case study [RH09] to assess if a change taxonomy
proposed by the authors helps to understand the consequences of requirements change,
why and when it happens. The study was conducted during the execution of a software
development project in the government sector and involved 15 software developers and
analysts. Data on requirements changes were collected during the different phases of the
software development life cycle. The quality of changes was assessed by a researcher and a
project manager. The authors defined quantitative metrics to answer their research ques-
tions like the number of changes and the cost of changes and used hypothesis testing to
evaluate the hypotheses related to their research questions.
Another study on requirements evolution by Herrmann et al. [Her+] is one of the pioneer
in specifying the delta requirements without having to describe complete system in details.
Herrmann et al. investigates the applicability of TORE, a requirements engineering approach
to identify delta requirements for an engineering tool. Delta requirements refer to changes in
requirements identified when comparing the as-is system with the system-to-be. The study
measures improvements in the as-is-analysis, the to-be-analysis, and the prioritization of
requirements.
Maiden et al. [Ncu+07; MR05; Mai+04], have presented several case studies in the ATM
domain to validate RESCUE, a scenario-driven requirements engineering process. In the
studies, the authors ran several creativity workshops with ATM experts with different exper-
tise to study how RESCUE helps to discover stakeholder and system requirements. The work-
shops were organized in three main phases: a training phase about RESCUE, a brainstorm-
ing phase, and then an application phase where the experts applied RESCUE to discover re-
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quirements for different ATM tools (e.g., DMAN, CORA-2, and MSP). During the workshops,
color-coded idea cards, post-it notes, A3 papers have been used to collect the results. The
authors claimed that, although not all the workshop sessions were a success, the overall pro-
cess definitely was – as it helped to set up a common understanding and facilitated the in-
teraction among people involved.
3.4 Studies on Selecting Risk Countermeasures
Mehr and Forbes [MF73] suggest that “risk management theory needs to merge with tradi-
tional financial theory in order to bring added realism to the decision-making process". In
line with the suggestion, Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is often used with risk management to
assess the effectiveness of risk countermeasures [AP01; Boa+01; Sen00]. Major CBA steps
include: a) develop measures to mitigate a certain problem b) develop measure alternatives
c) estimate the impact and cost of each measure d) compare the benefit and costs for each
measure alternative e) conduct a sensitive analysis of the uncertainty of estimated benefit
and cost f ) recommend a cost-effective measure alternative for implementation.
In risk management, decision on different risk countermeasure alternatives has been
emphasized in many studies [Sto+02; Nor10; WHO09]. The guideline in [Sto+02] proposes
cost-benefit analysis to optimally allocate resources and implement cost-effective controls
after identifying all possible countermeasures. This encompasses the determination of the
impact of implementing (and not implementing) the countermeasures, and the estimated
costs of them. Another guideline [WHO09] provides a semi-quantitative risk assessment.
The probability and impact of risks are put into categories, which are assigned with scores.
The differences between the total score for all risks before and after any proposed risk re-
duction strategies relatively show the efficiency among strategies, and effectiveness of their
costs. It also suggests that the economic costs for baseline risks should be evaluated using
one of the following methods: Cost-Of-Illness, Willingness-To-Pay, Qualified-Adjusted Life
Years, Disability-Adjusted Life Years. These methods have been designed to assess cost of
risks, but not cost of countermeasures.
Butler [But02] proposes the Security Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM) to evaluate al-
ternative security designs. It employs a four-step process, namely benefit assessment, threat
index evaluation, coverage assessment, and cost analysis. This approach focuses mostly on
the consequence of risks rather than cost of countermeasures.
Chapman and Leng [CL04] describes a decision methodology to measure the economic
performance of risk countermeasure alternatives. The methodology is based on two kinds of
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analysis (baseline and sensitivity), four methods of economic evaluation, and a cost-accounting
framework. The cost is broken down into several dimensions and types. The advantage is
to provide a clear economic justification among countermeasure alternatives. However, it
does not differentiate alternatives based on their suitability to mitigate risks. In other words,
the methodology focuses on the cost-difference aspect but does not take into account the
benefit-difference (in terms of level of risks reduced) among alternatives.
There exist studies on Real Options Thinking [Kul+99; AK99; LS07] to articulate and com-
pare different security solutions in terms of their business value. These solutions however
are on the management aspect such as postpone, abandon, or continue to invest in secu-
rity. Norman [Nor10] advocates the use of Decision Matrix to agree on countermeasure al-
ternatives. A Decision Matrix is a simple spreadsheet, which contains a list of countermea-
sures, and a list of risks, which those countermeasures mitigate. For each countermeasure,
there are estimates with respect to cost, effectiveness, and convenience. The countermea-
sure effectiveness is measured by metrics contained within the Sandia Vulnerability Assess-
ment Model. That approach is however not clearly defined, and all metrics are developed as
spreadsheets, which are complicated to implement and follow.
Houmb et al. [Hou+12] introduce SecInvest, a security investment support framework
that derives a security solution fitness score to compare alternatives and decide whether
to invest or to take the associated risk. SecInvest relies on an eight-step trade-off analysis,
which employs existing risk assessment techniques for risk level. SecInvest scores alterna-
tives with respect to their cost and effect, trade-off parameters, and investment opportu-
nities. However, that approach does not provide a systematic way to assess the effects of
alternatives on risks, either not take into account the dependency among countermeasures
in an alternative.
Existing risk assessment methods, such as some mentioned above, mostly perform on a
target software system at a particular point in time. However, when software evolves, risks
might also evolve. Lund et al. [Lun+11b] and Solhaug and Seehusen [SS13] propose gen-
eral techniques and guidelines for managing risk in changing systems. In particular, they
proposed a risk assessment method for long-lived evolving system that includes assessment
steps, language for the modeling and documentation of changing risks, and techniques for
tracing evolution from requirements models to risk models. This is one of the pioneers in
the field of evolving risks.
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3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a background understanding about the state-of-the-art. In the sub-
sequent chapters, we will discuss about the application scenarios from which we exemplify
the notions and concepts of the proposed framework. These scenarios also serve for the
evaluation purpose of the framework.
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APPLICATION SCENARIOS
This chapter describes application scenarios taken from industrial projects in the
ATM domain. These scenarios are used to exemplify all principle and concepts in
the proposed framework, and to conduct a series of empirical studies to evaluate the
proposed framework.
I
N order to improve the comprehension of the proposed framework, we try to exemplify
as much as possible principles and concepts. All examples are taken from industrial
projects in the ATM domain. In this chapter we discuss application scenarios from
which examples are built. To the brevity, we only focus on parts of systems rather the en-
tire projects.
Software systems in the ATM domain usually are very long lasting lifetime and evolvable.
Due to the continuous increasing of the air traffic, as well as the increasing of security, de-
pendability, and performance requirements, these software systems have to face to many
kinds of changes during their long lifetime. These systems must be able to accommodate
for changes in the controlled process, such as improved aircraft performance, to host new
controller supporting tools, and be compatible with possible new control procedures and
rules applied by the controllers. Therefore, good designs that early consider (as much as
possible) potential future changes will increase the reliability of ATM systems and provide
smooth operations in air traffic controller.
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Table 4.1: Technical documents of the scenario.
Name Document Title Description
SC-D1.1(1) Description of the sce-
narios and their require-
ments
describes in detail the requirements for the ATM scenario.
Changes concerning to the introduction of AMAN are also
elaborated.
SWIM-D1.2.1(2) Information Content and
Service Requirements
describes an overview of SWIM, ATM information con-
tent requirements and services requirements.
SWIM-D1.6.1(2) SWIM Prototype Re-
quirements for Iteration
describes the system context that the SWIM will face and
support, including a set of usecases, scenarios where
SWIM integrates with other systems. Requirements for
the prototype iteration are also elaborated.
SWIM-D2.3.1(2) SWIM-SUIT information
models and services
describes existing ATM information systems, and future
SESAR ATM system, as well as the role of SWIM network
in the SESAR ATM architecture. Evolution of the SWIM
services is also elaborated.
SWIM-TECH(3) Segment 2 Technical
Overview
describes in detail the functional architecture of SWIM,
including architecture options, design solutions, and
technologies.
Sources:
(1)http://www.securechange.eu/content/deliverables
(2)http://www.swim-suit.aero/swimsuit/projdoc.php
(3)http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_
units/techops/atc_comms_services/swim/documentation/media/Segment%202/
SegmentTechnicalOverview_10709.pdf
We employ these scenarios in this dissertation because we have good contacts with prac-
titioners (each has more than 10-year experience in the ATM domain in the context of the
Secure Change project1. This would ease the conduction of the empirical evaluation, and
make the outcomes of the evaluation more realistic.
Table 4.1 presents a list of technical documents from which ATM scenarios are taken.
These documents are provided by Deep Blue Srl, an Italian consultancy company special-
ized in human factors, safety and evaluation of ATM concepts and systems, which actively
participates in the SESAR Initiative.
1http://www.securechange.eu/
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the SWIM scenario from which
illustrative examples for the framework are taken. Section 4.2 briefly presents the ATM ap-
plication scenarios that we employ to conduct a series of empirical evaluation studies to
evaluate the proposed framework.
4.1 The SWIM Scenario
The System Wide Information Management (SWIM) [Adm09] is an information manage-
ment infrastructure, which connects all ATM actors (both human and non-human) from
aircrafts to ground facilities. It allows seamless information interchange and the capability
of finding the most appropriate source of information while catering for information secu-
rity requirements.
FAA has proposed a logical architecture of SWIM that consists of several functional blocks.
Among these blocks, we focus on the possible evolution of the Enterprise Information Sys-
tem Security (ISS-ENT), and External Boundary Protection (BP)[Adm09, section 5.6]. To keep
the running example simple and illustrative, we only present a small subset of requirements
and requirements evolution of both ISS-ENT and BP. Interested readers are referred to [Adm09,
section 5.6] for further details.
The ISS-ENT plays as part of the underlying infrastructure used by enterprise systems.
The ISS-ENT includes two sub parts: Identities and Keys Management Infrastructure (IKMI)
and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The IKMI concerns the management of keys and iden-
tities of system entities including all SWIM’s actors (both human and non-human). The IDS
detects if there is intrusion within the network and thereby prevents potential attacks as
much as possible. The two corresponding requirements of IKMI and IDS are: Enable iden-
tities and keys management infrastructure (RQ-E1), and Enable intrusion detection (RQ-E2).
The BP controls the connection and information exchange between entities within en-
terprise systems, and with external entities. The corresponding requirement of BP is Enable
external boundary protection (RQ-B1).
Domain experts in the field of ATM have foreseen the potential changes in the working
environment where the number of actors (both airspace applications and ATM users) might
quickly increase. Consequently, both the ISS-ENT and BP might need to scale up with a large
number of entities to be managed. Due to such changes, the experts have identified sev-
eral possibilities that might occur. Then, changes in requirements and components to fulfill
requirements are identified in each possibility.
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Table 4.2: The evolution of ISS-ENT (including IKMI and IDS), BP, and their possible design
alternatives.
Part Possibility Belief Requirements Alternatives
IKMI IKMI-P1 10% RQ-E1 OpenLDAP (C1)
Oracle Identity Directory (C2)
IKMI-P2 20% RQ-E1, RQ-E3 C2
IKMI-P3 30% RQ-E1, RQ-E4 C1, Ad-hoc Singe-sign on (C3)
C2
IKMI-P4 40% RQ-E1, RQ-E3, RQ-E4 C2
IDS IDS-P1 60% RQ-E2 Host-based IDS (C4)
Network-based IDS (C5)
IDS-P2 40% RQ-E2, RQ-E5 C5
BP BP-P1 40% RQ-B1 Ad-hoc BP (C6)
Common-gateway BP (C7)
BP-P2 40% RQ-B1,RQ-B2 C6, C2, Centralized Policy Decision Point
(C8)
C7, C2,C8
BP-P3 20% RQ-B1,RQ-B2,RQ-B3 C7, C2,C8
Where: RQ-E1: Enable identities and keys management infrastructure, RQ-E2: Enable intru-
sion detection, RQ-E3: Support scalable IKMI , RQ-E4: Support Single sign-on (SSO), RQ-E5:
Support scalable, centralized intrusion detection, RQ-B1: Enable external boundary protec-
tion, RQ-B2: Support scalable BP, RQ-B3: Provide BP overall security assessment
Note: all numbers in this table are imaginary for the illustration purpose only.
Table 4.2 summarizes evolution possibilities, changes, and components to fulfill require-
ments in ISS-ENT and BP. The first column Part indicates different parts, namely, IKMI, IDS,
and BP, where evolution might occur. Since these parts are relatively independent, we as-
sume the evolution among them is independent. The second column Possibility lists pos-
sible scenarios (or possibilities) that evolution might happen in future. Each possibility is
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associated with an expertise belief that the corresponding scenario will happen; this belief is
denoted in the third column Belief. Notably, all belief numbers in this table are imaginary for
the illustration purpose. The two next columns (Requirements and Alternatives) describe re-
quirements with respect to evolution, and different design alternatives (or implementation
choices) to fulfill the requirements. Each alternative occupies one row in the table.
According to Table 4.2, IKMI could evolve to one of the four possibilities, namely IKMI-
P1, IKMI-P2, IKMI-P3, and IKMI-P4. The first possibility IKMI-P1 has one requirement RQ-E1
and indicates the scenario where no change happens in future. Its belief is 10%. It has two
design alternatives C1 and C2 respectively. In this table, we refer to Ci as component. The
second possibility IKMI-P2 indicates a future scenario that has the requirement RQ-E1 and
a new requirement Support scalable IKMI (RQ-E3). The third possibility IKMI-P3 indicates a
scenario that has RQ-E1 and a new requirement Support Single sign-on (SSO) (RQ-E4). The
fourth possibility IKMI-P4 indicates a scenario that has RQ-E1 and both new requirements
RQ-E3 and RQ-E4.
Similarly, the IDS has two possibilities (IDS-P1 and IDS-P2); the BP has three possibilities
(BP-P1, BP-P2 and BP-P3). The first possibility of each part indicates a future scenario where
no change happens.
As IKMI, IDS, BP are independent, we have in total 24 possibilities to be considered for
SWIM. These possibilities are associated with expertise beliefs about the probabilities that
they might happen. The decision maker now faces the question: “how to select a design
alternative that is better resilient to evolution than others?".
4.2 The AMAN Scenario
The context of this scenario is the evolution in air traffic management procedures planned
by the SESAR research programme, which is building the future European air traffic man-
agement system. The scenarios focus on the introduction of a new queue management tool,
AMAN, and the introduction of a new data transport infrastructure, SWIM, that will replace
the current phone-communication lines.
Before the introduction of the AMAN, the flight arrival management operations are per-
formed by the Sector Team composed by two controllers, the Tactical and Planning Con-
trollers. This is done with the support of the CWP (Controller Working Position). The con-
trollers have to compute the arrival sequence for the flights and give clearances for landing
to the pilots flying in their sector on the basis of the information displayed by the CWP such
as air traffic, radar data, weather condition, etc provided by different ATM actors. The com-
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munication among these actors takes places over a dedicated and secure communication
line.
After the introduction of AMAN, the AMAN provides support to controllers by automat-
ically generating the arrival sequence. The AMAN may also provide other functionalities,
such as generation of advisories for aircrafts, or metering capabilities for a runway, or sup-
port runway allocation (at airports with multiple runway configurations). At the organiza-
tional level, the introduction of the AMAN requires the introduction of a new type of con-
troller, namely, the Sequence Manager who will monitor and modify sequences generated by
AMAN, and will provide information and updates to Sector Team. At the operational level, all
ATM actors (including AMAN) communicate via SWIM, a new network for the management
and sharing of information. This communication would provide authenticity, integrity and
availability that should be comparable with the one provided by the dedicated communica-
tion lines (e.g., phone) currently used by controllers.
4.3 Chapter Summary
This section described two application scenarios in the ATM domain. Both were taken from
real industrial projects. The first scenario was about SWIM, an information management
infrastructure that connects all ATM subsystems from aircrafts to ground facilities. In this
scenario we focused on the enterprise security services and boundary protection services.
We employed this scenario to illustrate the proposed framework (see chapter 5).
The second scenario was about the AMAN scenario, which we mostly focused on the
evolution in requirements model at high level abstraction concerning the introduction of
AMAN. We employed this scenario to conduct evaluation studies for the framework (see
chapter 8).
In the next chapter, we are going to describe the proposed framework where we discuss
how we model evolution in requirements models and the formal semantic of the modeling
approach.
Part II
Framework Details
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THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The chapter proposes a framework that tackles the fundamental issue of modeling
and reasoning about requirements evolution to aid the selection of evolution-resilient
design alternative. The modeling support captures requirements evolution in terms
of controllable and observable rules. The reasoning support provides three quanti-
tative metrics to identify which requirements must be implemented to guarantee the
best chances of success (Max Belief) or minimize the risk of wasting money (Resid-
ual Disbelief and Max Disbelief). The formal semantics of the evolution uncertainty
and evolution metrics, as well as the underpinning formal mathematical model of
the metrics are also discussed. The applicability of the framework is illustrated with
an example from the development of the SWIM platform in Air Traffic Control.
R
EQUIREMENTS evolution is unavoidable for any long-lived system due to changes in
business objectives, regulations, standards, environment or threats. In many cases,
these changes are not completely unknown. For instance, the ongoing discussion
in a standard body might feature two or three proposals, albeit it might not be clear which
one will finally win. Therefore, when having a number of possible design alternatives for the
system, decision makers need to select one that is evolution-resilient.
The proposed framework aims at dealing with the uncertainty of the requirements evolu-
tion to support the selection of such design alternatives. The intuition is to provide: a mod-
eling support mechanism to capture the requirements evolution of the system ‘as-is’, and
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an automated reasoning support mechanism to aid the selection of an evolution-resilient
system design alternative.
Figure 5.1 briefs the conceptual model of the proposed framework. Requirements evo-
lution is modeled by Evolution Rule. There are two kinds of rules: Observable Rule and
Controllable Rule. The former kind captures potential changes and their uncertainty (i.e.,
likelihood of occurrence). The latter kind captures different design alternatives that fulfill
requirements. Hypergraph Requirements Model is a representation used to express require-
ments models. The evolution rules are also incorporated into this hypergraph. We introduce
several Reasoning Algorithms that reason on the hypergraph to derive possible Design Alter-
natives and calculate different Evolution Quantitative Metrics for each alternative. There are
three quantitative metrics: Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes evolution rules to
capture requirements evolution. Section 5.2 discusses an interpretation of evolution uncer-
tainty based on game-theoretic approach. Section 5.3 presents evolution metrics and their
semantics that support the reasoning on evolution uncertainty. Section 5.4 discusses the for-
mal rule and revised evolution metrics for complex scenarios of evolution in requirements
evolution. Finally Section 5.5 summarizes this chapter.
Hypergraph 
Requirements Model
Reasoning Algorithm
Evolution Rule
Controllable 
Rule
Observable 
Rule
Design Alternative
Evolution 
Quantitative Metric
Max 
Belief
Residual 
Disbelief
annotates
reasons on
quantifies
derives
* 1
1
*
*1
1
*
Max 
Disbelief
MODELING SUPPORT
REASONING SUPPORT
The conceptual model of the framework is illustrated using UML class diagram. The round rectangles denotes
entities. The shaded background groups entities for evolution modeling support, and entities for evolution
reasoning support.
Figure 5.1: The conceptual model of the proposed framework.
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5.1 Modeling the Requirements Evolution
This section describes how we capture the evolution in requirements models for a simple
evolution scenario – the before-after evolution perspective (see Section 3.1) where an orig-
inal requirements model could evolve to many possibilities during the study period. More
complex evolution scenarios will be discussed later in Section 5.4.
Requirements evolution includes both planned and unplanned changes. The unplanned
changes are unexpected, but happen in a system-to-be at a certain time in future (i.e., a
system to-be-next). They might happen due to external factors and are not under the control
of domain experts or the company who builds the system. These factors could be either
changes in regulation, business goals or agreements; or new demands in the market; or new
concepts or changes in standards, and so on. Though unplanned changes are out of control,
they can be foreseen at some level of uncertainty, which we call evolution probability. The
evolution probability is the belief by which a change (or changes) might occur in future.
The occurrence of planned changes, as name suggested, is expected. Still it might not be
100% for sure due to some unexpected reasons and/or aforementioned factors. For instance,
we may plan to integrate a new function into the SWIM next year, but then we might not
do that due to some financial issues. Hence they still have a likelihood of occurrence (i.e.,
evolution probability), albeit this likelihood is usually high (more than 90%, for example) as
they are intentional.
These planned and unplanned changes with their evolution probabilities are captured
by observable rules, which are described as follows.
Definition 5.1 (observable rule). An observable rule of a requirements model (or sub model)
RM, denoted as ro(RM), is a set of triples (i.e., evolution possibilities) RM
pi−→ RMi where pi is
the probability that RM evolves to RMi . The possibilities in a rule are complete and mutual
exclusive.
ro(RM)=
{
RM
pi−→RMi
∣∣∣∣∣ pi > 0∧ n∑
i=1
pi = 1
}
(5.1)
where n is the number of evolution possibilities.
To satisfy the requirements of the system-to-be and potential systems-to-be-next, several
design alternatives could be developed. A design alternative and its related concepts are
described as follows:
Definition 5.2. Given a requirements model RM:
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• Amandatory requirement is a requirement that must be satisfied in order to ensure that
the system is working properly.
• A design alternative D is a set of model entities such that their implementation will
satisfy all mandatory requirements.
• A primitive design alternative D∗ is a design alternative where removing any member
of the set makes it no longer a design alternative.
• The complete set of primitive design alternatives ΣD
∗
RM is the set of all primitive design
alternatives.
• The complete set of design alternatives is the set of all design alternatives.
These design alternatives of a requirements model (either for system-to-be or systems-
to-be-next) are captured by controllable rules, as described as follows.
Definition 5.3 (controllable rule). A controllable rule of a requirements model (or sub model)
RM, denoted as rc (RM), is a set of pairs RM−→D∗j , where D∗j is a primitive design alternative of
RM.
rc (RM)=
{
RM−→D∗j |D∗j ∈ΣD
∗
RM
}
(5.2)
We simplify notation and use the arrow (−→) to denote both observable and controllable rules
rather than a different symbol. The label on top with the probability should be enough to
distinguish them.
Example 5.1 (evolution rules) Figure 5.2 visualizes the evolution rules of the IDS part within
the ISS-ENT (see Table 4.2, Section 4.1). The requirements model is denoted by a rectangle
with three compartments that respectively depict the name of the requirements model, a list
of its mandatory requirements, and a list of primitive design alternatives.
In this example, the name of requirements model is IDS-P1. It currently has one require-
ment: RQ-E2. To fulfill this requirement, we have two design alternatives: Host-based IDS
(C4), or Network-based IDS (C5). Due to the evolution described in Section 4.1, the IDS
could either remain unchanged (first possibility, IDS-P1), or will evolve to a scenario (sec-
ond possibility, IDS-P2) that has two requirements: RQ-E2 and Support scalable, centralized
intrusion detection (RQ-E5). To fulfill these requirements, there is one design alternative: C5.
The expertise belief for IDS-P1 to occur is 60%, and for IDS-P2 is 40%.
The observable rule corresponding to Figure 5.2 is written as follows:
ro(IDS)=
{
IDS-P1
0.6−−→ IDS-P1, IDS-P1 0.4−−→ IDS-P2
}
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A (part of) requirements model is represented as a rectangle with three compartments: the top for the model
name, the middle for list of requirements, and the bottom for list of primitive design alternatives. The solid
arrow connects two requirements models (or to the model itself) to indicate the possibility that the source
model might evolve to the target model with a certain level of belief (probability).
Figure 5.2: The observable and controllable evolution.
The controllable rules for these possibilities are written as follows:
rc (IDS-P1)= {IDS-P1−→ {C4} , IDS-P1−→ {C5}}
rc (IDS-P2)= {IDS-P2−→ {C5}}
Importantly, IDS-P1 might also have another design alternative such as {C4, C5}. This de-
sign alternative is not a primitive one and belongs to the complete set of design alternatives.
However, in the controllable rule we capture only the primitive design alternatives as speci-
fied above.
5.2 Semantics of Evolution Probability: a Game-Theoretic
Interpretation
In the proposed framework, the evolution uncertainty is represented as evolution probabil-
ities captured in observable rules. The high level semantics of evolution probability is the
likelihood that an evolution might happen in given circumstances. However, we still need a
more detail semantics for evolution probabilities, which turns to be necessary to aid the elic-
itation of these values. In other words, the semantics behind the claim that “the probability
to have a head (or tail) while tossing a coin is 50%” is well-known and measurable, which is if
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Game has n round, each round is about a software component Ci
FOR i = 1 to n
Domain Expert announces pi ∈ [0,1]
Company announces decision di : 1: make now, -1: buy later
The Market announces ri ∈ [0,1]
The cumulative asset value of Company is
Ai = Ai−1+di (ri −pi )
Figure 5.3: The protocol of the game explaining the sematic of the evolution probability.
one tosses a coin 100 times, he/she has the head (or tail) of the coin about 50 times. So what
does it mean for saying “the probability of an evolution is 50%"?
To answer such question, this section describes a game similar to one discussed by Shafer
et al. [Sha+09] to account for the evolution probability. In this game there are three players:
Domain Expert, Company, and Market. The sketch of this game is denoted in Figure 5.3.
In this protocol, Company wants to have software component Ci , and asks the Domain
Expert for his opinion about the value of Ci in future. This pricing information also includes
the expert’s estimate that the component might turn out to be useless.
• At the first step, Domain Expert announces pi , which is his opinion about a fair price
of Ci . So near-zero value of pi means Ci will likely be useless, according to Domain
Expert.
• At the second step, Company has to select between two options:
– Either “buy later": Company decides to buy Ci later from suppliers at the Market’s
price and sets aside pi in its books to buy Ci .
– Or “make now": Company decides to tender in order to make Ci now at price pi .
• At the third step, Market announces ri , which is the real price of software component
Ci .
At the end of a round, the Company ends up with either a software asset or a monetary
asset. The value of the software asset is determined by the market price. Table 5.1 exhibits
all possible round-ending cases where Company could either win or lose the round upon to
the decision made in the second step.
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Table 5.1: The asset value of Company based on different decisions
“make now" (di = 1) “buy later" (di =−1)
ri < pi software costs pi but values only ri <
pi (lose)
stashed cash pi exceeds price ri on
market (win)
ri > pi software has value ri > pi cost paid to
produce it (win)
cash on books pi < ri money needed to
buy software on market (lose)
The law of large numbers here corresponds to say that if unlikely events happen then
Company has a strategy to multiply the value of its assets by a large amount. Suppose
pi ¿ ri , then the belief on events that should not happen (smaller pi means that the com-
ponent should be useless) is wrong: these allegedly unlikely events do indeed happen. By
systematically betting against the Domain Expert and making the software at pi , the Com-
pany can multiply the value of its assets. The pi is the evolution probability.
5.3 Semantics of Reasoning about the Evolution Uncertainty
This section introduces three quantitative metrics to evaluate design alternatives with re-
spect to evolution uncertainty, as well as the underpinning mathematical model of these
metrics. The three quantitative metrics, namely, Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Dis-
belief are as follows.
Max Belief (MaxB): measures the maximum belief that a design alternative D would be us-
able after evolution happens. According to the discussed game semantics, Max Belief
is the maximum amount of money to allocate if you want to “make now" a call of ten-
der (and trust the domain expert).
Residual Disbelief (ResD): is the complement of total belief that a design alternative D is us-
able after evolution happens. It is the (maximum) amount of money that you would be
able to save if you postpone the decision (“buy later” so that you do not spend money
on potential useless software).
Max Disbelief (MaxD): measures the maximum belief such that a design alternative D is
useless after evolution happens. Max Disbelief partially supports the action “buy later”
that postpones the implementation of D. It is the max belief in the evolution where D
is utterly useless. Thus, it could be used as an approximation of Residual Disbelief.
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The requirements model RM might evolve to one of twelve possibilities, where RM evolves to RM12 with highest
probability 0.45. So, Cj has probability of 0.45 to be useful. Ci occurs in all remaining possibilities, which make
for 0.55. However, the probability that an individual possibility where Ci is useful will actually happen is only
0.05.
Figure 5.4: An example of the long tail problem.
The Max Belief and Residual Disbelief might differ substantially in some cases, in par-
ticular in presence of a heavy tail of probabilities. This problem, firstly coined by Anderson
[And04], is present when a larger than normal population rests within the tail of the distri-
bution.
Example 5.2 (long tail) Figure 5.4 shows an example of long tail where a requirements
model RM might evolve to a number of possibilities with very low probabilities (say, eleven
possibilities from RM1 to RM11 with 0.05 each), and another extra possibility with a domi-
nating probability (say, RM12 with 0.45). From RM1 to RM11, Ci is a design alternative suit-
able for all of them. Cj is a design alternative only for RM12. Suppose that Ci and Cj are
disjoint each other. According to the metric definitions, Ci is quantified with a triplet of
Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief: 〈0.05,0.45,0.45〉; and Cj is quantified with
〈0.45,0.55,0.05〉. Clearly, if ones’ preferences are based on risk minimization, then buying
later Ci could be a good choice. Yet this would be missing the opportunity to make now Cj.
Some people might put their bets on the long tail [And04], while others do the other way
round [Elb08]. We do not take a stand in this debate. Instead, we provide values of both Max
Belief (i.e., the head) and Residual Disbelief (i.e., the tail). One can use these values to select
the “best-for-him/her" option.
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For a requirements model RM with observable rule ro(RM)= {〈RM pi−→ RMi 〉|i = 1..n}. Let
D be a design alternative of RM , we have:
MaxB(D)
de f= max
{〈RM
pi−→RMi 〉∈ro (RM)|∃D∗∈ΣD∗RMi :D∗⊆D}
pi
ResD(D)
de f= 1− ∑
{〈RM
pi−→RMi 〉∈ro (RM)|∃D∗∈ΣD∗RMi :D∗⊆D}
pi
MaxD(D)
de f= max
{〈RM
pi−→RMi 〉∈ro (RM)|6∃D∗∈ΣD∗RMi :D∗⊆D}
pi
(5.3)
These metrics provide a quantitative assessment that supports the selection of design
alternatives for a requirements model RM at design time. The optimal design alternative
should have a good trade-off between its Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief
measures. The default implementation for the preference criteria is “higher max belief, lower
residual disbelief and lower max disbelief". Such decision orientation can be explained using
the game discussed in Section 5.2. In this way, the system implemented by this alternative
has a higher chance of success, and minimizes the risk of wasting money with less modi-
fication when evolution happens. Risk averse principals might choose another alternative.
From an algorithmic perspective it is only important to have a preference relation between
triplets of metrics.
Example 5.3 (quantitative metrics) With reference to Table 4.2, Table 5.2 reports all possi-
ble combinations of design alternatives of each part and their metrics’ values. The first col-
umn is the identifier of the global design alternative obtained by combining the correspond-
ing design alternatives of individual parts, which are reported in the next three columns. The
last three columns are the metrics’ values of a global design alternative. Notably, we elimi-
nate some redundant combinations such as {C1, C6, C2, C8} because both {C1} and {C2} are
design alternatives of IKMI. Therefore it is not necessary to have them both in a global design
alternative.
According to Table 5.2, the global design alternatives #5–#12 have the highest Max Belief,
the global alternative #12 has the lowest Residual Disbelief, and the lowest Max Disbelief as
well. Thus, the alternative #12 is the best one according to the selection criteria discussed
previously.
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Table 5.2: Qualitative metrics for design alternatives of the running example.
No. Design Alternatives
Max Belief Residual Disbelief Max Disbelief
IKMI IDS BP
1 C1 C4 C6 2.4% 97.6% 9.6%
2 C1 C4 C7 2.4% 97.6% 9.6%
3 C1 C5 C6 2.4% 96.0% 9.6%
4 C1 C5 C7 2.4% 96.0% 9.6%
5 C2 C4 C6 9.6% 76.0% 9.6%
6 C2 C4 C7 9.6% 76.0% 9.6%
7 C2 C4 C6,C2,C8 9.6% 52.0% 6.4%
8 C2 C4 C7,C2,C8 9.6% 40.0% 6.4%
9 C2 C5 C6 9.6% 60.0% 9.6%
10 C2 C5 C7 9.6% 60.0% 9.6%
11 C2 C5 C6,C2,C8 9.6% 20.0% 4.8%
12 C2 C5 C7,C2,C8 9.6% 0.0% 0.0%
13 C1,C3 C4 C6 7.2% 90.4% 9.6%
14 C1,C3 C4 C7 7.2% 90.4% 9.6%
15 C1,C3 C5 C6 7.2% 84.0% 9.6%
16 C1,C3 C5 C7 7.2% 84.0% 9.6%
5.4 Formal Rules for Complex Evolution Scenarios
The requirements evolution in real world systems could be very complicated in two dimen-
sions: scale and time. The former appears when the requirements model is too large and
complex. It is therefore mostly impossible to analyze the evolution in the entire require-
ments model as a whole. The latter determines the case that evolution might occur multi-
ple times in a requirements model over time. Additionally, an evolution might depend on
the previous occurrence of evolution. This section discusses how these complex evolution
scenarios could be addressed by using evolution rules described in previous sections. This
section also provides the underpinning mathematical models beyond these scenarios.
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5.4.1 Evolution in Large Requirements Model
Requirements models for real systems are typical too large to study evolution in require-
ments model. The current design principle of software systems typically divides a big re-
quirements model into several sub models (or sub parts) representing separated functional
modules. Hence instead of studying evolution in a big requirements model as a whole, we
could analyze evolution in its sub models. Evolution in these sub models could be latter
combined to represent evolution in the global requirements model. To the simplicity we
assume that evolution in a part is independent with evolution in others.
Local evolution rules in independent sub parts could be combined to achieve the global
evolution rules for the global requirements model. The rationale of this combination is the
effort to reuse the notions of Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief without any
extra treatment. In the following we discuss how to combine evolution rules from two inde-
pendent sub parts.
Given two independent sub parts SM and SM ′ of a requirements model. The evolution
rules for these parts are respectively ro(SM), ro(SM ′) (observable rules), and rc (SM), rc (SM ′)
(controllable rules) as follows:
ro(SM)=
{
SM
pi−→ SMi
∣∣∣∣∣pi > 0∧ n∑
i=1
pi = 1
}
(5.4)
ro(SM
′)=
{
SM ′
p ′j−→ SM ′j
∣∣∣∣∣p ′j > 0∧ m∑
j=1
p ′j = 1
}
(5.5)
rc (SM)=
{
SM −→D∗t
∣∣∣D∗t ∈ΣD∗SM } (5.6)
rc (SM
′)=
{
SM ′ −→D∗k
∣∣∣D∗k ∈ΣD∗SM ′ } (5.7)
Let RM be the combined model of two parts SM and SM ′. The evolution rules of RM are
formulated as follows:
ro(RM)=
{
SM ∪SM ′
pi ·p ′j−−−→ SMi ∪SM ′j
∣∣∣∣SM pi−→ SMi ∈ ro(SM)∧SM ′ p ′j−→ SM ′j ∈ ro(SM ′)}
(5.8)
rc (RM)=
{
SM ∪SM ′ −→D∗i
∣∣∣D∗i ∈ΣD∗SM∪SM ′ } (5.9)
Example 5.4 Recall to Table 4.2, Figure 5.5 illustrates an example of combining evolution
rules in two sub parts IKMI and IDS.
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Figure 5.5: Example of combining two observable evolution rules.
5.4.2 Continuous Evolution in Requirements Models
The continuous evolution in requirements models is described in the continuous evolution
perspective previously discussed in Section 3.1. Here, during the study period, the require-
ments models keep evolving at multiple time points. We refer to this evolution perspective
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Figure 5.6: Observable rules in a continuous evolution requirements model.
as multi-step evolution (or continuous evolution) where in each step, the evolution is cap-
tured by also using the evolution rules described in Section 5.1. For the sake of brevity, we
can assume that there is only one observable rule in a requirements model at a certain time
regardless of its complexity. This makes sense because if there are many observable rules
in different parts of the model, they eventually could be merged into a global, unique one
for the whole model as discussed in Section 5.4.1. Thus the continuous evolution could be
captured seamlessly by using the evolution rules where the original requirements model in
a step s is one of a possibility requirements model in the accessor step s−1.
Example 5.5 Figure 5.6 illustrates a two-step evolution, in which observable rules are de-
noted as dotted boxes. The original model lays on top part of a box, and all potential evolu-
tions are in sub boxes laid at the bottom. There are directed edges connecting the original
model to potential evolutions. The label on each edge represents the probability such that
original model evolves to target model. In Figure 5.6, an original requirements model RM 01
evolves to either RM 11 , RM
1
2 or RM
1
3 . Subsequently, RM
1
i evolves to RM
2
j , where i=1..3 and
j=1..9.
We extend formulae in (5.3) to formulate the calculation of Max Belief, Residual Dis-
belief, Max Disbelief in the sense of continuous evolution. Given a requirements model
RM , and its design alternative D, we respectively denote MaxB∗(D|RM), ResD∗(D|RM), and
MaxD∗(D|RM) as the Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief of D with respect to
the continuous evolution of RM , as the following formulae show.
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MaxB∗(D|RM)=

is-DA(D,RM) RM does not evolve,
max{
〈RM
pi−→RMi 〉∈possibility(D, RM)
}pi ·MaxB∗(D|RMi ) otherwise.
(5.10)
ResD∗(D|RM)=

1− is-DA(D,RM) RM does not evolve,
1− ∑{
〈RM
pi−→RMi 〉∈possibility(D, RM)
}pi · (1−ResD∗(D|RMi )) otherwise.
(5.11)
MaxD∗(D|RM)=

1− is-DA(D,RM) RM does not evolve,
max{
〈RM
pi−→RMi 〉∈ro (RM)\possibility(D, RM)
}pi ·MaxD∗(D|RMi ) otherwise.
(5.12)
where
• is-DA(D,RM) is a function that returns 1 if D is a design alternative of RM , or returns 0
otherwise;
• possibility(D,RM)=
{
〈RM pi−→RMi 〉 ∈ ro(RM) |is-da(D,RMi )
}
is the set of evolution pos-
sibilities of the evolution rule of RM such that D is a design alternative in the evolved
models RMi .
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has presented a new concept that is evolution rule. There are two kinds of evo-
lution rules: observable rule and controllable rule. We employed evolution rules to capture
the uncertainty of evolution in requirements model by the concept evolution probability.
Requirements models in this chapter were treated as high level of abstraction, which were
collection of entities and relations. Therefore we could use evolution rules to capture the
uncertainty of evolution in requirements model expressing in many RE languages.
The evolution probability were a kind of subjective probability. Its semantics was further
explained by a game-theoretic interpretation. Based on evolution probability, we proposed
three different evolution metrics: Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief to es-
timate the resilience of a design alternative with respect to evolution. These metrics were
useful measures to support the selection of a good evolution-resilient design alternative.
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We also discussed two complex scenarios of evolution: evolution in big requirements
models, and continuous evolution. In the former, we suggested to study evolution in inde-
pendent sub-models of the original one then combined them later. In the latter, we extended
the formulae of evolution metrics to address the continuous evolution in requirements mod-
els.
In the next chapter, we are going to describe a series of algorithms to automate the cal-
culation of proposed evolution metrics for design alternatives of requirements models.
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AUTOMATED REASONING SUPPORT
This chapter describes a mechanism to automate the calculation of the quantitative
metrics in the proposed framework. For this purpose, we employ hypergraph as a
means to capture requirements models where evolution rules are incorporated. Based
on this, we develop a series of algorithm to do the calculation. The algorithms support
the incremental calculation that automatically reacts on each change made to the
requirements model so that users could immediately see the change of metrics at the
minimum calculation effort. Moreover, we also present a formal analysis on these
algorithms.
T
HE previous chapter has described the framework to address the known-unknown
in requirements evolution. The framework has proposed a couple of quantitative
metrics, as well as mathematic formulae to calculate them. However, it is almost
impossible to do this manually for evolution in a large scale requirements model. Therefore
having an automated reasoning support is an essential criterion of success of the proposed
framework. This chapter describes a series of algorithms to calculate metric values. These
algorithms are designed to support the incremental calculation so that any change made by
designers could be immediately reflected in change to metric values in an efficient way.
Moreover, since the proposed framework does not stick to any particular language, we
thus need a universal means to represent requirements model in which evolution rules are
incorporated. For this purpose, we employ hypergraph as a means to convey requirements
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models. The hypergraph does not intentionally substitute any RE languages. Hence, it only
contains enough information for the reasoning purpose.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents hypergraph,and how we re-
cast some existing requirements modeling languages to hypergraph. Section 6.2 describes
the algorithms to incrementally calculate the quantitative metrics. Section 5.4 analyzes the
computational complexity of the algorithms. Section 6.4 provides formal proofs for proposi-
tion, lemmas, and theorems.
6.1 Hypergraph Requirements Model
In order to automate the reasoning about requirements evolution, we employ directed hy-
pergraph [Aus+83] as a structure to represent requirements models. With reference to Fig-
ure 5.1 (Section 5), the Hypergraph Requirements Model is a representation used to express
requirements models. A requirements model in an existing modeling language (e.g., KAOS
[Lam09a], i*[Yu99], SysML [Sys]) could be transformed into a hypergraph for the execution
of the algorithms. This transformation preserves the information about requirements sat-
isfaction, but removes other information to keep the hypergraph simple. In this section,
we describe a formalization of hypergraph (Section 6.1.1), and hypergraph equivalences of
graphical constructs in some modeling languages (Section 6.1.2).
6.1.1 A Formalization of Hypergraph
A hypergraph, according to [Aus+83], comprises of nodes and hyperarcs. Nodes represent
requirements, and hyperarcs represent relations between nodes. We define refines relations
that connect a source requirement node to a target requirement node; the target require-
ment is satisfied if the source one is satisfied. If a target requirement requires more than
one source requirement in order to be satisfied, we employ an extra compound node in the
middle. Then a refines relation is divided into:
• component-edge refines connects a source requirement node to a target compound
node.
• target-edge refines connects a source requirement node, or a source compound node
to a target requirement node.
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Then a controllable rule is implicitly represented when a target node is reached by refines
hyperarc(s) (i.e., the target requirement has various design alternatives). Selecting different
incoming arcs means selecting different design alternatives for a target node.
To represent observable rules, we need to introduce a new type of nodes – observable
node, and a new type of relations – evolves relation. An observable node bijectively indicates
an observable rule; and an evolves relation connects an observable node and a requirement
node to represent for the occurrence of one evolution possibility.
The observable node is also able to participate in a refines relation as a source requirement
node. We then need to extend the concept of the component-edge refines and the target-edge
refines mentioned above. Hence, a component-edge refines could connect a source observ-
able node to a target compound node; and a target-edge refines could connect a source ob-
servable node to a target requirement node.
To this extent, we formally define a hypergraph as follows.
Definition 6.1 (hypergraph requirements model). A hypergraph requirements modelHRM is
a tuple
〈
N ∪Nc ∪No , H ∪Hc ∪Ho ,r oot ,µ
〉
where:
• N is a set of requirements nodes.
• Nc is a set of compound nodes.
• No is a set of observable nodes.
• H ⊆ (N ×N )∪ (Nc ×N )∪ (No ×N ) is a set of target-edge refines relations.
• Hc ⊆ (N ×Nc )∪ (No ×Nc ) is a set of component-edge refines relations.
• Ho ⊆N ×No is a set of evolves relations
• r oot ∈N ∪No is the root node of the hypergraph.
• µ is a function that assigns the evolution probability to an evolves relation.
Example 6.1 (hypergraph requirements model) Figure 6.1 presents the hypergraph of
SWIM scenario (see Section 4.1). In hypergraph, different graphical notations are used to
emphasize the distinction between leaf requirements (rectangles) and others (round rect-
angles). Leaf requirements might also be referred to as components. Diamonds represent
observable nodes. To visualize relationships, plain edges are component-edge refines rela-
tions; arrows are target-edge refines ones (target requirements correspond to arrow heads).
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Rectangles represent leaf requirements; round rectangles denote intermediate requirements. Diamonds are
observable nodes. Red circles depict compound nodes.
Figure 6.1: The hypergraph requirements model of the SWIM scenario.
The evolves relations are also plain edges, but decorated with the evolution probability and
the identifier of the evolution possibility to distinct with component-edge refines relations.
We distinguish each evolution possibility by a unique identifier, which is the combina-
tion of the name of the observable node and the index of the evolution possibility in the
corresponding observable rule. An example of such identifiers is illustrated in Figure 6.1 as
o3:3, where o3 is the name of the observable node.
We revise the definition of a design alternative for an arbitrary node in the hypergraph as
follows.
Definition 6.2 (design alternative in hypergraph). Let t be a node in a hypergraphHRM.
• D is a design alternative of t if and only if D be a set of leaf nodes inHRM and:
• t ∈D, or
• ∃〈x, t〉 ∈H ∪Ho such that D is a design alternative of x, or
• t ∈Nc such that for all 〈x, t〉 ∈Hc , D is a design alternative of x.
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Figure 6.2: Some modeling constructs in different modeling languages and their equivalence
in the hypergraph.
• D∗ is a primitive design alternative of t if and only if: D∗ is a design alternative of t ,
and no proper subset of D∗ is a design alternative of t .
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Figure 6.3: The requirements model of ISS-ENT modeled by existing languages and by hyper-
graph.
6.1.2 Hypergraph Representation for Existing Modeling Languages’s
Constructs
Modeling constructs in different requirements modeling languages can be casted to hyper-
graph’s constructs. In this section, we select three languages i*/Tropos[Yu96], KAOS[Lam09b],
and SysML[Sys] to illustrate the equivalences between some constructs of these languages
and those of hypergraph.
Figure 6.2 presents a set of transformation patterns of three RE languages: i*/Tropos,
KAOS, and SysML to hypergraph. By using these patterns we can convert a requirements
model in the these languages to hypergraph. As we only need information concerning the
fulfillment of requirements, we transform such information only and ignore unnecessary
other information. Concretely, a goal/task (i*/Tropos, KAOS) or a requirement (SysML) is
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casted to a requirement node in hypergraph. The ownership between an actor and a goal
(i*/Tropos) is denoted as a tag associated to the requirement node in hypergraph. AND-
decompose relations (i*/Tropos, KAOS), and containment relations (SysML) are casted to re-
fine relations. An OR-decompose relation is casted into several refines ones. Assign relations
(KAOS) and satisfy relations (SysML) are also casted to refine relations.
The transformation from a requirements model to hypergraph could be done automati-
cally via pattern-based transformation engine, the VIATRA2 framework described in [VB07].
As an illustration for the transformation, Figure 6.3 exhibits equivalent forms of the re-
quirements model for ISS-ENT in i*/Tropos (a), KAOS (b), SysML (c), and hypergraph (d).
6.2 Algorithms for Design Alterative Identification and
Metric Calculation
The basic idea behind the algorithms is to propagate metric values from leaf nodes to the
root node in a hypergraph and cache their value at intermediate nodes. By term propagate,
we mean a bottom-up approach where we first calculate metrics for leaf nodes, then calcu-
late (or generate) metric values of a parent node based on its children. To be clear, recall to
Definition 6.1, in a relation 〈s, t〉 ∈ H ∪Hc ∪Ho of a hypergraph, we refer to the source node
s as child node, and the target node t as parent node.
This idea allows for an incremental calculation of metrics where there are changes in the
graph. It is important for practical usage as we envision the framework to support the design
process where the designer experiments with alternatives, or refines evolution probabilities
or adding new evolution as additional information from the environment becomes available.
We only need to re-calculate the metric values at nodes affected by changes and propagate
the new calculation up to the root, while leaving metric values at other nodes untouch. This
is essentially better than redoing the whole calculation from ground up.
The intermediate data structure used for the metric calculation is a list of design alter-
natives annotated with extra information. We refer to this list as Design Alternatives Table
(DAT). The definition of an annotated design alternative is as follows.
Definition 6.3 (annotated design alternative). An annotated design alternativeD of a node t
is a tuple
〈
D,mb,r d ,md ,φ
〉
, where:
• D is a design alternative of t ,
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• mb,r d ,md are the values of Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief of D,
respectively.
• φ is a set of identifiers of evolution possibilities that D supports (i.e., D is a design alter-
native in these possibilities).
Each node has its own DAT containing all of the annotated design alternatives for itself.
As the root node is normally the top requirement for a requirements model, the DAT of the
root node contains all of the annotated design alternatives to be selected for the system.
Aside from DAT, the algorithms use some additional data structures for the calculation
such as VISIT to maintain the processing status of a node (i.e., 1-processed, 0-otherwise);
READY to determine whether a node is ready to process (i.e., there is enough data for pro-
cessing). These data structures are also used to avoid reprocessing a processed node. Ta-
ble 6.1 summarizes them and a list of algorithms needed for the metric calculation. The
metric calculation is divided into following phases:
• Generating the DATs (section Section 6.2.1): generate DATs for all nodes in a hypegraph
by propagating DATs from the leaf nodes to the top.
• Calculating metrics for a design alternative (Section 6.2.2): calculates metric values for
a design alternative based on DAT of the root node.
• Updating the DATs due to incremental changes ( Section 6.2.3): incrementally updates
DATs with respect to changes in a hypergraph. It avoids from-scratch regeneration for
incremental changes made to the hypergraph once DATs have been properly gener-
ated.
We further discuss the computational complexity of algorithms in Section 6.3.
6.2.1 Generating the DATs
The algorithm generateDAT() (see Algorithm 1) takes a hypergraph as input and gener-
ates DAT for every node in two steps. First, the algorithm sets up ready-to-process status for
every node by updatingREADY. Concretely, for every leaf node x, it is immediately ready (i.e.,
READY[x] = 0) and queued to Q. For each of other nodes, its ready-to-process status is set
to the number of incoming edges to it. Second, the algorithm invokes propagateDAT()
to generate all DATs.
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Table 6.1: Data structures and algorithms for the metric calculation.
The names of data structures are in uppercase; the names of algorithms are in lowercase.
Name Description
VISIT[x] maintains the processing status of a node (1 if a node is processed).
READY[x] maintains the readiness-for-process of a node (0 if a node is ready).
DAT[x] maintains the DAT of the node x.
Q is a queue holding a list of ready-to-process nodes.
generateDAT() generates DAT for every node from scratch.
propagateDAT()propagates DATs from nodes in Q to the root.
updateDAT() handles the incremental changes to update the DATs of affected nodes.
1 procedure generateDAT( HRM: hypergraph)
2 precondition
3 postcondition
4 DAT[x]: is initialized for every node x in HRM
5 begin
6 makeQempty();
7 for each node x ∈HRM do
8 if x is leaf then
9 READY[x] ←0;
10 enqueue(Q, x);
11 else
12 READY[x] ←number of incoming edges to x
13 propagateDAT(HRM);
14 end
Algorithm 1: Generating DAT for every node in a hypergraph.
The algorithm propagateDAT() (see Algorithm 2) takes a hypergraph as input, gener-
ates DAT for queued nodes in Q, and propagates these DATs to the root node. To simplify the
presentation of the algorithm, following operators are defined:
• p: the complement value of a probability p.
p = 1−p (6.1)
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1 procedure propagateDAT(HRM: hypergraph)
2 precondition
3 Q : contains all ready-to-process nodes.
4 READY: is properly set to the readiness of every node.
5 postcondition
6 DAT : contains proper DATs of all nodes.
7 begin
8 markAllNodesUnvisited(); {for every node x, set VISIT[x] ←0}
9 while Q 6= ; do
10 x ←dequeue(Q);
11 if (VISIT[x] = 0) {check whether node is ready, but not visited}
12 VISIT[x] ←1; {mark node visited}
13 if x is leaf node then
14 DAT[x] ←{〈{x} ,1,0,0,;〉};
15 else
16 DAT[x] ←; ;
17 {calculate DAT[x] based on incoming edges of x, i.e., x's children}
18 if x is an observable node then
19 for each 〈z, x 〉 ∈HRM do DAT[x] ←DAT[x] merge µ(〈z, x 〉)· DAT[z];
20 else if x is a requirement node then
21 for each 〈z, x 〉 ∈HRM do DAT[x] ←DAT[x] ∪ DAT[z];
22 else {x is a compound node}
23 for each 〈z, x 〉 ∈HRM do DAT[x] ←DAT[x] join DAT[z];
24 for each 〈x, t 〉 ∈HRM do {outgoing edges of x}
25 READY[t] ←READY[t] − 1;
26 if READY[t] = 0 then
27 enqueue(Q, t);
28 end
Algorithm 2: Propagating DAT in a hypergraph.
• pin : extracts the nth (1-based) element in a tuple. To improve the readability, we sub-
stitute n by a symbolic name. For example, letD = 〈D,mb,r d ,md ,φ〉 be an annotated
design alternative, pi2.D and pimb .D both return the Max Belief value ofD.
• p ·DAT(x): represents the multiplication of a probability value to all annotated design
alternatives in a DAT(x).
p ·DAT(x)= {〈Di , p ·mbi ,1−p · r d i , p ·md i ,φi〉 |〈
Di ,mbi ,r d i ,md i ,φi
〉 ∈DAT(x)} (6.2)
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• consolidate: this operator takes two inputs,D as an annotated design alternative, and
DAT(x) as design alternatives table at node x. The operator updates the metrics’ val-
ues of D with respect to DAT(x). We calculate the metrics of D with reference to their
definitions as of (5.3). The consolidate operator is formulated as follows.
consolidateDAT(x)D
def= 〈piD .D,mb,r d ,md ,φ〉 (6.3)
in which:
mb =max{pimb .Di |Di ∈ supportDAT(x)(D)}
r d = 1− ∑
r d∈rdDAT(x)(D)
r d
md =max{pimb .Di |Di ∈DAT(x) \ supportDAT(x)(D)}
φ= ⋃
φi∈ΦDAT(x)(D)
φi
where:
• supportDAT(x)(D)= {Di ∈DAT(x)|piD .Di ⊆piD .D} is a set of annotated design alter-
natives in DAT(x), which are subsumed byD. An annotated design alternativeDi
is subsumed byD j if piD .Di ⊆piD .D j .
• ΦDAT(x)(D)=
{
piφ.Di |Di ∈ supportDAT(x)(D)
}
is a set of identifiers of evolution pos-
sibilities where piD .D is one of their design alternatives.
• rdDAT(x)(D)=
{
minpir d .Di |Di ∈ supportDAT(x)(D)∧piφ.Di ∈ΦDAT(x)(D)
}
We overload the consolidate operator to take one input, a DAT(x). This operator up-
dates the metrics’ values of every annotated design alternativeD in DAT(x).
consolidate(DAT(x)) def= {consolidateDAT(x)Di |Di ∈DAT(x)} (6.4)
• join: combines two annotated design alternatives Di =
〈
Di ,mbi ,r d i ,md i ,φi
〉
and
D j =
〈
D j ,mb j ,r d j ,md j ,φ j
〉
, as the following formula shows:
Di joinD j =
〈
Di ∪D j ,mbi ·mb j ,1− r d i · r d j ,0,φi ∪φ j
〉
(6.5)
Note that the Max Disbelief of the result design alternative is set to 0 because this value
will be calculated later via the consolidate operator. We also overload the join operator
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to combine two DATs of two nodes x1, x2, namely DAT(x1) and DAT(x2) respectively. In
this operation, we combine each annotated design alternative of DAT(x1) to each of
DAT(x2).
DAT(x1) joinDAT(x2)
def= consolidate{Di joinD j |Di ∈DAT(x1),D j ∈DAT(x2)} (6.6)
• merge: merges two DATs of two nodes x1 and x2.
DAT(x1)mergeDAT(x2)
def= consolidate(DAT(x1)∪DAT(x2)) (6.7)
In the Algorithm 2, the propagateDAT() dequeues a node x from Q and processes it.
For each dequeued node x, it checks processing status VISIT[x] to ensure that every node
is processed at most once (line 11–12).
When x is a leaf node, it is the only one design alternative for itself (i.e., we implement
it and it is satisfied). Hence, DAT(x) has only one entry, which is 〈{x} ,1,0,0,;〉 (line 13–14).
The Max Belief is 1 because of 100% chance of it being the case, both Residual Disbelief and
Max Disbelief are assigned to 0 because of 0% chance of it being useless. The last element is
an empty set since there is no evolution possibility.
When x is not a leaf node, the algorithm computes the DAT(x) based on the DAT of its
children (line 17–23) as follows:
D AT (x)=

merge
〈z,x〉∈Ho
µ(〈z, x〉) ·DAT(z) x is an observable node (6.8a)⋃
〈z,x〉∈H
DAT(z) x is a requirement node (6.8b)
join
〈z,x〉∈Hc
DAT(z) x is a compound node (6.8c)
Note that (6.8a–6.8c) are the net results of the for loops at line 19, 21, and 23 respectively
because the DAT of the parent node is initialized with the empty set at line 16.
Then, the algorithm iterates every parent node t of x to update the ready-to-process sta-
tus of t by counting down READY[t] by 1. If t is ready (i.e., READY[t] = 0), t is queued to Q
for processing in subsequence loops, see line 24–27.
Example 6.2 This example shows how to apply (6.8a–6.8c) in the propagation of DATs.
We exemplify the DAT propagation in a part of the hypergraph represented in Figure 6.1.
Concretely, we propagate DAT from leaf nodes C2,C6–C8 to the observable node O3. At the
beginning, DATs of leaf nodes are initialized as follows:
DAT(Ci )= {〈{Ci } ,1,0,0,;〉} , where: i ∈ {2,6,7,8}
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Applying (6.8b), we have DAT(RQ-B1) calculated as follows:
DAT(RQ-B1)=DAT(C6)∪DAT(C7)
= {〈{C6} ,1,0,0,;〉 ,〈{C7} ,1,0,0,;〉}
Applying (6.8c) then (6.8b), we have DAT(RQ-B3) calculated as follows:
DAT(RQ-B3)= {〈{C2,C7,C8} ,1,0,0,;〉}
Similarly, we have DAT of BP-Pi (i = 1...3) calculated as follows:
DAT(BP-P1)= {〈{C6} ,1,0,0,;〉 ,〈{C7} ,1,0,0,;〉}
DAT(BP-P2)= {〈{C2,C6,C8} ,1,0,0,;〉 ,〈{C2,C7,C8} ,1,0,0,;〉}
DAT(BP-P3)= {〈{C2,C6,C7,C8} ,1,0,0,;〉 ,〈{C2,C7,C8} ,1,0,0,;〉}
Applying (6.8a), we have DAT(O3) calculated as follows:
DAT(O3)= {〈{C6} ,0.4,0.6,0.4, {O3:1}〉 ,〈{C7} ,0.4,0.6,0.4, {O3:1}〉
〈{C2,C6,C8} ,0.4,0.2,0.2, {O3:1,O3:2}〉 ,
〈{C2,C7,C8} ,0.4,0,0, {O3:1,O3:2,O3:3}〉
〈{C2,C6,C7,C8} ,0.4,0,0, {O3:1,O3:2,O3:3}〉}
6.2.2 Calculating Metrics for a Design Alternative
When the algorithmgenerateDAT() accomplishes, the DAT of the root node holds a list of
all possible annotated design alternatives obtained by hypergraph traversing. This facilitates
the selection of design alternatives by their metric values.
Besides these alternatives, we are also able to calculate the metrics of an arbitrary design
alternative. Let D be a design alternative, DAT(x0) be the DAT of the root node x0, the metric
values of D are obtained by consolidating an annotated design alternative constructed from
D as follows: 〈
D,mb,r d ,md ,φ
〉= consolidateDAT(x0) 〈D,0,1,1,;〉 (6.9)
The metric values of D are the corresponding values of the annotated alternative: MaxB(D)=
mb,ResD(D) = r d , and MaxD(D) = md . Notably, D could also be a set of arbitrary compo-
nents. If D is not a valid design alternative in any evolution possibility, the Max Belief and
Residual Disbelief of D are 0 and 1 respectively with reference to (6.3).
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1 procedure updateDAT(HRM : hypergraph, n : node)
2 precondition
3 DAT : has been generated by propagateDAT().
4 postcondition
5 DAT : is updated with respects to changes in node n
6 begin
7 makeQemtpy();
8 markAllNodesUnvisited();
9 enqueue(Q, n);
10 {firstly, we determine which nodes should have their DAT updated.}
11 while Q 6= ; do
12 x ←dequeue(Q);
13 if (VISIT[x] = 0)
14 VISIT[x] ←1;
15 for each 〈x, t 〉 ∈HRM do {outgoing edges of x}
16 READY[t] ←READY[t] + 1;
17 enqueue(Q, t);
18 {secondly, update the DAT of identified node}
19 READY[n] = 0; {mark node n ready for recalculating DAT}
20 enqueue(Q, n);
21 propagateDAT(HRM);
22 end
Algorithm 3: Handling incremental changes.
6.2.3 Updating the DATs due to Incremental Changes
Once the DATs of all nodes have been properly generated, any changes made to the graph
will trigger an incremental update of DATs. We develop the algorithm updateDAT() (see
Algorithm 3) to handle incremental changes in a hypergraph. It takes two inputs: a hyper-
graph, and a node from which it and its parents need DATs updated. There are following
kinds of changes in a hypergraph:
• Add/remove a node: in the former case, we pass the added node to the algorithm to
have its DAT generated. In the latter case, all relations from/to the removed node
should also be removed. As a result, this case is handled indirectly by handling the
removal of these relations.
• Add/remove/modify an evolves relation: in all cases, we pass the observable node as-
sociated with the changed evolves relation to the algorithm to update the DATs of the
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observable node and its parents.
• Add/remove a refines relation: for component-edge refines relation, we pass the parent
compound node to the algorithm; for target-edge refines relation, we pass the parent
requirement node.
We do not explicitly consider the kind of changes that users modify a node including
requirement node, observable node, and compound node. A node in hypergraph does not
have any attributes that directly impact to the calculation of DATs. Thus we do not need to
handle the modification of nodes in the incremental update of DATs. For the similar reason,
we also do not consider the modification of refines relations in this algorithm.
Similar to the generation of DAT, Algorithm 3 also has two steps. For the first step, the
algorithm identifies nodes and their number of children, which need their DATs updated due
to the change (line 7–17). This step starts by visiting the input node n. For a visiting node
x, the number of unprocessed children of each x’s parent node (i.e., READY[]) is increased
by 1. Then, the algorithm recursively visits all x’s parent nodes. It employs the data structure
VISIT to ensure that every node in the input hypergraph is visited at most once. For the
second step, it invokes propagateDAT() to update DATs.
6.3 The Complexity of Algorithms
This section analyzes the computational complexity of the algorithms discussed in Section 6.2.
To improve the readability of the section, we move all proofs of proposition, lemmas, and
theorems in this section to the consecutive one (see further Section 6.4)
While propagating DATs from leaf nodes up to the root node, the number entries of the
DAT (i.e., DAT size) of a parent node is increasing rapidly (linear at observable nodes and
requirement nodes, and exponential at compound nodes). Consequently, the complexity of
the algorithms described in previous sections is exponential in both time and space.
Proposition 1. The complexity of the algorithmgenerateDAT() and the algorithmupdateDAT()
is O(n2 ·max |DAT|4), where |DAT| is the DAT size of a node in the hypergraph.
Proof. See Section 6.4.1.
If the input graph forms a k-ary fully connected lattice structure, it could have approx-
imately n+1k leaf nodes. Thus, the maximum number of design alternatives, which equals
74 CHAPTER 6. AUTOMATED REASONING SUPPORT
max |DAT|, is 2 n+1k . As a result, the complexity of the propagateDAT() is O(n2 ·24n). This
phenomenon is due to design alternatives competing across different evolution possibilities.
We address this exponential problem by preventing the explosion of the DAT size. Instead
of keeping all annotated design alternatives in a DAT, we only keep annotated design alter-
nativesDi of which piD .Di is a primitive design alternative within its evolution possibility as
the following formula shows:
filterDAT(x)= {Di ∈DAT(x) ∣∣∀D j ∈DAT(x) :piφ.Di ⊇piφ.D j →piD .Di ⊆piD .D j } (6.10)
The intuition behind this filter is that: first, Di supports all possibilities that D j supports
and more; second, the implementation ofD j requires all components to implementDi plus
some other components. Therefore, Di is more efficient than D j . As a result, the maximum
DAT size is equal to the sum of all primitive alternatives in all evolution possibilities.
Example 6.3 In Example 6.2, the DAT(BP-P3) includes two annotated design alternatives:
〈{C2,C7,C8} ,1,0,0,;〉 and 〈{C2,C6,C7,C8} ,1,0,0,;〉. The former has a primitive design alter-
native, while the latter has not. Hence we can eliminate the latter from DAT(BP-P3).
We revise the equation (6.8a–6.8c) to calculate a DAT of a parent node based on its chil-
dren’s DATs as follow:
D AT (x)=

filter(merge
〈z,x〉∈Ho
µ(〈z, x〉) ·DAT(z)) for observable node (6.11a)
filter(
⋃
〈z,x〉∈H
DAT(z)) for requirement node (6.11b)
filter( join
〈z,x〉∈Hc
DAT(z)) for compound node (6.11c)
The algorithm propagateDAT() is rewritten as propagateDAT*(), see Algorithm 4,
to reflect the new formulation. In Algorithm 4, we change line 19, 21, 23 where we ap-
ply the filter per each DAT. Hereafter, we define that algorithm generateDAT*() and
updateDAT*() are almost identical togenerateDAT() andupdateDAT() respectively.
One exception in the revised algorithms is that they call propagateDAT*() instead of
propagateDAT().
When the total number of primitive design alternatives is still very big, we extend the
filter to keep only winner annotated design alternatives, and eliminate all others (i.e., loser
annotated design alternatives). A winner annotated design alternative has one of its metrics’
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1 procedure propagateDAT*(HRM: hypergraph)
2 precondition
3 Q : contains all ready-to-process nodes.
4 READY: is properly set to the readiness of every node.
5 postcondition
6 DAT : contains proper DATs of all nodes.
7 begin
8 markAllNodesUnvisited(); {for every node x, set VISIT[x] ←0}
9 while Q 6= ; do
10 x ←dequeue(Q);
11 if (VISIT[x] = 0) {check whether node is ready, but not visited}
12 VISIT[x] ←1; {mark node visited}
13 if x is leaf node then
14 DAT[x] ←{〈{x} ,1,0,0,;〉};
15 else
16 DAT[x] ←; ;
17 {calculate the DAT[x] based on incoming edges of x, i.e., x's children }
18 if x is an observable node then
19 for each 〈z, x 〉 ∈HRM do DAT[x] ←filter(DAT[x] merge µ(〈z, x 〉)· DAT[z]);
20 else if x is a requirements node then
21 for each 〈z, x 〉 ∈HRM do DAT[x] ←filter(DAT[x] ∪ DAT[z]);
22 else {x is a compound node}
23 for each 〈z, x 〉 ∈HRM do DAT[x] ←filter(DAT[x] join DAT[z]);
24 for each 〈x, t 〉 ∈HRM do {outgoing edges of x}
25 READY[t] ←READY[t] − 1;
26 if READY[t] = 0 then
27 enqueue(Q, t);
28 end
Algorithm 4: Propagating DAT in a hypergraph.
values be the best, i.e., highest Max Belief, lowest Residual Disbelief, or lowest Max Disbe-
lief. Importantly, we consider the win-lose relationship with respect to metrics individually,
because debating whether a Max Disbelief winner is better than a Residual Disbelief (or Max
Disbelief) winner is similar to the aforementioned long-tail problem that we try to avoid (see
Section 5.3).
The intuition behind such filter is that: when we calculate the DAT of a parent node by
combining DATs of its children, the combination of winner annotated design alternatives in
child DATs will produce a winner annotated design alternative in the parent DAT as shown
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in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Once a DAT of a node is calculated, the DAT and the metrics’ values of its annotated
design alternatives are unchanged given that the hypergraph does not change.
Proof. See Section 6.4.2
Lemma 2. When merging two design alternative tables DAT(x) and DAT(y) by using the merge
operator defined in equation (6.7), a winner annotated design alternativeD in the merged de-
sign alternative table corresponds to a winner in the either DAT(x), or DAT(y) if:
• D is a Max Belief winner, or
• D is a Residual Disbelief winner and annotated design alternatives between DAT(x) and
DAT(y) are disjoint, or
• D is a Max Disbelief winner.
Proof. See Section 6.4.3
Lemma 3. When combining two design alternative tables DAT(x) and DAT(y) by using the
join operator defined in equation (6.6), a winner annotated design alternativeD in the joined
design alternative table is always the combination of two winners in DAT(x) and DAT(y) if:
• D is a Max Belief winner, or
• D is a Residual Disbelief winner and annotated design alternatives between DAT(x) and
DAT(y) are disjoint, or
• D is a Max Disbelief winner.
Proof. See Section 6.4.4
Therefore, when we filter out all loser alternatives from a DAT and keep only winner ones,
we can assure that all annotated design alternatives in the DAT of the root node are ones that
have the best metric values according to Lemma 2, Lemma 3.
Lemma 2 and 3 hold for Max Belief and Max Disbelief winner, however they might not
hold for Residual Disbelief winner in the case that annotated design alternatives in child
DATs are not disjoint. This explains why the lattice structure generates an exponential com-
plexity. In order to obtain a correct result, we need to proceed as follows:
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• Before generating DATs, we firstly compute a set of “candidate" solutions (or candi-
dates, for short) for every node in the hypergraph, which are the union of candidates
of all child nodes below it. The candidate of a leaf node is the node itself.
• Then, for every observable node, we compute a set of “multiple-run" candidates for
this node, which are intersection of candidates of pairwise child nodes.
• For every child node of an observable node, we propagate down the multiple-run can-
didates of the observable node intersecting with the candidates of the child node.
When the child node is an observable node, what is propagated further down is the
union of the “local" multiple-run candidates and the multiple-run candidates from
the parent.
• Hence, while generating DATs, for every node we have a set of multiple-run candidates.
In the revised algorithm, each time a filter operation is applied at a node, we keep the
winner alternatives and other alternatives that are entirely in the multiple-run candi-
dates of the node. At a result, the DAT of every node x has at most 3+2|MR(x)| alterna-
tives, which are winners for each metric plus all possible multiple-run candidates.
Theorem 1. The algorithm generateDAT*() is polynomial in the number of nodes O(n
2)
and exponential in O(max |MR(n)|), where |MR(n)| is the maximum number of multiple-run
candidates.
Proof. See Section 6.4.5
If this is still unsatisfactory, we can use only Max Belief as a criterion to select the winner.
We refer to such filter as 1-Max Belief winner filter operator, as shown as below:
filtermb DAT(x)=
{
Di ∈DAT(x)| 6 ∃D j ∈DAT(x) :pimb .D j ≥pimb .Di
}
(6.12)
Theorem 2. The algorithm generateDAT*() using the filter operator as of (6.12) termi-
nates in polynomial time in the number of nodes O(n2).
Proof. See Section 6.4.6
Theorem 3. When the algorithm generateDAT*() terminates, each entry in the DAT of
the root node is either a Max Belief winner, or a Residual Disbelief winner, or a Max Disbelief
winner.
Proof. See Section 6.4.7
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6.4 Proofs of Algorithm Complexity
6.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. The complexity of the algorithmgenerateDAT() and the algorithmupdateDAT()
is O(n2 ·max |DAT|4), where |DAT| is the size of a DAT of a node in the hypergraph.
Proof. In generateDAT() (Algorithm 1), the complexity of the makeQempty() at line 6
is O(1). The for loop at line 7 repeats at most n, where n is the total number of nodes in
a hypergraph. Then the complexity of this for loop is O(n). As a result, the complexity of
generateDAT() depends on that of propagateDAT() (i.e., Algorithm 2). Likewise, we
also have the complexity of updateDAT() depends on propagateDAT().
Algorithm 2 consists of two loops: one for setting the process status of all nodes (line
8), and another one for processing node (line 9–27). The former iterates every node and
sets its visited status to 0. Hence the complexity of this loop is O(n). The latter while loop
processes all nodes in queueQ. Since every node is processed at most once, which is enforced
in line 11–12, thiswhile loop repeats at most n times. In each loop, the algorithm computes
the DAT for the processing node x (line 17–23), the propagates this DAT to parent nodes (line
24–27).
With reference to (6.6), (6.7), the complexity of the join and merge operators are O(max |DAT|4),
O(max |DAT|2) respectively, where |DAT| is the size of a DAT. Asides, a node has maximum
n−1 connections. Thus, the for loops at line 19 (or line 21, or 23) and 24 are at most n−1
iterations. Thus, the upper bound of the complexity of the while loop is O(n2 ·max |DAT|4).
Therefore, the complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n2 ·max |DAT|4).
6.4.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Once a DAT of a node is calculated, the DAT and the metrics’ values of its annotated
alternatives are unchanged given that the hypergraph does not change.
Proof. According to Algorithm 2, a DAT of a node x is ready to calculate when all its children’s
DATs are property calculated (see line 26). One it has been calculated, its status is updated
to visited (see line 12). Hence its DAT will not be touch later due to the check in line 11.
6.4.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. When merging two design alternative tables DAT(x) and DAT(y) by using the merge
operator defined in equation (6.7), a winner annotated design alternativeD in the merged de-
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sign alternative table corresponds to a winner in the either DAT(x), or DAT(y) if:
• D is a Max Belief winner, or
• D is a Residual Disbelief winner and annotated design alternatives between DAT(x) and
DAT(y) are disjoint, or
• D is a Max Disbelief winner.
Proof. Let DAT(z)=DAT(x)mergeDAT(y) be the merged design alternative table of DAT(x)
and DAT(y). Suppose thatDZ is a winner annotated design alternative in DAT(z).
Case 1 (DZ is a Max Belief winner), we have:
pimb .DZ = max
DZ i∈DAT(z)
pimb .DZ i
From (6.3)(6.4)(6.7), we have:
∃D ∈DAT(x)∪DAT(y) :pimb .DZ =pimb .D∧piD .DZ =piD .D
Suppose thatD is not a winner in neither DAT(x) nor DAT(y), it implies:
∃D′ ∈DAT(x)∪DAT(y) :pimb .D′ >pimb .D =pimb .DZ
⇒∃DZ ′consolidateDAT(z)D′ ∈DAT(z) :pimb .DZ ′ >pimb .DZ
This contradicts to the premise thatDZ is a Max Belief winner.
Case 2 (DZ is a Residual Disbelief winner), we have:
pir d .DZ = min
DZ i∈DAT(z)
pir d .DZ i
In the case that alternatives are disjoint between DAT(x) and DAT(y), we have:
∃D ∈DAT(x)∪DAT(y) :pir d .D =pir d .DZ
ifD is not a Residual Disbelief winner, it implies that:
∃D′ ∈DAT(x)∪DAT(y) :pir d .D′ <pir d .D
⇒∃DZ ′ = consolidateDAT(z)(D′) :pir d .DZ ′ <pir d .DZ
This contradicts to the premise thatDZ is a Residual Disbelief winner.
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Case 3 (DZ is a Max Disbelief winner), we have:
pimd .DZ = min
DZ i∈DAT(z)
pimd .DZ i
Similarly, from (6.3)(6.4)(6.7), we have one of following cases hold.
– Case 3a: ∃D ∈ {Di ∈DAT(x)|piD .Di =piD .DZ } such that:pimd .D = 0, orpimd .D =max{pimb .D j |D j ∈DAT(x)∧piD .D j 6⊆piD .DZ }=pimd .DZ
If pimd .D = 0, obviously X is a Max Disbelief winner. Otherwise, suppose that X is
not a Max Disbelief winner, it implies that:
∃D′ ∈ {D′|D′ ∈DAT(x)∧piD .D′ 6=piD .DZ }⊂DAT(z) :pimd .D′ <pimd .D
This contradicts to the premise that Z is a Max Disbelief winner.
– Case 3b: ∃D ∈ {Di ∈DAT(y)|piD .Di =piD .DZ }. Similarly we also have D is a Max
Disbelief winner.
6.4.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. When combining two design alternative tables DAT(x) and DAT(y) by using the
join operator defined in equation (6.6), a winner annotated design alternativeD in the joined
design alternative table is always the combination of two winners in DAT(x) and DAT(y) if:
• D is a Max Belief winner, or
• D is a Residual Disbelief winner and annotated design alternatives between DAT(x) and
DAT(y) are disjoint, or
• D is a Max Disbelief winner.
Proof. Let Dwx =
〈
Dwx ,mb
w
x ,r d
w
x ,md
w
x ,φ
w
x
〉
, Dlx =
〈
D lx ,mb
l
x ,r d
l
x ,md
l
x ,φ
l
x
〉
respectively de-
note winner and loser alternatives in DAT(x). Similarly, Dwy ,D
l
y respectively denote winner
and loser alternatives in DAT(y).
Let DAT(z)= {Dx joinDy |Dx ∈DAT(x),Dy ∈DAT(y)}, the application of operator consolidate
on DAT(z) will be the output of combining DAT(x) and DAT(y) by using join operator.
consolidateDAT(z)=DAT(x) joinDAT(y)
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An annotated design alternative in DAT(z) is a combination of either two loser annotated de-
sign alternatives (denoted asDz0), or a loser and a winner1 (denoted asDz1), or two winners
(denoted asDz2). We have:
Dz0 =
〈
D lx ∪D ly ,mblx ·mbly ,1− r d lx · r d ly ,0,φlx ∪φly
〉
Dz1 =
〈
D lx ∪Dwy ,mblx ·mbwy ,1− r d lx · r d wy ,0,φlx ∪φwy
〉
Dz2 =
〈
Dwx ∪Dwy ,mbwx ·mbwy ,1− r d wx · r d wy ,0,φwx ∪φwy
〉
Case 1 ( Max Belief winner/loser: mbwx >mblx), we have
mblx ·mbly −mbwx ·mbwy ≤mblx ·mbwy −mbwx ·mbwy
=mbwy (mblx −mbwx )< 0
⇒Dz2 is a winner alternative in DAT(z).
Applying similar proof in Case 1 (Lemma 2) we haveDz2 is also a winner in consolidateDAT(z).
Case 2 (Residual Disbelief winner/loser: r d wx < r d lx), we have
1− r d lx · r d ly −
(
1− r d wx · r d wy
)
≥ 1− r d lx · r d wy −
(
1− r d wx · r d wy
)
= r d wy · (r d wx − r d lx)= r d wy · (r d lx − r d wx )≥ 0
⇒Dz2 is a winner alternative in DAT(z).
Applying similar proof in Case 2 (Lemma 2) we haveDz2 is also a winner in consolidateDAT(z)
if alternatives in DAT(z) are disjoint.
Case 3 (Max Disbelief winner/loser: md wx <md lx)
Let D̂lx =
{
Dx ∈DAT(x)|piD .Dx 6⊆piD .Dlx
}
be the set of annotated design alternatives that
are not supported byDlx . Similarly, we also have: D̂
w
x ,D̂z0,D̂z2. We have:
D̂z0 ⊆ (D̂lx ×DAT(y))∪ (DAT(x)× D̂ly )
=
{
Dx joinDy
∣∣∣Dx ∈ D̂lx ,Dy ∈DAT(y)}∪{Dx joinDy ∣∣∣Dx ∈DAT(x),Dy ∈ D̂ly }
D̂z2 ⊆ (D̂wx ×DAT(y))∪ (DAT(x)× D̂wy )
1Because join is a commutative operator, DAT(x) joinDAT(y) is equivalent to DAT(y) joinDAT(x). Therefore,
the combination of a loser in DAT(x) with a winner in DAT(y) is similar to the combination of a winner in
DAT(x) with a loser in DAT(y).
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Hence, when we apply consolidate on DAT(z), the Max Disbelief of Dz0, and Dz2 is as
follows:
MaxD(Dz0)=max
( a︷ ︸︸ ︷
max{pimd .Dx |Dx ∈ D̂lx} ·max
{
pimd .Dy |Dy ∈DAT(y)
}
,
max{pimd .Dx |Dx ∈DAT(x)} ·max{pimd .Dy |Dy ∈ D̂ly }︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
)
MaxD(Dz2)=max
( c︷ ︸︸ ︷
max{pimd .Dx |Dx ∈ D̂wx } ·max
{
pimd .Dy |Dy ∈DAT(y)
}
,
max{pimd .Dx |Dx ∈DAT(x)} ·max{pimd .Dy |Dy ∈ D̂wy }︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
)
SinceDlx ,D
l
y are Max Disbelief losers,D
w
x ,D
w
y are winners, we have:
max
{
pimd .Dx
∣∣∣Dx ∈ D̂lx }>max{pimd .Dx ∣∣∣Dx ∈ D̂wx }
max
{
pimd .Dy
∣∣∣Dy ∈ D̂ly }>max{pimd .Dx ∣∣∣Dy ∈ D̂wy }
It implies: a > c,b > d ⇒MaxD(Dz0)>MaxD(Dz2)
Similarly, we have MaxD(Dz1)>MaxD(Dz2). Therefore, we haveDz2 is a Max Disbelief
winner.
6.4.5 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. The algorithm generateDAT*() is polynomial in the number of nodes O(n
2)
and exponential in O(max |MR(n)|), where |MR(n)| is the maximum number of multiple-run
candidates.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we have the complexity of generateDAT*()
depends on the complexity of propagateDAT*() (i.e., Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4 is almost identical to Algorithm 2, except calling to filter() each time child
DATsare merged or combined. Basically, filter() could be a loop on all entries in a DAT. Thus
its complexity is O(max |DAT|) where max |DAT| is the maximum DAT size. Similar to proof
of Proposition 1, the complexity of Algorithm 4 is O(n2 ·max |DAT|5)
As discussed, max |DAT| = 3+2max |MR(n)|. Hence the complexity of the algorithm is O(n2+
n2 ·25·max |MR(n)|).
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6.4.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. The algorithm generateDAT*() using the filter operator as of (6.12) termi-
nates in polynomial time in the number of nodes O(n2).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we have the complexity of the algorithm is:
O(n2 ·max |DAT|5). Here we select only one Max Belief winner, max |D AT | = 1. Therefore,
the complexity of the algorithm is O(n2).
6.4.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. When the algorithm generateDAT*() terminates, each entry in the DAT of
the root node is either a Max Belief winner, or a Residual Disbelief winner, or a Max Disbelief
winner.
Proof. Base case: for node x is a leaf, the DAT(x) has one single entry which consists of x
itself. This entry is obvious a winner.
Induction case: for node y is a non-leaf node; and y have children nodes xi such that
DAT(xi ) contains all winners. If y is a compound node, the DAT(y) is computed by com-
bining all DAT(xi ) by using join operator. According to Lemma 3, all winners in DAT(y) are
composed from winners in DAT(xi ). It means all winners in DAT(y) are actually winners even
when all losers are removed from DAT(xi ).
Similarly, if y is a requirement node or an observable node, the DAT(y) is computed
by combining all DAT(xi ) by using merge operator. According to Lemma 2, all winners in
DAT(y) are composed from winners in DAT(xi ). It means all winners in DAT(y) are actually
winners even when all losers are removed from DAT(xi ).
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a series of algorithms that incrementally calculate quantitative met-
rics in the proposed framework described in chapter 5. The algorithms were incremen-
tal as they recalculated the metrics according to any changes made to the requirements
model based on the previous calculation. Thus it could minimize the calculation effort for
such changes. The algorithms relied on hypergraph as a structure to capture requirements
models. The computational complexity of the algorithms were also analyzed and formally
proved.
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In the next chapter, we are going to present UNICORN, a proof-of-concept prototype of
the CASE tool that provides a GUI editor for hypergraph requirements model, and imple-
ments the algorithms described in this chapter.
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UNICORN: TOOLING AND THE FIRST (SELF)
EVALUATION
This chapter presents UNICORN, a CASE tool for modeling and reasoning about the
uncertainty of requirements evolution. The tool provides graphical constructs as well
as different views of requirements evolution to assist users to model requirements evo-
lution. The tool also supports the evolution analysis in which facilitate the selection
of design alternative. We additionally conduct a performance simulation for the im-
plementation of the algorithms, and a self-evaluation study on a large example.
T
HE chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 presents an overview of major features.
Section 7.2 describes the high level architecture of the tool. Section 7.3 illustrates how
the tool apply for the example previous discussed in Section 5.1. Section 7.4 presents
a simulation to the performance of the tool. Section 7.5 illustrates the application of the tool
in a large example. Section 7.6 summarizes this chapter.
7.1 Features Overview
UNICORN is an Eclipse-based prototype that aims to demonstrate the proposed framework
described in Chapter 5 in terms of modeling and reasoning. The tool is provided as a set of
EMF-based Eclipse plug-ins written in Java, relying on standard EMF technologies such as
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GMF, Xtext. The features of the tool can be categorized into two major categories: Modeling
support and Reasoning support.
The modeling support includes features necessary to model requirements evolution. Im-
portant features in this category are as follows:
• Support requirements evolution modeling. The GUI editor of UNICORN provides sev-
eral constructs to draw a hypergraph for a requirements model with evolution rules.
The structure of hypergraph supported by UNICORN allows users to model the evolu-
tion from any requirements from the very top most requirements (i.e., root require-
ments) to the leaf ones. Figure 7.1 illustrates a simple example consisting of three re-
quirements, where the top requirement evolves to other one.
• Support different views. Several views are supported to assist designers. In particular,
Normal View shows the complete requirements with evolution rules; Evolution View
presents only evolving parts of the model; and Original View displays the requirements
model without any evolution.
• Support large model. A large requirements model can be partitioned into several sub
models. Sub models are edited in separated windows. Each model can reference to
other models. Changes in a model will be automatically reflected to other models.
• Support customization and extension. The graphical constructs of UNICORN are highly
customizable. Adding a new constructs with custom figures and attributes, or modify-
ing existing constructs can be done via configuration files and the plug-in architecture.
This enables UNICORN to support the modeling of requirements in other RE languages
without changing the UNICORN source code.
Figure 7.1 presents the basic constructs by which we draw requirements models in UNI-
CORN. A requirement entity represents a requirement. A refines relation connects a re-
quirement to other requirement. It means that the parent requirement can be fulfilled if its
child is fulfilled. If more than one children are required, these children connect to an extra
compound node, which in turn connects to the parent requirement. By allowing several re-
fines relations to connect to a requirement, we can model the different design alternatives
of a controllable rule. An observable entity represents an observable rule where the origi-
nal requirement is connected by an evolves relation. Evolution possibilities are connected
by evolution possibility relations. Elements in other diagram could be referenced by special
construct off-diagram reference.
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Figure 7.1: The constructs to modeling requirements evolution in UNICORN.
In Figure 7.1, the original requirements model Before has three requirements: 1, 2, and
3. 1 is refined to 2 and 3. Therefore, Before has one design alternative, which is {2, 3}. Before
might evolve to a possibility Afteri in which 4 is refined to either 5 or 6. The evolution prob-
ability for this evolution is 0.6. Besides, Before might remain unchanged with the probability
of 0.4. The observable and controllable rules captured by this figure are as follows.
ro(Before)=
{
Before
0.6−−→Afteri ,Before 0.4−−→Before
}
rc (Before))=
{
Before−→ {2, 3}}
rc (Afteri )=
{
Afteri −→ {5} ,Afteri −→ {6}
}
The reasoning support provides an environment for developing automated analyses on
requirements models. For example, the graphical models could be transformed into a data
structure that facilitates the analysis. The traceability between the modeling constructs and
transformed data structure is also maintained. Currently, we have implemented following
analysis:
• Evolution analysis: This analysis walks through the entire requirements models and
calculate quantitative metrics (Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief ) for
each design alternative. The analysis can incrementally update the metric values with
respect to changes in the model as soon as the user changes the models.
7.2 Architectural Overview
The tool architecture is specially designed to support a high level of customization and ex-
tension. Figure 7.2 presents the overall architecture of the UNICORN tool. In this figure, com-
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ponents are depicted by rectangles. The headed-arrow connections denote the interaction
between components where the source components invoke (or use) the target ones. These
components are briefly described as follows:
• The Universal Data Model is a common storage for the constructs of all models. Since
graphical constructs could be defined by users (e.g., add new construct with custom
attributes, or add new attributes to existing constructs), the Universal Data Model is a
meta-meta model (see Figure 7.3).
• The Language Registry maintains definitions of graphical constructs in requirements
models, as well as conversion rules to transform the data model to other data struc-
tures used by analysis. The construct definitions and conversion rules are defined in
configuration files, which are fully customizable.
• The Data Service uses the construct definitions in the Language Registry to allow other
components to manipulate the data stored in the data model.
• The GUI Service is in charge of manipulating graphical objects and data model. It em-
ploys the Custom GUI components to create several GUI objects (e.g., construct fig-
ures, themes, and so on) consumed by the GUI Editor, which is a front-end graphical
editor.
• The Model Conversion Engine uses the conversion rules stored in the Language Reg-
istry to convert the requirements model to the underlying data structures used by the
custom analysis.
• The Custom Analysis is a set of analyses run on the editing requirements model. Each
custom analysis has a Visualizer to show the analysis result.
Figure 7.3 describes the class diagram of the Universal Data Model. The Element is an
abstract class representing any element in the model, which could be either an entity, or a
relation. An Entity could be a requirement, or an observable node. A relation captures the
relationship between entities. An Attribute is a special kind of element, holding the attribute
value of an element.
Figure 7.4 shows the syntax of the construct definition file in the Extended Backus-Naur
format. To keep the syntax tidy and clear we do not provide complete definition of some non-
terminal production rule such as expression, as well as common terminal symbols such as
identifier (ID). The definition file begins with a keyword language followed by an ID, which
7.2. ARCHITECTURAL OVERVIEW 89
Language Registry
Universal Data Model
Construct Definitions
Model Conversion Rules
Data Service
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Figure 7.2: The overall architecture of the UNICORN tool.
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Figure 7.3: The class diagram of the Universal Data Model
.
is the language name and a set of elements. An element is either an entity or a relation.
Each element has a set of attributes, which has name, data type (optional), and initial value.
Figure 7.5 exhibits an example where the requirement construct is defined with respect
to the grammar denoted in Figure 7.4. The requirement construct is an entity whose graph-
ical representation is a round rectangle with a label inside. The label is to show and edit the
name and the description of this requirement. There is one text field Actor in requirement.
The initial value of this field is a blank.
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1 language ::= "language" ID (element)* ";"
2 element ::= ("entity"|"relation") ID "{" attribute * "}"
3 attribute ::= ("field")? ID (":" type)? "=" expression ";"
4 tag ::= ID ":" expression
5 type :: = "string"|"float"|"date"|"boolean"|ID
Figure 7.4: The compact syntax of the construct definition file.
1 entity requirement {
2 figure = new RoundRectFigure() { Size=(50,60),
3 addChildFigure(new CenterLabelFigure("req_name"), DOCK_FILL)};
4 req_name_parser = {pattern="[{0}]\n{1}", fields=(Name, Description)};
5 field Actor: string = "";}
Figure 7.5: A fragment of a construct definition file.
7.3 Screen Shots
We demonstrate the features supported by the tool in a scenario previously described in Sec-
tion 4.1. The scenario concerns the evolution in the requirements models of the ISS-ENT and
BP [Adm09, section 5.6]. In this scenario we focus on the authentication and the implemen-
tation of boundary protection (BP) services.
Modeling requirements evolution. Figure 7.6 illustrates the requirements model with evo-
lution rules of the scenario. The model says that the requirement RQ-0 is refined to both
RQ-1 and RQ-2. RQ-1 is later refined to RQ-3, and so on. RQ-1 has an evolution rule where
RQ-1 might remain unchanged with probability 0.4, or might evolve such that RQ-1 will be
refined, in a new way, into RQ-3, RQ-4, and RQ-5. The rest of the diagram can be read in the
similar manner. Due to space limit, some screen shots (e.g., different views) are not provided.
Interested readers are referred to the web site of the tool 1.
Reasoning about requirements evolution. Figure 7.7 shows the evolution analysis on the
requirements model of the scenario, in which the evolution metrics for each design alterna-
tive are calculated. The analysis result is shown in two tabs. The first tab reports possible
alternatives derived from the model and their corresponding evolution metrics. The second
tab displays the DAT, which is an internal structure stored at every node in the model to cal-
1http://disi.unitn.it/~tran/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/Unicorn
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Figure 7.6: The requirements model of the scenario with evolution rules.
Figure 7.7: The evolution analysis on the requirements model of the scenario.
culate the evolution metrics. Additionally, users can specify their own alternative, and have
its evolution metrics calculated.
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To improve the readability, only incoming connections for the root and a selected (gray) node are
shown.
Figure 7.8: An example of generated hypergraph for simulation.
Any changes in the diagram will be automatically reflected in the analysis result. Since
the analysis on requirements evolution is incremental, only changed nodes in the model are
recalculated. This improves the overall performance of the tool.
7.4 Performance Simulation of the Algorithms
In this section, we describe a simulation to assess the performance of the above algorithms.
Particularly, we randomly generate several hypergraphs, then we run the algorithms on these
hypergraphs and measure the execution time. The performance of the algorithms can be
evaluated by the execution time of the algorithms on hypergraphs with different complexi-
ties.
The complexity of a generated hypergraph is represented by the number of requirements
n, the maximum level of refinement (or depth) h, and average degree of nodes d . To the
simulation purpose, we generate hypergraphs in different scales: small (50 requirements),
medium (500 requirements), large (1,000 requirements), and very large (5,000 requirements).
For each scale, we generate 40 hypergraphs with the level of refinement h ranged from 3 to
10.
A generated hypergraph at scale of n requirement nodes and h levels of refinement is
generated as follows. Firstly, we create a matrix (h−1)× l of requirement nodes, where l is
the number of leaf nodes: l ≈ (n−1)(h−1) . Secondly, we create a root node that refines to all nodes
in the first row of the matrix. Thirdly, for every node x at row i th (i = 1..h−2), we create r
refines relations (r is a random number from 1 to l ) that connect to l nodes at row i +1.
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Left: the distribution of total nodes (requirement + compound nodes) in hypergraphs. Right: the distribution
of the average degree per node in hypergraphs.
Figure 7.9: The complexity of the simulation hypergraphs.
Example 7.1 Figure 7.8 exemplifies a generated hypergraph at scale n = 40, and refinement
level h = 6. The hypergraph is the matrix 4×4 of requirement nodes. The figure also demon-
strates a node with 2 refines relations (r = 2).
Figure 7.9 shows the complexity of generated hypergraphs in terms of total nodes (in-
clude requirement nodes and compound nodes) per each scale, and the average degree (i.e.,
the number of incoming and outgoing connections) per node in hypergraphs.
Figure 7.10 reports the simulation performance of the algorithms on generated hyper-
graphs in terms of the execution times. The simulation is performed on a Windows 7 ma-
chine with duo-core 2.7GHz CPU, and 6GB of RAM. For small and medium models (the
number of requirements is around 500) the execution time is almost immediately (less than
1 seconds). For large models (the number of requirements is around 1,000), it is a bit longer,
but still quite fast (less than 3 seconds). The execution time significantly increase for very
large models (the number of requirements is around 5,000) where the total number of nodes
(requirements and compounds) is more than 10,000 and the average degree per node is more
than 300. However, the absolute execution time is still relative fast (approximately 10 section
for 50% of the cases). Clearly, it is an evidence that the algorithm has very good performance
with respect to the complexity of hypergraphs.
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Figure 7.10: The execution time of the algorithms on simulation hypergraphs.
7.5 A Self-Evaluation Case Study
In this section we conduct a case study for the tool in both modeling and reasoning about
evolution in requirements model. Notably, the term case study here is as same as the one
used by other RE researchers, but is not the one defined in the field of empirical evaluation.
In this case study, we take a big requirements model in Si* language (approximately 150
goals), transform this model into hypergraph , and run the algorithms to enumerate design
alternatives and calculate their evolution metrics. We then report the execution time of the
algorithms. The details of this self-evaluation are described as follows.
Scenario. The scenario is from the ATM domain, which concerns the management and
resolution of conflicts in the trajectories of aircrafts. The scenario is briefed as follows. Each
flight has its own trajectory in the airspace, called Reference Business Trajectory (RBT). Oc-
casionally, there is conflict among these RBTs. Upon conflict detection, the Air Traffic Ser-
vice Unit (ATSU) notifies the conflict to all downstream ATSUs and negotiates for a new RBT
alternative provisional. Finally, ATSU notifies the involved aircrafts the new RBT alterantive.
In this evaluation we mostly focus on the evolution of security requirements in the above
scenario.
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of the hypergraph.
Number Min Max Average
Number of Nodes 178 – – –
Depth 26 – – –
Number of observable rules 5 – – –
Number of controllable rules 16 3 4 3.25
Number of OR branches 27 2 5 2.45
Number of design alternatives 864 – – –
Modeling. The modeling includes two phases. At first we model the requirements from
this scenario using Si*. Here, instead of working on a very big model with unreadable text, we
divide the model into sub models of requirements assigned to particular actors in the system.
The Si* diagrams for the requirements model of the scenario are illustrated in Figure 7.11–
7.18.
In the next phase, we analyze potential changes of the requirements model of the sce-
nario to identify evolution rules. Then we apply the proposed framework to model evolu-
tion. We manually transform the requirements model plus evolution rules into a hypergraph
requirements model. We use UNICORN to model this hypergraph. Also, we divided the hy-
pergraph requirements model into several sub diagrams. Cross-diagram references are done
via Off-diagram reference constructs. Figure 7.19–7.26 present these diagrams.
Reasoning. We run the evolution analysis implemented in UNICORN on the hypergraph.
Table 7.1 presents some descriptive statistics of the hypergraph. The analysis take approx-
imately 4 seconds on a 2x2.2 GHz Windows 7 machine with 6MB of RAM. A variant imple-
mentation of the algorithms, which keeps only winner alternatives (see Section 6.3), takes
about 0.2 second on the same machine. Both implementations suggest 11 design alterna-
tives with most optimal evolution metrics values (i.e., highest Max Belief, lowest Residual
Disbelief, and lowest Residual Disbelief).
7.6 Chapter Summary
We have presented UNICORN, a tool for modeling and reasoning about requirements evolu-
tion. By modeling support, UNICORN provided several customizable graphical constructs to
model the requirements evolution. By reasoning support, UNICORN provided an environ-
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Figure 7.11: Requirements diagram for Airspace Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) actor.
ment where the graphical notation could be transformed to a data structure facilitating the
analysis. UNICORN demonstrated this by implementing an analysis for requirements evolu-
tion.
To continue evaluating the proposed framework, in the next chapter we study the effec-
tiveness of the proposed framework, particularly the modeling approach by conducting a
series of empirical studies with many kinds of participants who are different levels of exper-
tise knowledge in both ATM domain and the proposed framework.
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Figure 7.12: Requirements diagram for Planning Controller (PLC) actor.
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Figure 7.13: Requirements diagram for Air Traffic Control Center (ATCC) actor.
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Figure 7.14: Requirements diagram for Admin actor.
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Figure 7.15: Requirements diagram for Executive Controller (EC) actor.
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Figure 7.16: Requirements diagram for Conflict Tools System (CTS) actor.
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Figure 7.17: Requirements diagram for Flight Data Processing System (FDPS) actor.
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Figure 7.18: Requirements diagram for Aircraft actor.
Figure 7.19: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Airspace Navigation Service Provider
(ANSP) actor.
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Figure 7.20: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Planning Controller (PLC) actor.
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Figure 7.21: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Air Traffic Control Center (ATCC) actor.
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Figure 7.22: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Admin actor.
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Figure 7.23: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Executive Controller (EC) actor.
Figure 7.24: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Conflict Tools System (CTS) actor.
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Figure 7.25: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Flight Data Processing System (FDPS)
actor.
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Figure 7.26: Hypergraph requirements diagram for Aircraft actor.
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EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE
FRAMEWORK WITH THIRD-PARTY
In this chapter, we report the results of the empirical evaluation on the modeling ap-
proach of the proposed framework. The studies involve participants who have differ-
ent level of knowledge of the framework and of the ATM domain. The results from the
studies show that the modeling approach is effective in capturing evolution of com-
plex systems. In addition, domain knowledge and method knowledge do not have an
observable effect on the effectiveness of the framework.
T
HIS chapter presents the results of an empirical evaluation conducted on the evolu-
tion modeling approach of the proposed framework (previously proposed in chapter
5). The evaluation aimed to assess the effectiveness of the approach in modeling re-
quirements evolution and whether the effectiveness depends on the analyst’s level of knowl-
edge of the approach and of the application domain. To this end, three empirical studies had
been conducted with different types of participants, namely domain experts, researchers,
and students, with different level of knowledge of the modeling approach and of the appli-
cation domain.
As context for the evaluation, the ATM domain was chosen for three main reasons. First,
ATM systems are complex and critical systems that are going through significant architec-
tural, organizational, and operational changes as planned by the SESAR [EUR03]. Second,
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change management is a critical issue in the ATM domain. The need of system engineering
techniques to support change management is well recognized [Gra+09]. Last but not least
there is a significant body of research about empirical evaluations of requirements engineer-
ing approaches in the ATM domain [MR05; Mai+04; Ncu+07]. For example, in [Mai+04], De-
parture Manager (DMAN), a system for managing departure of aircrafts, is used as context
of evaluation. This makes it easier to benchmark the evaluation studies. In the empirical
evaluation, we have focused on changes associated with the introduction of a new decision
supporting tool, AMAN, and SWIM in the ATM domain.
Figure 8.1 summarizes how the empirical evaluation studies in this chapter developed
along a two-year horizon. First, a study had been conducted within the researchers who
have proposed the approach to model evolving requirements. Then, the envelope has been
pushed further by carrying out a series of workshops with domain experts and industry prac-
titioners as in [Ncu+07]. Last, a study with MSc students was conducted.
The researchers (or also called method experts, interchangeably) have a good knowledge
of method (i.e., the modeling approach proposed in chapter 5), but their knowledge of do-
main is limited. In contrast, domain experts (or also called practitioners, interchangeably)
have a good knowledge of the domain, but their knowledge of the method is limited. The
students are novices as their knowledge of domain and method are both limited.
The results from the studies show that the modeling approach is effective in capturing
evolution of complex systems. In fact, the studies showed that it is reasonably possible
for people different than the method’s own inventor (such as students or domain experts)
to build significantly large models, and identify possible ways for these models to evolve.
Moreover, the studies have shown that for domain experts, method experts, and novices,
if they are supplied with appropriate knowledge (i.e., knowledge of method for domain ex-
perts, knowledge of domain for method experts, and knowledge of both domain and method
for novices), they can model the evolution modeling with no significant difference.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.1 briefly discusses how we apply the pro-
posed modeling approach in Si* modeling language. We describe the research methodology
in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 presents the analysis of the data collected during the studies.
Section 8.4 summarizes the main findings. Section 8.5 discusses the threats to validity. Sec-
tion 8.6 presents lessons learnt from the studies. Section 8.7 summarizes the chapter.
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Figure 8.1: Chronology of the family of empirical studies
8.1 Requirements Evolution in Si* Modeling Language
The evolution modeling approach discussed in chapter 5 is independent from any partic-
ular RE modeling language. In the evaluation studies, we use the Si* language [Mas+10] to
represent requirements models. Si* is founded on the concepts of actor, goal, task, resource
and the relations AND/OR decomposition, means-end, and delegation. An actor is an active
entity that models humans as well as software agents and organizations. A goal captures a
strategic interest that actor wants to be achieved. A task represents a particular course of
actions that produces a desired effect. It can be executed to satisfy a goal. A resource is an
artifact produced/consumed by a goal or a task. AND/OR decomposition is used to refine a
goal into sub-goals. The AND-decomposition means that the parent goal will be achieved if
all its sub-goals are achieved or satisfied. The OR-decomposition, instead, means the par-
ent goal will be achieved if at least one of its subgoals are achieved. The branches of a goal
decomposition represent different design alternatives to fulfill the top goal. A delegation re-
lation between two actors marks a formal passage of responsibility (delegation execution) or
authority (delegation permission) from an actor (delegator) to the actor receiving the respon-
sibility/authority (delegatee) to achieve a goal or to provide a resource.
Actors, goals, tasks and resources are graphically represented as circles, ovals, hexagons
and rectangles, respectively. Delegation of execution and delegation of permission relations
are graphically modeled as edges labeled with De and Dp, respectively.
We will now illustrate the concept of evolution rules using a simplified version of the
application scenarios introduced in section 4.2 of chapter 4.
Example 8.1 (Before Model) Recall to the evaluation scenarios described in Section 4.2,
Figure 8.2 presents an excerpt of the goal model for the Sector Team before the introduc-
tion of AMAN. In the Sector Team’s goal model we do not decompose the top goals into
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[3] Arrival sequence 
delivered to aircrafs
[4] Advisories 
to aircrafts 
prepared
[5] Advisories to 
aircrafts delivered
Sector 
Team
AND
[1] Arrival sequence 
managed
[2] Arrival sequence 
optimally generated
AND
Figure 8.2: An excerpt of the goal model for the Sector Team.
operational tasks to keep the model simple and easy to read. The top goal is g1:“Arrival se-
quence managed”, which is and-decomposed into g2:“Arrival sequence optimally generated”
and g3:“Arrival sequence delivered to aircrafts”. The latter goal g3 is further and-decomposed
into g4:“Advisories to aircrafts prepared” and g5:“Advisories to aircrafts delivered”.
To represent an observable rule in a Si* model, we introduce a new graphical construct,
which is the container of the before and after models. When a model is large and complex,
wrapping the entire model inside a container is sometimes hard to follow. Therefore, we
recommend to analyze the evolution in sub parts of the models. However, if a big model is
unavoidable, it requires the modeling tool to have a large-model support mechanism. The
prototype for modeling requirements evolution (see Chapter 7 ) addresses this problem by
dividing a large model into several diagrams. A diagram then can link to others by using a
special modeling construct – Off-diagram Reference, see Section 7.1.
Controllable rules are implicitly represented by OR decomposition, a native Si* graphical
construct that allows designers to express alternative sub-goals to implement a parent goal.
Therefore, in Si*, we represent controllable rules by means of OR decompositions.
Example 8.2 (Evolution Rules) We now illustrate how the Sector Team’s goal model in Fig-
ure 8.2 can evolve. We focus on goal g3:“Arrival sequence delivered to aircrafts". We call Before
the sub-model rooted at g3. The figure represents one observable rule and one controllable
rule. The observable rule
ro(Before)=
{
Before
0.4−−→After1,Before 0.35−−→After2,Before 0.25−−→Before
}
consists of three evolution branches: each branch corresponds to the arrow that links the be-
fore model Before to one of the after models After1,After2 and Before. In the first evolution
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The rectangles with label on top are the containers of Before and After model. The label is the name of the
contained model. Each container has a chevon at the bottom to collapse/expand its content. The arrows
labeled with probability connecting two containers determines that the source model evolves to the target
model.
Figure 8.3: The graphical representation of the observable for goal g3.
possibility, g4 is delegated to AMAN. This dependency is presented by the line labeled with
De connecting goal g4 to the actor AMAN. The actor AMAN satisfies g4 by either g9:“Basic
advisory generator", or by g10:“Detail advisory generator". The probability that this possibility
becomes true is 0.4. In the second evolution possibility, Before might evolve to After2 where
a new goal g11:“Detail advisories to aircrafts prepared" replaces g4. The g11 is also delegated
to AMAN, and it is fulfilled by g10:“Detail advisory generator". The probability that this possi-
bility occurs is 0.35. The third evolution possibility is that the model Before does not change
with probability 0.25.
The controllable rule is represented by the OR-decomposition of g4 into goals g9 and
g10 in After1. This rule has only two branches corresponding to the branches of the OR-
decomposition.
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8.2 Evaluation Method
In this section we present the research questions and hypotheses (Section 8.2.1), and the
protocol followed to conduct the evaluation studies (Section 8.2.2).
8.2.1 Research Objectives
Following the Goal-Question-Metric template [BR88], the goal of the studies is to assess if
the method proposed in Chapter 5 is effective in capturing potential evolution of complex
system requirements and whether effectiveness is influenced by knowledge of the domain
or the method itself. Given the goal of the evaluation (see also RQ1 – Section 2.1, and E2 –
Section 2.2), the main questions to be answered are:
RQ3 Is the approach effective in modeling requirements evolution of complex systems?
RQ4 How does effectiveness of the approach is impacted by knowledge of domain and knowl-
edge of method?
The definition of effectiveness is borrowed from the Method Evaluation Model proposed
by Moody [Moo03] where the effectiveness of a method is defined as how well it achieves its
objectives. Effectiveness can be measured by evaluating the quantity and/or quality of the
results (output measures). Thus, to measure the effectiveness of the method to answer RQ3
we use the following variables that correspond to the main characteristics of evolution rules,
the main outcome of the method’s application:
• size of baseline. It is the number of unique model elements and interconnections in
the before model of an observable rule.
• size of change. It is number of unique model elements and interconnections across all
after models that are not in the before model or disappeared from the before model of
an observable rule.
• number of evolution rules.
• number of branches for evolution rules.
The calculation of these variables is illustrated using a simplified version of the scenarios
introduced in section 8.1.
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Example 8.3 (Counting Dependent Variables) The dependent variables for the evolution
rule described in Example 8.2 can be computed as follows:
• size of baseline = 8, which includes 1 actor (Sector Team), 5 unique goals (g1–g5), 2
AND-decompositions (g1 decomposes to g2, g3; and g3 decomposes to g4, g5).
• size of change =11, which includes 1 new actor (AMAN) + 1 deleted goal (g4) + 3 new
unique goals (g9, g10, g11) + 2 De-dependency + 1 new OR-decomposition + 2 new
AND-decompositions (g3 decomposes to g5, g11; g11 decompose to g10) + 1 deleted
AND-decomposition (g3 decomposes to g4, g5).
• number of evolution rules = 2, which includes 1 observable rule, and 1 controllable rule
(g4 OR-decomposes to g9, g10.)
• number of branches for evolution rules: the observable rule has 3 branches, and the
controllable rule has 2 branches.
To investigate the second research question RQ4, we use as control variables the method
knowledge and the domain knowledge of subjects participating in the studies. We also de-
fined the following set of null hypotheses Hn.m0: n denotes the research question to which
the hypothesis is related, m denotes the progressive hypothesis number, and 0 denotes that
it is a null hypothesis.
H2.10 There is no difference in the size of baseline identified by researchers, practitioners and
master students.
H2.20 There is no difference in the size of changes identified by researchers, practitioners and
master students.
H2.30 There is no difference in the number of evolution rules identified by researchers, prac-
titioners and master students.
H2.40 There is no difference in the number of branches for evolution rules identified by re-
searchers, practitioners and master students.
8.2.2 Experimental Design
The protocol consists of three main phases:
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• Training.
– Participants are administered a questionnaire to collect information about their
level of expertise in requirement engineering, security and on other methods they
may know.
– Participants have to attend lectures about the modeling approach and on the
ATM evolution scenarios depending on their expertise.
– Participants are given a training material consisting of the slides used for intro-
ducing the modeling approach and documents describing the evolution scenar-
ios and their requirements.
• Application.
– Participants work alone or in groups and apply the modeling approach to the
ATM evolution scenarios.
– At the end of the application phase, participants have to deliver a report docu-
menting the application of the method.
• Evaluation.
– Participants are requested to evaluate the modeling approach through focus group
interviews.
– An ATM domain expert evaluates the report delivered by the participants to assess
the quality of the models and the evolution rules drafted by them.
8.2.3 Experimental Procedure
We have conducted three studies with different kinds of participants. Following the termi-
nology in [NB12], first, we run a preliminary study where the participants were the same
researchers who have proposed the approach: the researchers have a good knowledge of the
approach but are domain limited. Second, we have conducted a study with domain experts
(a.k.a practitioners) who are novice to the approach, but have a very good knowledge of the
ATM domain. Third, we have conducted a study with master students who are method and
domain limited (i.e., they have little prior knowledge of the approach and of the ATM do-
main).
Table 8.1 summarizes the participants and their knowledge for each study. By ‘domain
knowledge’ (or knowledge of domain), we mean the participants’ level of expertise to the
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Table 8.1: Participants’ knowledge in the empirical studies.
Study Participants Method Knowledge Domain Knowledge
Study 1 Researchers Good Limited
Study 2 Domain Experts Limited Good
Study 3 Master Students Limited Limited
scenarios during the course of the evaluation studies. For the participants who do not have
any prior domain knowledge, we provide the scenario documents (see Table 4.1) in advance.
Similarly, by ‘method knowledge’ (or knowledge of method), we also mean the level of exper-
tise of participants to the modeling approach (in Section 5.1). We provide training workshop
or lectures to participants in advance. To conduct the studies, we have followed a mixed
research approach that combines hypothesis testing with focus group interviews.
In what follows, for each study, we describe the participants, and the setting of the study.
8.2.3.1 Study 1: Preliminary Study within the Research Group
Participants Three researchers have participated in the experiment. All of them had a
background in requirement engineering and security, and were involved in the design of
the approach to model and reason on requirements evolution.
Setting The researchers have first gained knowledge about the domain by attending half a
day workshop about ATM procedures and tools, and safety and security issues in ATM orga-
nized by Deep Blue. Deep Blue also provided to the research team documentation about
ATM process, AMAN and SWIM architecture and their functional and non functional re-
quirements. After the training on the ATM domain, the researchers were engaged in three
modeling sessions that took place at the University of Trento, each of the duration of half
a day. During these sessions, the researchers worked independently and modeled several
evolutionary scenarios following the approach to model requirements evolution. The sce-
narios considered include the introduction of the AMAN; the introduction of the ADS-B, a
new surveillance tool used to determine aircrafts’ positions, the introduction of the SWIM,
and the introduction of the AMAN and SWIM to connect AMAN with queue management
tools in other airports. For each of the evolutionary scenarios, the researchers have drawn
an original model Before and identified an evolution possibility A f teri . The Before model
and the After models have been modeled in the Si* language [Mas+10].
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8.2.3.2 Study 2: Workshops with ATM experts
The study was organized into three separated workshops held in April 2011 (WS1), June 2011
(WS2), and September 2011 (WS3). The workshops involved both researchers and ATM ex-
perts. The role of researchers was to facilitate the workshop and make observations. The role
of ATM experts was to apply the modeling approach and provide feedback about its effec-
tiveness to model requirements changes.
• Training workshop (WS1) trained the participants on the modeling approach.
• Evaluation workshop (WS2) focused on the evaluation of the quality of the models and
the evolution rules drawn by the researchers.
• Application workshop (WS3) asked ATM experts to apply the approach.
8.2.3.3 WS1: The Training Workshop
Participants Seven ATM experts have participated in WS1: four of them are Deep Blue
consultants with various background (e.g., Computer Science, Human Factors, Safety and
Security) who have worked in several projects related to the ATM domain. The other three
ATM experts have been working for an European Air Navigation Service Provider with dif-
ferent roles and responsibilities: one is a system administrator, while the other two are air
traffic controllers. The ATM experts have also extensive experience with the evaluation of
new operational concepts [EUR10] and are currently involved in various SESAR evaluations.
Setting The workshop started with a training session to introduce the experts to the re-
quirements engineering domain and the modeling approach for evolving requirements. Then,
ATM experts assessed the representation of changes (in terms of goals), the likelihood of par-
ticular change scenarios and the representation of such changes. Then, the research team
held a focus group with the participants to identify possible evolution rules.
8.2.3.4 WS2: The Evaluation Workshop
Participants Eight ATM experts participated in the second ATM workshop: seven partici-
pants were the same from the first workshop plus one additional participant who works as
ATM manager.
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Figure 8.4: Third ATM workshop.
Setting During the workshop, the researchers have shown the original model and the pos-
sibility of evolution model After they have drawn in Study 1. The quality of the requirements
models and of the evolution rules has been discussed and the models have been revised
with the domain experts. At the end of the workshop, the researchers conducted a semi-
structured interview to collect preliminary feedbacks on the approach.
8.2.3.5 WS3: The Application Workshop
Participants The third workshop had eleven participants: a security engineer from indus-
try and ten ATM experts. The ATM experts were the same as the other workshop plus two
other Deep Blue consultants who have expertise in Security and Safety for ATM systems.
Setting The workshop started with a brief presentation of the scenario to which the experts
had to apply the modeling approach to requirements evolution and a summary of the steps
they had to follow. The participants were divided into four heterogeneous groups (in terms of
expertise). Each group had to draw an original model and one possibility of evolution model
After using the Si* tool. At the end of the workshop, the research team engaged the partici-
pants into a focus group where the participants have provided additional feedback about the
modeling approach. The application phase and the focus groups session have been audio-
video recorded (see Figure 8.4). Due to the limited time availability of the participants, the
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application phase did not terminate with the third workshop but continued remotely over a
three months period going from September to November 2011.
8.2.3.6 Study 3: Study with Master Students
Participants Eleven students enrolled in the Master in Computer Science at the Univer-
sity of Trento participated in the study. They had a background in Security Engineering and
Information Systems.
Setting Students were trained about the approach for evolving requirements during the
Security Engineering course and they were introduced to the ATM domain. As additional
materials, they received three documents describing AMAN and SWIM users requirements,
SWIM content and information services, and AMAN and SWIM core architecture. Then, the
participants were divided in four groups. Each group chose a possible scenario associated
with the introduction of AMAN and SWIM network, and had to apply the approach for evolv-
ing requirements. After examining the scenarios, they drafted Si* models representing the
requirements of the chosen scenario, and identified controllable and observable evolution
rules. The participants were not observed during the application phase. Thus, to collect data
about the application phase, students were asked to deliver a report describing in details the
application of the approach and the generated models.
8.3 Quantitative Data Analysis
We collected the artifacts produced by researchers, domain experts and students as sum-
marized in Table 8.2. The table reports for researchers, domain experts and students the
mean and standard deviations of size of baseline, size of changes, and number of branches
for controllable and observable rules.
To take into account the quality of the evolution rules and requirements models gener-
ated by students and researchers, we asked to a Deep Blue consultant who was expert in
the ATM domain to assess the quality of the requirements and evolution rules. The level of
quality was evaluated on a four-item scale as specified in Table 8.3.
Based on this scale, the groups who have got an assessment Valuable or Specific were
classified as good groups because they have produced evolution rules and requirements
models of good quality. On the contrary, the groups who were assessed Generic or Unclear
were considered as not so good (bad) groups. Figure 8.5 reports the final assessments in the
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Table 8.2: Data about the Type of Participants and the Artifacts Generated.
Some standard deviation values for practitioners are not available because we have only one group of practi-
tioners in the evaluation studies in this chapter.
practitioner researcher student
Effect mean std.dev mean std.dev mean std.dev
Size of Baseline 188.00 0.00 28.67 13.49 156.88 69.62
Size of Change 14.67 4.73 16.67 9.42 9.33 5.47
Number of Observable Rules 3.00 – 2.00 1.00 6.00 2.94
Number of Branches per Observable Rule 2.00 0.00 2.17 0.41 3.42 0.83
Number of Controllable Rules 3.00 – 2.00 1.00 13.00 7.16
Number of Branches per Controllable Rules 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 2.27 0.49
Total Number of Rules 6.00 – 4.00 2.00 19.00 10.10
Table 8.3: Scale for expert assessment on the quality of requirements and evolution rules.
Scale Requirements Quality Evolution Rules Quality
Unclear Not clear which are the requirements
for the scenario
Not clear which are the evolution rules
for the scenario
Generic Requirements are present but they are
not specific for the scenario
Evolution rules are present but they are
not specific for the scenario
Specific Requirements are present and they are
related to the scenario
Evolution rules are present and they are
related to the scenario
Valuable Requirements are present and propose
real solutions for the scenario
Evolution rules are present and propose
real evolution possibilities for the sce-
nario
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Figure 8.5: The quality of requirements models and evolution rules produced by students.
matrix where the columns are the different quality levels of identified requirements models,
and the rows are those of identified evolution rules. Among four groups of students, three
have identified most of specific and important requirements and requirements evolution of
the ATM scenarios. The last group was even better. They recognized valuable requirements
and evolution rules from the scenarios. This implies that the artifacts produced by students
are good enough for the purpose of this work. The quality of the models produced by the
researchers was assessed that have good quality on requirements and evolution by the ATM
experts during the second workshop.
8.3.1 Preparation for an Analysis of Variance
We wanted to determine the differences between the size of baseline, size of the change for
evolution rules, the number of branches for evolution rule, and the number of evolution
rules produced by researchers, practitioners, and students by means of the analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA). In order to apply ANOVA, we first checked that its assumptions are satisfied.
All the p-values in the following results are given under the assumption that the significance
level α = 0.05.
Dependent Variables are Normally Distributed To check whether the dependent variables
are normally distributed we used the Shapiro-Wilk test [RW11] for normality. For all depen-
dent variables the p-value returned by Shapiro-Wilk test is lower than 0.05, and thus the
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Figure 8.6: Size of Baseline and Size of Changes for Type of Participants
variables are not normally distributed.
Homogeneity of Variances We test the homogeneity of the variances with Flinger-Killen
test. The test results are not significant with p≥ 0.05, except for the total number of branches.
The assumption on homogeneity of variances is thus met for all the dependent variables
except for the total number of branches.
Observations Independence By design, the observations about the different types of par-
ticipants are totally independent of each other.
8.3.2 Results
Since the assumptions on normal distribution are not satisfied, we cannot use ANOVA. We
need to apply Kruskal-Wallis test, which is the non-parametric alternative to ANOVA when
ANOVA assumptions are not met.
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Table 8.4: Kruskal Wallis Summary
Effect Degree of Freedom Kruskal Wallis χ2 p-value
Size of Baseline 2 15.842 0.000
Size of Change 2 6.342 0.042
Number of Observable Rules 2 4.652 0.098
Number of Controllable Rules 2 5.622 0.060
Total Number of Rules 2 5.622 0.060
Number of Branches for Observable Rule 2 12.786 0.002
Number of Branches for Controllable Rule 2 2.801 0.246
Size of baseline and Size of change First, we compared the size of baseline and size of
changes identified by researchers, practitioners and students. Figure 8.6(a) shows that re-
searchers have sketched requirement models of lower size but have considered changes of
small, medium and big size. Similarly, practitioners have produced a single big requirement
model and changes of similar complexity of researchers. Students have produced two dif-
ferent kind of artefacts: some group of students produced small models and small changes;
other groups identified one big model and changes of increasing complexity like practition-
ers. Obviously, the figure shows a difference between domain experts, students, and re-
searchers on the baseline of the models. However, looking at Figure 8.6(b), which reports
the distribution of size of changes, we could observe that the size of change among partici-
pants might not as much different as the size of baseline.
The results of Kruskal-Wallis test reported in Table 8.4 confirmed the observation. The
results are statistically significant both for the size of baseline (p-value = 0.000) and the size
of changes (p-value =0.042). However, in Table 8.5, a pairwise comparison conducted using
Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the difference between the size of baseline is statistically
significant only for the pair researcher – student (p-value = 0.000). Instead, the difference
between the size of change is not statistically significant for any pairs of participant types.
Number of evolution rules We then compared the difference in the number of evolution
rules across the different types of participants. Figure 8.7(a) shows the median of the number
of evolution rules in total and for type of rules (observable and controllable) produced by the
researchers, practitioners and students. Students produced obviously more evolution rules
than researchers and practitioners; while researchers and practitioners produced around the
same number of rules. The same holds if we consider the number of controllable rules, but
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Table 8.5: Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Summary -Pairwise Comparison among Type of Partici-
pants.
Since we perform three comparisons per each effect, the Bonferroni-corrected significant level α is
0.05/3 = 0.017.
Effect Pair of Participant Types p-value
Size of Baseline practitioner researcher 0.025
practitioner student 0.171
researcher student 0.000
Size of Change practitioner researcher 1.000
practitioner student 0.111
researcher student 0.035
Number of Observable Rules practitioner researcher 0.637
practitioner student 0.468
researcher student 0.074
Number of Controllable Rules practitioner researcher 0.637
practitioner student 0.400
researcher student 0.057
Total Number of Rules practitioner researcher 0.637
practitioner student 0.400
researcher student 0.057
Number of Branches for Observable Rule practitioner researcher 0.637
practitioner student 0.016
researcher student 0.003
Number of Branches for Controllable Rule practitioner researcher 0.000
practitioner student 0.340
researcher student 0.175
Total Number of Branches practitioner researcher 0.556
practitioner student 0.051
researcher student 0.023
not the number of observable rules. In fact, researchers, practitioners and students have
identified around the same number of observable rules.
We checked with Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 8.4) if these results are statistically significant.
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The short horizonal lines show the median of the total number of evolution rules (a), and median of
the total number of branches per rules (b) for type of participants and type of evolution rule.
Figure 8.7: Number of Rules and Branches for Participants Type.
The differences in the number of observable rules (p-value = 0.098), number of controllable
rules (p-value = 0.060), and total number of rules (p-value = 0.060) identified by researchers,
practitioners and students are not statistically significant. These results are confirmed by the
pairwise comparison that we have run with Wilcoxon rank-sum test as shown in Table 8.5.
Number of branches for evolution rules Last, we compared the difference in the number
of branches for evolution rules across the different type of participants. Figure 8.7(b) reports
the median of the number of branches. Obviously, students perform better than researchers
and practitioners with respect to the number of branches for observable rules. They pro-
duced more branches of observable rules than those of controllable rules (although in Fig-
ure 8.7(a) we see that they produced less observable rules than controllable ones). With
respect to the total number of branches for all rules and the total number of branches for
controllable rules, there is no observable difference between students, practitioners and re-
searchers.
In Table 8.4, the results of the Kruskal-Wallis test show that the difference in the number
of branches per observable rules (p-value = 0.002) is statistically significant. This does not
hold for the number of branches for controllable rules (p-value = 0.246). In Table 8.5, the
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Table 8.6: Hypothesis testing results
No Hypothesis Result
H2.10 No difference in the size of baseline sketched by re-
searchers, practitioners and master students.
Rejected
H2.20 No difference in the size of changes identified by re-
searchers, practitioners and master students
Non conclusive
H2.30 No difference in the number of evolution rules identified
by researchers, practitioners and master students.
Accepted
H2.40 No difference in the number of branches for evolution
rules identified by researchers, practitioners and master
students
Rejected (for
the number of
branches for ob-
servable rules)
pairwise comparison with Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the total number of branches
for observable rules is significant difference for the pair practitioner – student (p-value =
0.016) and researcher – student (p-value = 0.003). The difference in the number of branches
for controllable rules is statistically significant only for the pair practitioner – researcher (p-
value = 0.000). For the total number of branches, there is no statistically significant difference
in any pairs of participant types.
8.4 Discussion
This section summarizes the main findings from the studies we conducted (see Table 8.6).
8.4.1 Method’s Effectiveness
As shown in Table 8.2, researchers, practitioners and students were able to produce require-
ments models of medium size and identify new requirements associated with the introduc-
tion of the SWIM and the AMAN. In addition, the evaluation of the quality of the models
carried by the ATM expert shows that participants were able to recognize and identify evo-
lution rules specific to the introduction of the SWIM and the AMAN. Since the number and
the quality of the requirements model and evolution rules identified by the participants was
reasonably good, we can conclude that the proposed framework is effective in modeling re-
quirements evolution.
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8.4.2 Impact of Knowledge of Domain and Knowledge of Method
Impact on Size of Baseline The results of Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 8.4) and of the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (see Table 8.5) show that the size of initial requirement models pro-
duced by students is higher than the one of researchers. Thus, null hypothesis H2.1.0 can
be rejected. We could also conclude that domain knowledge and method knowledge do not
have an observable effect on the size of baseline variable for two main reasons: a) students
who have limited knowledge of the method have produced bigger models than researchers
who are method aware; b) students have produced initial requirements models with similar
size to the one of the models produced by practitioners who are domain aware.
Impact on Size of Change The Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 8.4) shows that there is a sta-
tistically significant difference in the size of changes identified by researchers, practitioners
and students. However, this result is not supported by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (see Ta-
ble 8.5), which shows there is no statistically significant difference between any of the pairs
of type of participants. Thus, we have not enough evidence to accept or reject hypothesis
H2.2.0. Based on the results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test we may conclude that domain
knowledge and method knowledge do not determine the size of change.
Impact on Number of Evolution Rules With respect to the number of evolution rules,
both the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Table 8.4) and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (see Table 8.5)
show that there is no statistically significant difference among researchers, practitioners and
students. Thus, H2.3.0 can be accepted and we can conclude that domain knowledge and
method knowledge do not have an effect on the number of evolution rules.
Impact on Number of Branches for Evolution Rules Both the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Ta-
ble 8.4) and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (see Table 8.5) show that there is a statistically signif-
icant difference in the number of branches for observable rules. Students produced observ-
able rules with significantly more branches than the one of researchers and practitioners. As
a result, H2.4.0 is rejected for the number of branches of observable rule. The students’ do-
main knowledge and method knowledge are limited, it is expected that they would identify
less branches than other participant types. However, as mentioned, we have here an evi-
dence that the students performed better than researchers and practitioners with respect to
the total number of branches for rule. Thus, we could conclude that domain knowledge and
method knowledge do not have an observable effect on the identification of a higher number
of evolution scenarios.
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8.4.3 Implications for the Method
During the focus group interviews, the ATM experts reported important aspects of the ap-
proach that require further investigation. They all pointed out that it is not possible to predict
all the possible changes in advance especially for complex systems such as ATM systems:
“Sometimes, when you apply you discover a third change that is better than the one you
have predicted”, ATM Manager
“The model may be good but when you switch from theory to practice you realize that
there are many situations that you did not consider”, ATM Manager.
“We are talking about very complex systems. You don’t know from the beginning all the
actors involved in the process. There are always certain changes that you cannot predict
due to the complexity of the system”, Senior Deep Blue consultant.
The ATM experts went further and suggested that an iterative approach should be ap-
plied to identify all the possible evolution alternatives:
“It should be an iterative process ”, and “you need to have more iterations if you want to
reach 100%. You cannot foreseen everything at the beginning”, ATM expert.
We have addressed this suggestion in the proposed framework by proposing an incre-
mental reasoning support (described in Chapter 6 ). This will efficiently enables a multi-
round modeling and reasoning of evolution where potential changes are iteratively identi-
fied.
The ATM experts also suggested that the graphical representation should be simplified
because it does not scale very well for complex systems such as ATM systems. They re-
marked that an incremental approach should be used to draw the rules. We noted this issue
concerning the graphical representation of observable rules (see Figure 8.3). It is difficult to
graphically represent observable rules if we treat requirements at a high level of abstraction.
Instead, we have proposed alternative representations depending on RE languages. For ex-
ample, in goal based languages like i*, KAOS, we suggested the use of additional construct
such as observable node to determine the evolution of a particular goal in a goal model (see
Figure 7.1); in risk graph, we suggested the use of tags associated to risk graph elements (see
Figure 10.13(b)).
8.5 Threats to Validity
We discuss the four main types of threats to validity [Woh+12] in what follows.
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Conclusion validity Conclusion validity is concerned with issues that affect the ability to
draw the correct conclusion about the relations between the treatment and the outcome of
the experiment. The main threat to conclusion validity relevant for the studies is low sta-
tistical power. The sample size must be big enough to come to correct conclusions. We
performed a post-hoc power analysis for the Kruskal-Wallis test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test
for the three users’ cohorts. The size of the sample is too small to have a power of 0.80.
Therefore, it will be necessary to run the experiment again with more subjects for each user’s
cohorts - researchers, practitioners and students.
Internal validity Internal validity is concerned with issues that may indicate a causal rela-
tionship between the treatment and the outcome, although there is none. A threat to inter-
nal validity can be the use of different application scenarios across the three study groups.
Different scenarios may generate a bias in this experiment as effects might be due to (or can-
celed by) the varying difficulties of the scenarios. To mitigate this risk we have asked prac-
titioners to identify scenarios that were close in complexity according to their opinion. An
important reason behind the use of different scenarios was to avoid a problem that emerged
in previous pilot studies: when a scenario is repeatedly used (and therefore progressively re-
fined) domain experts tend to focus on the adequacy of the requirements models at object
level rather than at meta-level. For example, by reconsidering the same scenario twice or
assessing the work of the students in comparison with their own, practitioners might have
spent several minutes discussing whether the right sentence for the goal in Figure 8.2 was
“detailed advisory”, and evaluate a model as inadequate because “specific advisory” should
have been used in its place. By using different scenarios the evaluation focused on the forest
rather than the trees. We believe that the advantages far outweigh the risks.
Another threat to internal validity is related to the use of Si* as requirement modeling lan-
guage. The feedback provided by the ATM experts on the possible adoption of the graphical
representation to model requirements evolution in the ATM domain can be biased by the
fact that the requirements model were drawn in the Si* requirements language. Si* graphical
notation tends to get very complex even for simple models and this aspect may have influ-
enced the feedback of the ATM experts. We should organize another study using a different
requirements language to evaluate whether the feedbacks depend on the use of Si*.
Construct validity Construct validity concerns generalizing the result of the experiment to
the concept and theory behind the experiment. The main threat to construct validity in the
experiment of this chapter was represented by a communication gap between the research
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team and the domain experts. Research team and domain experts might use same terms
with different meanings and this can lead to misunderstandings; therefore, wrong or unre-
lated feedback might be provided. For example, the distinction between goal and resource
was difficult to understand for the experts. A resource in the requirements engineering do-
main is an artifact produced/consumed by a goal, which captures a strategic interest of a
stakeholder that is intended to be fulfilled. In the ATM domain, a goal has the same mean-
ing that resource has in the requirements engineering domain and this lead to confusion.
To mitigate this threat we have included a “mediator” who occasionally reformulated ques-
tions of the research team for the domain experts and reformulated domain experts’ feed-
back for the researchers. The mediator role in this experiment was played by a member of
Deep Blue who has a solid Information and Communication Technology (ICT) background
(PhD in Compute Science), and is very strong experience in the ATM domain (20+ year ex-
perience as senior consultant). Before running the studies, we have several discussion with
this member to ensure that he can fully understand the proposed framework.
External validity External validity concerns the ability to generalize experiment results
outside the experiment settings. External validity is thus affected by the objects and the
subjects chosen to conduct the experiment. We reduced the threats to external validity by
making the experimental environment as realistic as possible. In fact, as object of the ex-
periment we have chosen a real evolutionary application scenario proposed by Deep Blue, a
consulting company, which is actively involved in SESAR Initiative.
However, a threat to external validity of the experiment results is represented by the use
of Si* as requirements modeling language. To generalize these results beyond this empirical
evaluation, we should run other controlled experiments where different requirements mod-
eling languages – problem frames, natural language, tables – are used by subjects to draw the
evolution rules.
8.6 Lessons Learnt
In this section we highlight a number of aspects that we should take into account to continue
our research.
• Subjects’ Selection. The selection of domain experts strongly influences the relevance
of feedback collected and the satisfaction of the success criteria chosen for the case
studies. In the case studies, the selected domain experts had a different background
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and so we were able to collect feedback about the approach to requirements evolution
from different perspectives. However, an issue of the domain is the separation between
ATM organizations and IT suppliers. They have different and often competing stakes.
In future studies, we think that one should evaluate the approach separately with two
groups of ATM organizations and IT supplier, and identify methods to firewall feedback
by different groups. This might highlight competitive advantages that one group might
gain over the other by adopting the method.
• Language Gaps. Another interesting lesson concerns the foreign language gap. The
level of engagement of the domain experts depends on two main factors: the means
to provide feedback, and the language in which such feedback needs to be provided.
Our workshop sessions included Hungarians, Indians, Italians, Norwegians, and Viet-
nameses; juggling between languages made our meetings lively. Albeit obvious in
hindsight, this was not mentioned in the previous work by N. Maiden and others [MR05;
Mai+04; Ncu+07] because their studies were clearly English-to-English. A possible so-
lution is that the domain experts can discuss in their mother tongue and then provide
summary feedback in English, but this hampers the immediacy of the feedback, and
“minority opinions” might not be reported (we noticed this phenomenon during the
workshops). The mediator was a useful tool to mitigate the internal validity threats
also in this setting.
• Determinants of Users’ Technology Acceptance. A major factor in the level of engage-
ment of domain experts is the perceived compliance with the practice in industry. In
the ATM domain, the discussion was facilitated by the existence of a model repre-
sentation (influence diagrams), which was very close to goal models. When we pro-
posed the same approach to another company, a show-stopper in the discussion with
a practitioner was simply “We use DOORS” (and therefore cannot use and should not
waste time evaluating requirements models in format different than DOORS). This was
purely a syntactical limitation, not a semantical or methodological one: we could have
perfectly used DOORS to link requirements expressed by goal models, but our tool
simply did not do it, as we thought this was just “Engineering”. This is indeed true if
we considered limiting our evaluation to an experiment (as noted in [CF+09] this is
what the vast majority of RE papers report). Being able to syntactically interface with
these tools (even for just gathering requirements IDs to label goals), is essential to ob-
tain better perceived compliance and thus a better engagement and case-study based
evaluation. As future work, we would like to organize a controlled experiment to evalu-
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ate if perceived compliance is a motivating factor that leads to an individual’s intention
to use a methodology.
• Evolution Probability Setting. An aspect of the approach that deserves further inves-
tigation concerns the definition of a systematic process to obtain evolution probabili-
ties. Typically, decision-makers are not able to provide probability that an event occurs
but just the frequency with which the event happens [Lun+11a, Chap. 10.2.1]. Even
when they are able to provide probabilities, they are subjective and contain a high de-
gree of personal bias. In fact, the probability that an event occurs differs from person
to person. We could explore the use of game theory e.g., Clarke-Tax mechanism to as-
sess evolution probabilities based on the probabilities of an event specified by different
decision makers.
8.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we reported the results of three studies that we have conducted in the ATM
domain to evaluate the effectiveness and the impact that domain knowledge and method
knowledge on effectiveness of the proposed framework.
The main findings from the studies were that the approach is effective in modeling re-
quirements evolution. In fact, the studies showed that since researchers, practitioners and
students were able to produce significantly big requirements models, and identify possible
ways for these models to evolve. In addition, domain knowledge and method knowledge
did not have an observable effect on the effectiveness of the approach, since there was no
statistically significant difference between the artifacts produced by students who have lim-
ited knowledge about both domain and method, and researchers who were method aware
and practitioners who were domain aware. Determining which are aspects that can have
an effect on the effectiveness the proposed framework will be the subject of a separate case
study.
In the subsequent chapters we are going to present how to apply the proposed frame-
work in an other field – risk assessment. This will be an evidence for the applicability of the
proposed framework.

Part III
Applying the Proposed Framework to
Evolving Risks
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EARLY DEALING WITH EVOLVING RISKS IN
SOFTWARE SYSTEMS
Existing risk assessment methods often rely on a context of a target software system at
a particular point of time. Such contexts of long-lived software systems tend to evolve
over time. Consequently, risks might also evolve. Therefore, in order to deal with
evolving risks, decision makers need to select an appropriate risk countermeasure al-
ternative that is more resilient to evolution than others. To facilitate such decision,
we propose a pioneer method taking the uncertainty of evolutions and outputs of a
risk assessment to produce additional information about the evolution resilience of
countermeasure alternatives.
S
ECURITY risk analysis concludes with a set of recommended options for mitigating un-
acceptable risks [ISO09]. In order to treat risks, decision makers (or managers) have
to make decisions on proper countermeasures to implement. However, such invest-
ment decisions may be complicated. An organization needs the best possible information
on risks and countermeasures to decide what is the best investment. This involves deciding
which countermeasures offer a good trade-off between benefit and spending. The expendi-
ture required to implement the countermeasures, together with their ability to mitigate risks,
are factors that affect the selection. Inappropriate and over-expensive countermeasures are
money lost. Therefore, a systematic method that helps to reduce business exposure while
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balancing countermeasure investment against risks is needed. Such a method should help
answering questions like “(1): How much is it appropriate to spend on countermeasures?" and
“(2): Where should spending be directed?" as highlighted by Birch and McEvoy [BM92].
Unfortunately, there exists little support for the prescriptive and specific information
that managers require to select cost-effective risk countermeasures. Several cost estima-
tion models have been proposed, but most are only loosely coupled to risk analysis. For
example, the Security Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM)[But02] is well-suited to evaluate
risk reduction, but is very vague on the issue of cost effectiveness. Likewise, [WHO09] sug-
gests several methods to assess cost of risks (e.g., Cost-Of-Illness, Willingness-To-Pay), but
none of these methods provide specific support to evaluate countermeasure expenditure.
Chapman and Leng [CL04] propose a framework that justifies mitigation strategies based on
cost-difference, but does not take the benefit-difference (i.e., level of risk reduction) between
strategies into consideration.
Effective decision-making requires a correct risk model incorporating multi-aspect infor-
mation on countermeasures and a method to select between cost-effective countermeasure
alternatives. The multi-aspect information should contain the knowledge about the coun-
termeasures themselves, their associated expenditures and suitability to mitigate risks, as
well as the impacts they may have on each other.
Such effective decisions are much more important in the context of long-lived software
systems, which keep evolving to continuously satisfy changing business needs, new regula-
tions, or the introduction of new technologies. Such evolutions might expose the software
systems to new risks, and might make the output of the current risk analysis on the software
systems become partially obsoleted. Consequently, the software systems might be no longer
secure.
The results of a software system risk assessment are typically valid under a given context,
which is a particular system configuration, and under certain requirements and assump-
tions about the target system at a particular point of time. Once a particular risk assessment
is completed, countermeasures are proposed and decision makers (or managers) face the
question of selecting an appropriate countermeasure alternative (i.e., a set of countermea-
sures) to be implemented in order to mitigate unacceptable risks. However, when the context
evolves, risks might also evolve. Previously acceptable risks might become unacceptable or
vice versa, or new risks emerge [Lun+11a, Chap. 15]. For example, any risk mitigated by SHA-
0 based countermeasure was acceptable before 2004, but might be unacceptable later since
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SHA-0 was efficiently attacked1. Thus, a current countermeasure alternative may no longer
be appropriate and it is necessary to develop new ones to address the evolving or newly
emerging risks. This might include adding additional security requirements as a protection
to ensure the system security, or the creation of completely new security controls. Obviously,
implementing new ones to replace for obsoleted ones may be more expensive than having
one that still may be appropriate for evolving risks. The decision makers then face an alike
question of selecting appropriate countermeasure alternative, yet in the extent of evolution
of the context and evolving risks.
While there exist several established risk assessment methods e.g., [Lun+11a; ML05; Nor10;
Sch99; Sto+02; Tra+13b], few provide support for a systematic selection on risk counter-
measure alternatives [Tra+13b; Sto+02; Nor10], and even less for dealing with evolving risks
[Lun+11b]. Traditional risk assessment methods typically perform on a context at a particu-
lar point of time and hence cannot guarantee the continuous validity of the risk assessment
results in an evolving context. Concerning evolutions, in [Lun+11b; SS13], the authors pro-
posed a general technique and guideline for managing risk in changing systems. However,
they did not mention the uncertainty of evolution (i.e., likelihood of occurrence), and how
to use this information to support the decision making process.
As an effort to fill some of that void, this chapter adapts the framework described in Chap-
ter 5 to introduce a risk-evolution approach. The focus of this chapter is not on how to obtain
the uncertainty information, but rather on how to make use of them to produce additional
factors to support the decision making process. Instead, the risk-evolution approach adapts
the evolution rules (modeling) and evolution metrics (reasoning) to the evolving risks. The
purpose of this risk-evolution approach is to quantify countermeasure alternatives in terms
of evolution metrics, and hence assist the selection of an evolution-resilient countermeasure
alternative.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.1 presents common terms in this chapter.
Section 9.2 describes the risk-evolution approach. Section 9.3 exemplifies the approach in a
case study. Section 9.4 summarizes the chapter.
9.1 Terminology
• Context: includes all required information to do risk assessment such as assumptions
about the working environment, requirements model, targets to be protected and so
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-0#SHA-0, site visited on March, 2013
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on. It is the premises for and the background of the risk analysis, as well as the pur-
poses of the analysis and to whom the risk analysis is addressed [Lun+11a, Chap. 5].
According to ISO 31000:2009, a context includes all external factors (e.g., regulatory,
environment) and internal factors (e.g., business process, policies, standards, system
functions, reference models).
• Before context: is the current context at the current time.
• After context: is the future context with potential changes.
9.2 The Risk-Evolution Approach
The proposed risk-evolution approach relies on a key concept: context. The context here is
for risk assessment. We employ the definition of context from [Lun+11a, Chapter 5] where a
context is “the premises for and the background of the risk analysis. This includes the pur-
poses of the analysis and to whom the risk analysis is addressed". A context can be implied to
include all required information to do a risk assessment for a software system, for instance,
requirements model of the software system, domain assumptions, the targets needed to pro-
tect and so on. The elements in a context, however, may change and evolve over time due
to numerous reasons e.g., introduction of new requirements, threats; changes in security
standards, regulation. This makes the context changed.
Figure 9.1 presents the conceptual models, expressed as a UML class diagram, on which
the risk-evolution approach builds. A Context Evolution Model is a collection of evolution
rules, which captures the evolutions of context. An Evolution Rule is either Observable Rule,
or Controllable Rule. The former captures the evolutions of a context. The latter captures all
possible alternatives addressing risks within a context. Further discussion on evolution rules
is provided in Section 9.2.3. An Evolution Rule has one before context and many after con-
texts. A Context is one mentioned before. A context can be enriched with the output of the
risk assessment. A Risk Countermeasure Alternative includes a collection of countermea-
sures, and a list of risks with residual risk levels after applying the countermeasures. Each
risk countermeasure alternative is quantified with Evolution Metric(s), which are detailed in
Section 9.2.4.
Table 9.1 briefs the steps of the proposed risk-evolution approach. The details of these
steps are elaborated next.
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Figure 9.1: The conceptual model of the proposed risk-evolution approach.
9.2.1 Step 1 – Identify Evolving Contexts
This step takes all documents about the planned and potential changes of the system as in-
puts. We consider four different evolution perspectives: maintenance, before-after, and con-
tinuous evolution, which are discussed in [Lun+11a, Chap. 15]. The maintenance perspective
relates to the outdate of a risk document of an existing system. Hence it is not the focus of
this work. The before-after perspective predicts future contexts by anticipating planned and
unplanned changes in the current context. The continuous evolution perspective predicts
the evolution of the current context over time based on planned gradual changes.
We abuse the notation of before and after contexts to represent these evolution perspec-
tives (except the maintenance one). Figure 9.2(a) demonstrates the before-after evolution
perspective. A context is depicted as a rectangle with child compartments. The first compart-
ment shows the context name, and the second compartments exhibits the changes compar-
ing to the before context. In this perspective, a before context might have many possibilities
to evolve to other after contexts, denoted as evolution possibility. At the end of the day, exact
one possibility materializes. Each evolution possibility associates with an evolution prob-
ability, which is the likelihood that a possibility materializes. Figure 9.2(b) illustrates the
continuous evolution perspective where changes happen continuously. The before context
at current time t0 might evolve an after context at time t1, which might continuously evolve
at time t2, and so forth.
After contexts can be identified by using any input document that describes potential
changes (either planned or unplanned) in the current context. Unplanned changes could be
anticipated by domain experts by using several techniques such as brainstorming with chalk
and blackboard, or techniques for requirements changes anticipation. Readers are referred
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Table 9.1: The steps of the proposed risk-evolution approach.
Step 1 Identify evolving contexts:
DESCRIPTION Identify all possible changes that would change the risk picture of the
system. Changes could be planed or not.
INPUT any document of changes in context.
OUTPUT set of contexts, including the current and evolved ones. Evolved con-
texts are associated with evolution possibilities.
Step 2 Perform risk assessment:
DESCRIPTION Apply an existing risk assessment method on each identified context.
Also, the risk countermeasure alternatives are expected to as a part of
output of the risk assessment method.
INPUT contexts identified in Step 1
OUTPUT risk countermeasure alternatives
Step 3 Model context evolution:
DESCRIPTION Establish the context evolution model from the identified contexts and
their correponsing risk countermeasure alternatives by using evolution
rules.
INPUT contexts with evolution probabilities (Step 1), risk countermeasure al-
ternatives (Step 2)
OUTPUT context evolution model
Step 4 Perform evolution analysis:
DESCRIPTION Run the evolution analysis on the established context evolution model
to calculate the evolution metrics for each risk countermeasure alterna-
tives to support the decision making process.
INPUT context evolution model
OUTPUT context evolution model quantified by evolution metrics
to [Lam09b, Chap. 6] for a more detailed discussion of these techniques. The evolution
probabilities are the experts’ belief that evolution possibilities might happen. The probabil-
ity semantics is accounted by using the game-theoretic approach described in Section 5.2.
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Figure 9.2: The evolution perspectives of contexts
9.2.2 Step 2 – Perform Risk Assessment
In this step, we employ a state-of-the-art risk assessment method (e.g., Attack Trees [Sch99],
Cause-Consequence Diagrams [ML05], and CORAS [Lun+11a]) to perform risk assessment
for identified contexts. The outcome of this step is list of risk countermeasure alternatives,
which are also the output of a risk assessment method.
A risk countermeasure alternative includes a list of countermeasures, and the residual
risks (with residual risk level) of a system after implementing the countermeasures. A coun-
termeasure could be a security controls (e.g., technology, policy), or a high level security
requirement that mitigates risks. A risk level is a pair of the likelihood by which a risk might
occur, and its impact. Based on risk level, a risk is categorized, such as acceptable or un-
acceptable. A residual risk level is the risk level after implementing countermeasures. Fig-
ure 9.3(a) depicts an example risk matrix where the risk R1 is unacceptable and the risk R2
is acceptable. Figure 9.3(b) shows the reduction of R1 where the risk level of R1 is reduced
from unacceptable to acceptable by applying the countermeasure C1. This risk reduction
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may also be represented in text format, for example, R1: 〈l , I 〉 C 1−−→ 〈l ′, I ′〉, where 〈l , I 〉 and〈
l ′, I ′
〉
are the risk levels without and with applying countermeasure C1 . We intentionally
do not specify the scales of likelihood and impact in Figure 9.3 because some might prefer
qualitative while others might prefer to have quantitative scales.
These information can be provided by many state-of-the-art risk assessment methods
such as Fault Tree Analysis [IEC90], Event Tree Analysis [Iec], Attack Trees [Sch99], Cause-
Consequence Diagrams [Rob+01; ML05], Bayesian networks [Cha91], and CORAS [Lun+11a].
Hence the proposed method is compatible with these methods.
When performing risk assessment on after contexts, we can do either a full risk assess-
ment from scratch, or an incremental risk assessment taking advantage on the risk assess-
ment on the before context. Needless to say, the former strategy does not use resources ef-
ficiently. The latter is better since it only addresses the changed parts of the after context
comparing to the before context [Lun+11a, Chap.15].
9.2.3 Step 3 – Model Context Evolution
This step takes the identified contexts and their corresponding risk countermeasure alterna-
tives to establish the context evolution model. We employ the modeling from Section 5.1 to
model the context evolution in terms of evolution rules. There are two kinds of rules: observ-
able rule and controllable rule. The former captures the way how the context evolves. The
latter captures different alternatives to address risks in each context. An evolved context, as
aforementioned, is foreseen with a certain evolution probability. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the evolving contexts identified in Step 1 are complete and mutual exclusive.
In other words, exact one of the after contexts materializes at the end.
LetC be a context, andCi be the i th after context ofC , and ca j be a risk countermeasure
alternative of C . The observable rule ro(C ) and controllable rules rc (C ) are described as
acceptable
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Figure 9.3: Risk level and Residual risk level.
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Figure 9.4: The context evolution model.
follows.
ro(C )=
{
C
pi−→Ci
∣∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
pi = 1
}
(9.1)
rc (C )=
{
C −→ ca j
∣∣ j = 1..m } (9.2)
where n is the number of after contexts of C ; pi is the evolution probability for which C
evolves toCi ; m is the number of risk countermeasure alternatives ofC . The sum of all pi is
1 since the after contexts are complete and mutual exclusive.
The before-after evolution perspective is represented by an observable rule. The continu-
ous evolution perspective is represented as a sequence of observable rules where the current
context of an observable rule is the after context of another observable rule, so on and so
forth.
Figure 9.4 shows a graphical visualization of the context evolution model of the contin-
uous evolution perspective. The observable rule is denoted by connections from a before
context to after contexts. The decorators on the connections are the evolution probabili-
ties. To denote the controllable rule, the rectangles representing context are extended with
a new compartment containing risk countermeasure alternatives, which are represented by
round rectangles. The controllable rule then is understood as different risk countermeasure
alternatives of a context.
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9.2.4 Step 4 – Perform Evolution Analysis
This step performs an evolution analysis on the context evolution model. The analysis em-
ploys evolution metrics from Section 5.3. In particular for the field of evolving risks, the evo-
lution metrics aim to quantify to what extent a risk countermeasure alternative can resist the
evolution. This analysis relies on three quantitative metrics: Max Belief, Residual Disbelief,
and Max Disbelief.
Max Belief (MaxB): is the maximum belief that a risk countermeasure alternative will be ap-
propriate if evolution happens. By term appropriate, we mean the residual risks after
applying the countermeasure alternative in the evolved contexts will still be accept-
able. So, the system will still be safe.
Residual Disbelief (ResD): is the belief that a risk countermeasure alternative will be inap-
propriate after evolution happens. It is also the belief by which the implementation
of the risk countermeasure alternative should be delayed until the context is clearly
known.
Max Disbelief (MaxD): is the maximum belief that a risk countermeasure alternative will be
inappropriate if evolution happens.
We define a binary function appropriate() that takes two inputs: a context C , and a risk
countermeasure alternative ca, to produce 1 if ca is appropriate within C , or 0 otherwise.
The Max Belief and Residual Disbelief of ca for the before-after evolution of the context C
are as follows.
MaxB(ca|C )= max
{〈C
pi−→Ci 〉∈ro (C )|appropriate(Ci ,ca)=1}
pi (9.3)
ResD(ca|C )= 1−
∑
{〈C
pi−→Ci 〉∈ro (C )|appropriate(Ci ,ca)}
pi (9.4)
MaxD(ca|C )= max
{〈C
pi−→Ci 〉∈ro (C )|appropriate(Ci ,ca)=0}
pi (9.5)
For the continuous evolution of the context C , we extend concept Max Belief, Residual
Disbelief, and Max Disbelief to Continuous Max Belief (MaxB∗), Continuous Residual Disbe-
lief (ResD∗), and Continuous Max Disbelief (MaxD∗). The formulas of these extended met-
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rics are as follows.
MaxB∗(ca|C )=

appropriate(C ,ca) if C does not evolve,
max
{〈C
pi−→Ci 〉∈ro (C )|appropriate(Ci ,ca)=1}
pi ·MaxB∗(ca|Ci ) otherwise.
(9.6)
ResD∗(ca|C )=

1−appropriate(C ,ca) if C does not evolve,
1− ∑
{〈C
pi−→Ci 〉∈ro (C )|appropriate(Ci ,ca)=1}
pi · (1−ResD∗(ca|Ci )) otherwise.
(9.7)
MaxD∗(ca|C )=

appropriate(C ,ca) if C does not evolve,
max
{〈C
pi−→Ci 〉∈ro (C )|appropriate(Ci ,ca)=0}
pi ·MaxD∗(ca|Ci ) otherwise.
(9.8)
In (9.6)(9.7), by saying the context C does not evolve, we mean that no evolving context
of C is identified. This does not mean C stops evolving, but its evolution may be ignored in
the analysis due to some reason.
After this analysis, each risk countermeasure alternative is quantified with two evolu-
tion metrics: Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief. Together with the benefit
and cost of a risk countermeasure alternative, these evolution metrics can support design-
ers in selecting the most evolution-resilient alternative for the system. To the perspective of
evolution-resilience, a better alternative is one that has a higher Max Belief, a lower Residual
Disbelief, and a lower Max Disbelief.
9.3 The Running Example
This section exemplifies the proposed method by a running example taken from an indus-
trial project in the ATM domain: the SWIM project [Pro08; Adm09]. The SWIM project aims
to provide consistent, efficient, transparent, and secure means for information interchange
among ATM systems. This example focuses on the Messaging Service, a part of SWIM, which
is responsible for a common and reliable layer to exchange messages within the SWIM ar-
chitecture.
Figure 9.5 illustrates the Messaging Service (MSG) architecture. In side the MSG, The
Mediator component is in charge of message transformation. The Message Routing is in
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Figure 9.5: The architecture of the Messaging Service within SWIM.
charge of point-to-point message transmission. Internal Services within SWIM can directly
connect to the MSG. The communications between other ATM Services, External Service
and MSG are done through the Web Service interface, and are subject to the supervision
of the Security Gateway. Hereafter, we apply steps in the proposed method on the running
example.
Applying Step 1: For simplicity, we do not show the before context. Instead, we only de-
scribe anticipated changes that might happen in the before context:
C1 The business rules might become more complex, therefore more expressive policies
are required to protect confidential resources.
C2 The ATM network might change from private network to public internet.
Since these changes are independent, either only C1, or only C2, or both might happen.
Consequently, the following after contexts are identified with corresponding probabilities of
occurrence:
• After1 (C1): no change will happen – 0.10.
• After2 (C2): only C1 will happen – 0.30.
• After3 (C3): only C2 will happen – 0.35.
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• After4 (C4): both C1 and C2 will happen – 0.25.
Applying Step 2: We perform risk assessment for all identified contexts. We only consider
one risk resulting from the risk assessment on the before context of MSG: “unwanted access to
confidential resources" (R1). The corresponding countermeasure, in a high level of abstrac-
tion, is: “implements authentication/authorization mechanism" (SR-1). It is further refined
into three operational countermeasure alternatives: ca1:X.509+SAML2, ca2:Kerberos+LDAP3,
and ca3:SAML+XACML4. Each countermeasure alternative includes two components: one
for authentication (the first component), and another one for authorization (the last one).
We use RLV1, RLV1’, and RLV1” to respectively represent for the residual risk level of R1
after applying ca1, or ca2, or ca3
We do not describe the risk assessment on after contexts, but discuss only the difference
between the risk assessment output of these contexts and that of the before context, as shown
below.
• C 1: as same as the before context.
• C 2: a new risk is identified: “unauthorized access to confidential resources because the
authorization mechanism cannot capture expressive policies"5 (R2). The countermea-
sure for R2 is: “implement a high expressive authorization mechanism" (SR-2). The
refined countermeasure alternative will be either ca2, or ca3. Similarly, the residual
risk levels of R2 by applying ca2 and ca3 are respectively denoted as RLV2 and RLV2’.
• C 3: a new risk is identified: “system collapses due to the malicious attacks on centralized
key server" (R3). The countermeasure for R3 is: “implement a robust key management
mechanism" (SR-3). The refined countermeasure alternatives will be either ca1, or
ca3. Similarly, the residual risk levels of R3 by applying ca2 and ca3 are respectively
denoted as RLV2 and RLV2’.
• C 4: both risks R2 and R3 are identified. Consequently, the only refined countermea-
sure alternative will be SAML+XACML. The residual levels of R2 and R3 are denoted
as RLV2, and RLV3 respectively.
2Security Assertion Markup Language
3Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
4eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
5This is a limit of SAML[RR09, chapter 6]
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Figure 9.6: The evolution of Messaging Service.
Applying Step 3: Let C0 be the before context, the evolution rules are as follows:
ro(()C0)=
{
C0
0.1−−→C1,C0 0.30−−→C2,C0 0.35−−→C3,C0 0.25−−→C4
}
,
rc (()C1)=
{
C1 −→
〈{
X.509,SAML
}
,RLV1
〉
,C1 −→
〈{
Kerberos,LDAP
}
,RLV1
〉
,
C1 −→
〈{
SAML,XACML
}
,RLV1
〉}
,
rc (()C2)=
{
C2 −→
〈{
Kerberos,LDAP
}
,RLV1, RLV2
〉
,C2 −→
〈{
SAML,XACML
}
,RLV1, RLV2
〉}
,
rc (()C3)=
{
C3 −→
〈{
X.509,SAML
}
,RLV1, RLV3
〉
,C3 −→
〈{
SAML,XACML
}
,RLV1, RLV3
〉}
,
rc (()C4)=
{
C4 −→
〈{
SAML,XACML
}
,RLV1, RLV2, RLV3
〉}
Figure 9.6 exhibits the context evolution model of the running example. In the figure, to
improve the readability, we represent the risk countermeasure alternative by its correspond-
ing countermeasures.
Applying Step 4: From (9.3)(9.4), we calculate the Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max
Disbelief of each risk countermeasure alternative. The results are reported in Table 9.2.
From the evolution-resilient perspective, the alternative SAML + XACML is the best since
it has the highest Max Belief, the lowest Residual Disbelief and the lowest Max Disbelief . The
alternative X.509 + SAML places the second, and the last one Kerberos + LDAP is the third.
These information are combined with the residual risks to support the countermeasure se-
lection.
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Table 9.2: The Max Belief and Residual Disbelief.
Risk Countermeasure Alternative
Counermeasures Residual Risks MaxB ResD MaxD
ca1:X.509 + SAML R1:RLV1, R3:RLV3 0.35 0.55 0.30
ca2:Kerberos + LDAP R1:RLV1’, R2:RLV2 0.30 0.60 0.35
ca3:SAML + XACML R1:RLV1”, R2:RLV2’, R3:RLV3’ 0.35 0 0
9.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we considered a target software system in a period of time with different con-
texts. We captured the evolution of risks, and then reason on their uncertainties to quantify
evolution-resilient countermeasure alternatives in terms of three evolution metrics.
It would be even more beneficial for decision makers if we can also provide more infor-
mation to assess these countermeasure alternatives within a particular context at a partic-
ular point of time. Hence, in the next Chapter 10 , we go deeper into the risks of the target
software system at a particular context. We shall evaluate every countermeasure alternative
in a context in terms of cost and benefit.
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SELECTING COST-EFFECTIVE RISK
COUNTERMEASURES
This chapter proposes a method to integrate the cost assessment into risk analysis to
aid the selection of cost-effective risk countermeasures. The proposed method makes
use of a risk graph model annotated with potential countermeasures, estimates for
their cost and effect. A calculus is then employed to reason about this model in order
to support decision by means of decision diagrams. We exemplify the instantiation
of the method in the CORAS method for security risk analysis. We also enrich the
capacity of evolution modeling and reasoning to the proposed method by applying
the risk-evolution approach described in the previous chapter.
T
HE previous chapter has presented a risk-evolution approach that operates on any
risk assessment methods. This is an advantage of it, but the representation the evo-
lution is limited in a very generic way. This chapter presents a method that support
the selection of cost-effective risk countermeasures based on risk graph. Then we apply the
proposed risk-evolution approach to the method. Since we base the method on risk graph,
which is generic enough to represent for many risk assessment methods, the risk-evolution
approach (Chapter 9 ) plus the method in this chapter could deliver a more fine-grain rep-
resentation of evolution in risk assessment, while still enabling the capability to deal with
evolution.
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The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 10.1 we present the proposed
method, including the steps, the modeling support and the analysis techniques. Section 10.2
details the calculus for propagating and aggregating reduction effect and effect dependency.
Section 10.3 exemplifies the method in CORAS. Section 10.4 discusses how to model evo-
lution in risk graph and how to perform reasoning about evolution. Finally, Section 10.5
summarizes this chapter.
10.1 The Proposed Method
As illustrated in Figure 10.1, the proposed method takes a risk model resulting from a risk
assessment and the associated risk acceptance criteria as input and delivers a set of rec-
ommended countermeasure alternatives as output. Hence, the method assumes that risk
assessment has already been conducted, i.e. that risks have been identified, estimated and
evaluated and that the overall risk analysis process is ready to proceed with the risk treat-
ment phase. We moreover assume that the risk analysis process complies with the ISO 31000
risk management standard [ISO09], in which risk countermeasure is the final phase. The
method consists of three main steps as follows:
STEP 1 Annotate risk model: Identify and document countermeasures. The results are docu-
mented by annotating the risk model taken as input with relevant information includ-
ing the countermeasures, their cost, their reduction effect (i.e., effect on risk value), as
well as possible effect dependencies (i.e., countervailing effects among countermea-
sures).
STEP 2 Perform countermeasure analysis: Enumerate all countermeasure alternatives and reeval-
uate the risk picture for each alternative. The analysis makes use of the annotated risk
model and a calculus for propagating and aggregating the reduction effect and effect
dependency along the risk paths.
STEP 3 Perform synergy analysis: Perform synergy analysis for selected risks based on deci-
sion diagrams. The outcome is recommended countermeasure alternatives, which
cost-effectively mitigate the selected risks.
Figure 10.2 presents the conceptual model, expressed as a UML class diagram [Rum+04]
on which the proposed method builds. A Risk Model is a structured way of representing an
unwanted incident and its causes and consequences using graphs, trees or block diagrams
[Rob+01], or tables [Lun+11a]. An unwanted incident is an event that harms or reduces the
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Figure 10.1: Steps of the proposed method.
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Figure 10.2: Conceptual model.
value of an asset, and a risk is the likelihood of an unwanted incident and its consequence for
a specific asset [ISO09]. A Countermeasure mitigates risk by reducing its likelihood and/or
consequence. The Expenditure includes the expenditure of countermeasure implementa-
tion, maintenance and so on. The Reduction Effect captures the extent to which a counter-
measure mitigates risks. The Reduction Effect could be the reduction of likelihood, and/or
the reduction of consequence of a risk. The Effect Dependency captures the countervailing
effect among countermeasures that must be taken into account in order to understand the
combined effect of identified countermeasures. The Calculus provides a mechanism to rea-
son about the annotated risk model. Using the Calculus, we can perform countermeasure
analysis on annotated risk models to calculate the residual risk value for each individual risk.
A Decision Diagram facilitates the decision making process based on the countermeasure
analysis.
10.1.1 Input Assumptions
The input required by the proposed method is a risk model generated by a risk assessment,
and the corresponding risk acceptance criteria. To ensure that the method is compatible
with several risk modeling techniques, we expect the risk model could be understood as a
risk graph instantiation. A risk graph [Bra+10] is a common abstraction of several established
risk modeling techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [IEC90], Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
[Iec], Attack Trees [Sch99], Cause-Consequence diagrams [Rob+01; ML05], Bayesian net-
works [Cha91], and CORAS risk diagrams [Lun+11a]. Hence, the method complies with these
158 CHAPTER 10. SELECTING COST-EFFECTIVE RISK COUNTERMEASURES
v1
[f1, co1]
v2
[f2, co2]
v3
[f3, co3]
v4
[f4, co4]
v6
[f6, co6]
v5
[f5, co5]
v7
[f7, co7]
fa
fb
fc
fd
ff
fe
Figure 10.3: Risk graph.
v
cm
[e]
pr, cr
Figure 10.4: Countermeasure with treats relation.
v
cm1
epr, ecr
cm2
Figure 10.5: Effect dependency relation.
risk modeling techniques, and can be instantiated by them.
A risk graph is a finite set of vertices and relations (see Figure 10.3). Each vertex v rep-
resents a threat scenario, i.e., a sequence of events that may lead to an unwanted incident,
and can be assigned a probability p, and a consequence co. A leads-to relation from v1 to v2
means that the former threat scenario may lead to the latter. Probabilities on the relations
are conditional probabilities indicating the likelihood of the former to lead to the latter when
the former occurs.
10.1.2 Detailing of Step 1 – Annotate Risk Model
This step annotates the input risk model with required information for further analysis. There
are four types of annotation as follows:
Countermeasure: In risk graphs, countermeasures are represented as rectangles. In Fig-
ure 10.4 there is one countermeasure and this is named cm.
Expenditure: In risk graphs, expenditure is expressed within square brackets following
the countermeasure name (e in Figure 10.4). This is an estimated of the total amount of
money spent to ensure the mitigation of countermeasure including expenditure of imple-
mentation, deployment, maintenance, and so on.
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Reduction effect: In risk graphs, reduction effect is represented by a dashed arrow deco-
rated by two numbers (pr and cr in Figure 10.4). It captures the mitigating effect of a coun-
termeasure in terms of reduced likelihood (i.e., probability reduction - pr), reduced conse-
quence (i.e., consequence reduction - cr), or both. Both pr and cr are relative percentage
values, i.e., pr,cr ∈ [0,1].
Effect dependency: In risk graphs, effect dependency is represented by a dash-dot arrow
with solid arrowhead decorated by two numbers (effect on probability reduction (epr), and
effect on consequence reduction (ecr) in Figure 10.5). It captures the impact of a countermea-
sure to the reduction effect of another, i.e., it can increase or decrease pr and/or cr of another
countermeasure. The epr impacts pr while the ecr impacts cr. Both epr and ecr are relative
percentage values, i.e., epr,ecr ∈ [0,1].
10.1.3 Detailing of Step 2 – Countermeasure Analysis
The countermeasure analysis in this step is conducted for every individual risk of the anno-
tated risk model. The analysis enumerates all possible countermeasure combinations, called
countermeasure alternatives (or alternatives for short) and evaluates the residual risk value
(i.e., residual consequence and probability) with resect to each alternative to determine the
most efficient one. Residual risk value is obtained by propagating the reduction effect along
the risk model to get the revised risk values. To this purpose, we have developed a calculus
with propagation rules. An example of rule is shown as below.
Rule 2.1 (Countermeasure) If there is a treats relation from countermeasure cm to vertex
v(p,co) with probability reduction pr and consequence reduction cr , we have:
cm
pr,cr−−−→ v v(p,co)
v(p ·pr ,co · cr )
Rule 2.1 applies to countermeasures as depicted in Figure 10.4. The probability reduction
pr on the probability p of the scenario means that p is reduced by pr ∈ [0,1]. Hence, p is
multiplied by pr = 1−pr . Likewise for the consequence reduction. The complete list of rules
is available in [Tra+13b].
From the leftmost threat scenarios (i.e., scenarios that have only outgoing leads-to re-
lations), probabilities assigned to threat scenarios are propagated to the right. During the
propagation, probabilities assigned to leads-to relations and reduction effects of counter-
measures are taken into account. Finally, the propagation stops at the rightmost threat sce-
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narios (i.e., scenarios that have only incoming leads-to relations). Based on the results from
the propagation, the residual risk value is computed.
Decision Diagram (Figure 10.6) is a directed graph used to visualize the outcome of a
countermeasure analysis. A node in the diagram represents a risk state, which is a triplet
of probability, consequence, and countermeasure alternatively of the risk in analyzed. The
probability and consequence are respective the X and Y coordinate of the node. The coun-
termeasure alternative is annotated on the path from the initial state S0 where no counter-
measure applied to the node. Notice that we ignore all states whose residual consequence
and probability are both greater than those of S0 since it is useless to implement such coun-
termeasures.
10.1.4 Detailing of Step 3 – Synergy Analysis
The aim of the synergy analysis is to recommend a cost-effective countermeasure alternative
for mitigating all risks, namely global countermeasure alternative. Such recommendation is
based on the decision diagrams for the individual risks (generated in Step 2), and the risk
acceptance criteria, and the overall costs (OC) of global countermeasure alternatives, which
are calculated as follows:
OC(ca)= ∑
r∈Rca
rc(r )+ ∑
cm∈ca
cost(cm) (10.1)
where ca is a global countermeasure alternative; Rca is the set of risks with respect to the
global countermeasure alternative ca; rc() is a function that yields the loss (in monetary
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value) due to the risk taken as argument (based on its probability and consequence); cost()
is a function that yields the expenditure of the countermeasure taken as argument.
The synergy analysis is decomposed into three following substeps:
STEP 3A Identify global countermeasure alternatives : Identify the set of global countermea-
sure alternatives C A for which all risks are acceptable with respect to the risk accep-
tance criteria. Decision diagrams of individual risks can be exploited for identifying
C A.
STEP 3B Evaluate global countermeasure alternatives : If no such global countermeasure al-
ternative is identified (C A =;), do either of the following:
– Identify new countermeasures and go to Step 1, or
– Adjust the risk acceptance criteria and go to Step 3A
If some global countermeasure alternatives are identified (C A 6= ;), select a global
countermeasure alternative ca ∈C A with the lowest overall cost OC(ca).
STEP 3C Decide cost-effective global countermeasure alternative: : If OC(ca) is acceptable (for
the customer company in question) then terminate the analysis. Otherwise, identify
more (cheaper and/or more effective) countermeasures and go to Step 1.
The above procedure may of course be detailed further based on various heuristics. For
example, in many situations, with respect to Step 3A, if the global countermeasure alterna-
tive ca ∈ C A, then we do not have to consider other global countermeasure alternative ca′
such that ca′ ⊆ ca. However, we do not go into these issues here.
10.2 The Calculus
10.2.1 Rules for Risk Graphs
In this section, we present the formal calculus for risk graphs. The calculus extends the cal-
culus presented in [Bra+10] with rules to deal with treatment effect and dependency. Note
that for all rules there is an implicit assumption that the premises and the conclusion are
type-correct.
Rule 1.1 (Relation) If there is a direct relation from v to v ′, we have:
v(p) v
p ′−→ v ′
(v u v ′)(p ·p ′)
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Rule 1.2 (Mutually exclusive vertices) If the vertices v and v ′ are mutually exclusive, we
have:
v(p) v ′(p)
(v unionsq v ′)(p)
Rule 1.3 (Statistical independent vertices) If the vertices v and v ′ are statistically indepen-
dent, we have:
v(p) v ′(p ′)
(v unionsq v ′)(p+p ′)
Rule 1.4 (Countermeasure) If the countermeasure cm treats vertex v , we have:
cm
pr,cr−−−→r v vt (p,co) ¬∃r ′ : cmr ′ ∈ t
vt∪{cmr }(p ·pr ,co · cr )
Rule 1.5 (Effect dependency) If there is an effect dependency from a countermeasure cm′
to a treats relation, we have:
cm′
epr,ecr−−−−−→
(
cm
pr,cr−−−→ v
)
cm′ 6∈ r
cm
pr+epr,cr+ecr−−−−−−−−−−→r∪{cm′} v
10.2.2 Rules for Treatment Diagrams
In this section, we present the formal calculus for treatment diagrams. The calculus contains
Rule 2.1 to Rule 2.4 from CORAS calculus [Lun+11a, Chapter 13], and new introduced rules
to deal with treatment effect and dependency. In the context of treatment diagrams of this
work, we work with frequency instead of probabilities. Hence, we replace p with f , pr with
f r , and epr with e f r from Rule 2.1 to Rule 2.10.
Rule 2.1 (Initiate) For a threat t and scenario/incident v related by the initiates relation,
we have:
t
f−→ v
(t u v)( f )
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Rule 2.2 (Leads-to) For the scenarios/incidents v1 and v2 related by the leads-to relation,
we have:
v1( f ) v1
l−→ v2
(v1u v2)( f · l )
Rule 2.3 (Mutually exclusive scenarios/incidents) If the scenarios/incidents v1 and v2 are
mutually exclusive, we have:
v1( f ) v2( f )
(v1unionsq v2)( f )
Rule 2.4 (Independent scenarios/incidents) If the scenarios/incidents v1 and v2 are sepa-
rate and statistically independent, we have:
v1( f1) v2( f2)
(v1unionsq v2)( f1+ f2)
Rule 2.5 (Treatment on scenario) If the treatment tms treats the scenario v , we have:
tms
f r−→r v vt ( f ) ¬∃r ′ : tmsr ′ ∈ t
vt∪{tmsr }( f · f r )
Rule 2.6 (Treatment on risk) For treatment tms that mitigates the risk v , we have:
tms
f r,cr−−−→r v vt ( f ,co) ¬∃r ′ : tmsr ′ ∈ t
vt∪{tmsr }( f · f r ,co · cr )
Rule 2.7 (Treatment on leads-to relation) If the treatment tms treats the leads-to relation
relating the scenario v and the scenario/risk v ′, we have:
tms
f r−→r (v f−→ v ′)
tms
f r−→r (v u v ′)
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Rule 2.8 (Treatment on initiate relation) If the treatment tms treats the initiate relation
relating the threat t and the scenario v , we have:
tms
f r−→r
(
t
f−→ v
)
tms
f r−→r (t u v)
Rule 2.9 (Treatment on threat) If the treatment tms treats the threat t and t initiates the
scenario v , we have:
tms
f r−→r t t f−→ v
tms
f r−→r (t u v)
Rule 2.10 (Effect dependency) If the treatment tms′ affects the treats relation connecting
the treatment tms and a scenario/risk v , we have:
tms′
e f r,ecr−−−−−→
(
tms
f r,cr−−−→ v
)
tms′ 6∈ r
tms
f r+e f r,cr+ecr−−−−−−−−−−→r∪{tms′} v
10.3 Exemplification in CORAS
As a demonstration of applicability, this section instantiates the proposed method into the
CORAS method for security risk analysis[Lun+11a] and exemplifies how the resulting ex-
tended CORAS method and language can be used to select cost-efficient risk countermea-
sures in an example drawn from a case study within the eHealth domain [Ome+12].
The risk model in the CORAS method is captured by so-called risk diagrams. A risk di-
agram is a causality graph consisting of potential causes (i.e., threats) that might (or might
not) exploit flaws, weaknesses, or deficiencies (i.e., vulnerabilities) causing a series of events
(i.e., threat scenarios) to happen, which could lead to unwanted incidents with certain likeli-
hood and concrete consequence (i.e., risks) to a particular asset. Threat scenarios and risks
are also called core elements in the risk diagram notation.
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The patient has one or more monitoring devices in the form of wearable sensors. They provide data
to an application in a handheld device, which does some processing on the data, aggregates the
results and sends them to the eHealth Server. The patient and his devices are authenticated by an
Identity Provider (IdP).
Figure 10.7: Architectural sketch of Patient Monitoring scenario (from [NES11, Figure 3.2])
In the risk diagram, there are two kinds of relationships with assigned likelihoods: ini-
tiate and leads-to relations. The former connects a threat to a core element, and the latter
connects a core element to another core element. Likelihoods assigned to initiate relations
can be either probabilities or frequencies, whereas, likelihoods assigned to leads-to relations
are conditional likelihoods.
Any risk diagram can be understood as an instantiation of a risk graph; such conver-
sion is formally defined in [Bra+10]. To make the instantiation more comprehensible, we
also present a running example that exploits an eHealth scenario proposed by the NESSoS
project[NES11] to exemplify the resulting extended CORAS method.
10.3.1 eHealth Running Example: Patient Monitoring
As illustrated in Figure 10.7, patients’ behaviors and symptoms are monitored in realtime.
This provides an improved basis for disease diagnoses and tailored therapy prescription reg-
iments. Patients are equipped with sensors that continuously collect patients data and send
these data to a handheld smart device (e.g., smart phone). This smart device, in turn, sends
the patient data to external eHealth servers where the patients’ eHealth Records (EHRs) are
updated.
The CORAS risk diagram in Figure 10.8 presents a partial result from a risk analysis of the
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Figure 10.8: Risk diagram of the scenario.
Patient Monitoring scenario [Ome+12]. In this risk diagram, network failure exploits the vul-
nerability unstable/unreliable network connection to initiate network connection goes down.
Likewise, handheld HW failure exploits the vulnerability unstable/unreliable handheld HW
to initiate handheld goes down. Both handheld goes down as well as network connection goes
down may lead to the transmission of monitored data is interrupted. This, consequently, may
lead to loss of monitored data, which impacts the provisioning of monitoring service. The rest
of the diagram is interpreted in the similar manner.
We assume in the following that this diagram is a consistent and complete documenta-
tion of risks identified during the risk assessment. We moreover use frequencies to estimate
likelihoods of core elements. Reasoning about frequencies in the risk and treatment assess-
ment is also supported by the proposed calculus.
10.3.2 Applying Step 1 – Annotate Risk Model
In this step, we annotate the CORAS risk diagrams according to Step 1 to create CORAS treat-
ment diagrams. Note that in CORAS, countermeasures are referred to as treatments.
Treatment annotation: treatments can apply to most of the elements in a treatment di-
agram, including all types of core elements, threats, and vulnerabilities. Figure 10.9 shows
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Figure 10.9: Annotated diagram
an example in which a treatment implement redundant network connection treats the sce-
nario network connection goes down, which was initiated by network failure by exploiting the
vulnerability unstable/unreliable network connection.
Expenditure annotation: the treatment expenditure, annotated as value inside the treat-
ment bubble, is the total expenditure spent for a treatment in a period of time. For instance,
in Figure 10.9, the expenditure for implementing a redundant network connection is 5000$
in ten year.
Reduction effect annotation: following Step 1, reduction effect in the CORAS instantia-
tion is annotated on treats relations as a pair
〈
f r,cr
〉
, where f r,cr are frequency reduction
and consequence reduction, respectively. For example, in Figure 10.9, the frequency of net-
work failure is thirty times in ten years, annotated as 30:10y . In a CORAS diagram, we suffix
the value of f r and cr with the letter ‘L’ and ‘C’, respectively, to distinguish between them.
The treatment implement redundant network connection only reduces the frequency (not
consequence) of unreliable network connection by 0.7 at cost 5000USD:10y . This means the
reduced frequency is (1−0.7) ·30:10y = 9:10y .
Effect dependency annotation: in Figure 10.9, to mitigate network connection goes down,
we could ensure sufficient Quality-of-Service (QoS) from network provider with the cost of
15000USD:10y . This, however, reduces the effect of a redundant connection. These two
treatments are countervailing. Ensuring such QoS will reduce the reduction effect of a re-
dundant connection by 0.3 as annotated in the figure.
As summary, Figure 10.10 shows the treatment diagram resulting from annotating the
risk diagram in Figure 10.8. Note that the likelihood annotations in Figure 10.10 are after the
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application of the analysis of Step 2, which is explained next.
10.3.3 Applying Step 2 – Treatment Analysis
The analysis employs an instantiated version of the calculus for risk graphs. Here, we ex-
emplify the propagation of likelihoods and reductions through an example taken from the
annotated treatment diagram of the eHealth scenario. Particularly, we show how to do the
propagation for risk “Loss of Monitored Data" (LMD). The result is presented in Figure 10.10.
For clarity, we use following acronyms for text in the diagram:
• TDI: “Transmission of monitored Data is Interrupted"
• NCD: “Network Connection goes Down"
• HGD: “Handheld Goes Down"
• NF: “Network Failure"
• HHW: “Handheld HW failure"
• IRN: “Implement Redundant Network connection"
• EQS: “Ensure sufficient QoS from network provider"
• IRH: “Implement Redundant Handheld"
Here we describe the frequency propagated for LMD. First, NF initiates NCD with fre-
quency 30:10y . The treatment IRN would reduce this frequency by 0.7L. However, due to
the effect dependency of EQS to IRN, the likelihood reduction of IRN is changed to 0.7L ·(1−
0.3L) ≈ 0.5L. Hence, IRN reduces the frequency propagated to NCD to 30:10y · (1− 0.5) =
15:10y . EQS would reduce the frequency of NCD by 0.7L. So, the frequency propagated to
NCD is 15:10y ·(1−0.7)= 4.5:10y . Second, HHW initiates HGD with frequency 10:10y . This is
propagated to HGD. IRH treats HGD with likelihood reduction 0.7L. Hence, frequency prop-
agated to HGD is 10:10y · (1−0.7) = 3:10y . Since NCD and HGD are independent and both
of them lead-to TDI, the frequency propagated to TDI is 4.5:10y ·0.8+3:10y ·0.9 = 6.3:10y .
Finally, the propagated frequency of LMD is 6.3:10y ·0.8= 5.04:10y .
Likewise we can calculate the frequencies of the entire diagram. Figure 10.10 shows the
complete diagram with frequencies calculated and annotated. Note that in Figure 10.10 we
have calculated the likelihoods when all treatments are taken into account. However, due
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Figure 10.10: Annotated treatment diagram with frequencies propagated.
to the effect dependencies it may be that implementing all treatments is not the optimal
alternative.
Figure 10.11 presents decision diagrams of risk LMD and LID (i.e., Loss of Integrity of
monitored Data). The detail result of the countermeasureanalysis for risk LMD is provided
in Table 10.1.
10.3.4 Applying Step 3 – Synergy Analysis
To facilitate the synergy analysis described in Step 3, we define the rc() function in (10.1) as
follows: rc(r )= co· f , where co is the consequence and f is the frequency of the risk r . Having
decision diagrams for individual risks, the synergy analysis described in Step 3 is detailed as
below.
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Figure 10.11: Decision diagrams of risks in the eHealth scenario.
STEP 3A We identify the set of global treatment alternatives based on the decision diagrams
generated in the previous step and the expenditures of treatments. For each risk,
we select the alleged cost-effective treatment alternatives. In particulary, we choose
S3LMD {I RH , I RN } (i.e., state S3 of risk LMD), and S7LMD
{
I RH , I RN ,EQS
}
; for risk
DAS, we choose S3D AS {U SW, I RH }, and S2D AS {I RH }; for risk LID, we choose S3LI D {I RH , I RN }
and S2LI D {U B A}. We assume all of these alternatives are acceptable with respect to the
acceptance criteria.
STEP 3B We calculate the overall cost for each global treatment alternative using (10.1). Ta-
ble 10.2 reports the overall costs for these alternatives. According to this table, we select
GS1 due to its smallest overall cost.
STEP 3C For the sake of simplicity, we assume that customers are satisfied with the recom-
mendation. Therefore, GS1 will be chosen for implementation.
10.4 Modeling Evolution in Risk Graph
This section applies the risk-evolution approach described in Chapter 9 to the proposed
countermeasure assessment method in this chapter to enable the modeling and reasoning
about evolution in the proposed method.
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Table 10.1: Analysis for the risk LMD.
The name of each treatment alternative is shown in the first column (Risk State). The Frequency column is
number of occurrences in ten years. Both Frequency and Consequence columns are values after considering
the treatments.
Ensure sufficient QoS from network provider
Implement Redundant Network connection
Implement Redundant Handheld
Risk/Risk State Treatment Frequency Consequence
Risk : Loss of Monitored Data
S0 26.4 5000
S1 • 21.36 5000
S2 • 12.96 5000
S3 • • 7.92 5000
S4 • 12.96 5000
S5 • • 7.92 5000
S6 • • 10.08 5000
S7 • • • 5.04 5000
10.4.1 Challenges in Modeling Evolution in Risk Graph
A naïve approach to graphically model the context evolution into risk model, i.e., risk graph,
is to maintain risk graphs with respects to identified contexts in separated models. This ap-
proach is very easy to achieve without any modification to existing risk method. However it
raises following challenges:
• Synchronization. We need to maintain multiple copies of the risk model, which equal
the number of identified contexts. These models could share a large common por-
tion. Therefore, any changes made to the shared part should be manually synchro-
nized among models. Usually, a big and complex risk model is divided into diagrams.
The number of diagrams to be maintained thus is multiplied by the number of iden-
tified contexts. Consequently, keeping these diagrams synchronized across contexts
tends to be an overwhelm, frustrating, and error-prone task if it is done manually.
• Different views support. The use of separated model per each context seems to be bet-
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Table 10.2: The global treatment alternatives in synergy analysis.
Individual Risk
Global Treatment Alternative LID LMD DAS Overall Cost
GS1{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,USW} S3 S3 S3 101740
GS2{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,EQS,USW} S3 S7 S3 102340
GS3{UBA,IRH,IRN,USW} S2 S3 S3 104500
GS4{UBA,IRH,IRN,EQS,USW} S2 S7 S3 105100
GS5{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN} S3 S3 S2 108740
GS6{UBA,SCO,IRH,IRN,EQS} S3 S7 S2 109340
GS7{UBA,IRH,IRN} S2 S3 S2 111500
GS8{UBA,IRH,IRN,EQS} S2 S7 S2 112100
ter for local view of the evolution in each identified context, but apparently does not
support well a global view of the evolution of the entire system. For example, users
might want to see what will change during the evolution, and what are the differences
among different evolution possibilities.
A modelling approach for evolution in risk graph should carefully consider these two
challenges to better facilitate the evolution analysis of evolving risks.
10.4.2 Modeling the Evolution
We propose an extension to the conceptual model of the proposed risk-evolution approach
described in Figure 9.1. The extension is to capture the evolution in risk graphs, see Fig-
ure 10.12, which is referred to as the meta-model of the evolutionary risk graph. This meta-
model is presented as a UML class diagram. In Figure 10.12, a class is represented by a rect-
angle. The class name is inside the rectangle, and is followed by class members (if any),
which are italic text, and are separated from the class name. The name of an abstract class is
also in italic. The text formation for the class name determines the type of the class: normal-
case text denotes a node, lower-case text denotes a relation, and underline text depicts a
decoration of either node or relation.
In this meta-model, an Evolutionary Risk Graph is a collection of Elements. The Element
abstract class represents all evolvable elements in a risk graph, which could be either an ab-
stract Vertex, or an abstract Relation. With reference to Section 10.1.2, there are two kinds of
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Figure 10.12: The meta-model of evolutionary risk graph.
vertices – Threat Scenario and Countermeasure, and three kinds of relations – leads-to, treats,
and effect dependency. All evolvable properties of these kinds of Elements are decorated sep-
arately in Evolution Decorator. Each decorator keeps a link to a Context where the decorator
is valid in. If a decorator does link to any Contexts, it means the Element associated to this
decorator does not evolved within the study period. There are five types of decorators with
respect to five types of Elements, i.e., Threat Scenario Decorator, Countermeasure Decorator,
leads-to Decorator, treats Decorator, and effect dependency Decorator. Each type of decora-
tor has corresponding property members, for instance leads-to Decorator has a member f ,
which represents the conditional probability of a leads-to relation (see Section 10.1.2).
Example 10.1 Figure 10.13 illustrates an example of modeling evolution in a risk graph.
On the left hand side, Figure 10.13(a) presents the context reference model (see section Sec-
tion 9.2.3), where the current context Before could evolves to After1, or After2 with the levels
174 CHAPTER 10. SELECTING COST-EFFECTIVE RISK COUNTERMEASURES
Context: After1
 Change #1
 Change #2
Context: After2
 Change #3
 Change #4
Context: Before
p1 p2
p0
(a) Context evolution model
v2
cm1
[e1]
v1
[f1, co1]
cm2
v3
[f3,co3]
f13
f12-1 after1
f12-2 after2
e2-1 after1
e2-2 after2
pr1,cr1 after1
pr2,cr2 after2
f2-1,co2-1 after1
f2-2,co2-2 after2
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(b) Risk graph with evolution decorator
Figure 10.13: An example of modeling evolution in risk graph.
of belief are p1, p2, respectively. Additionally, Before might be unchange with the belief of p0.
On the right hand side, Figure 10.13(b) shows the risk graphs with evolution decorators
annotated to modeling the evolution with respect to the context evolution model presented
on the left. In Figure 10.13(b), two threat scenarios v1, v2, and the countermeasure cm1 ap-
pear in all contexts, and stay unchange regardless of evolution. Thus, their corresponding
properties are displayed inside their node shape. Meanwhile, the threat scenario v2 and the
countermeasure cm2 appear in both After1 and After2 contexts, but not in the Before context.
The properties of v2 and cm2 are therefore displayed separately where different values might
be applied for different contexts. Consequently, the leads-to relation from v1 to v2, the treats
relation from cm2 to v2, and the effect dependency relation from cm2 are decorated accord-
ingly. We additionally change the color of evolved elements to emphasize the evolution.
By modeling this way, evolution is incorporated into a single risk graph. Therefore, it
avoids the synchronization challenge. However it might increase the complexity of the orig-
inal risk graph. The different view support challenge could be addressed with the help of the
graphical modeling tool, which will show or hide elements according to the expected view.
For example, if users want to see the original risk graph, all evolved elements of which their
decorators do not associate to the Before context will be hidden. Similar filter could be apply
if users only want to see the risk graph in the After1 context.
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10.5 Chapter Summary
We have presented a risk-graph-based countermeasure assessment method to select a cost-
effective countermeasure alternative to mitigate risks. The method required input in the
form of risk models represented as risk graphs. The method analysed risk countermeasures
with respect to different properties such as the amount of risk mitigation (Reduction Effect),
how countermeasures affect others (Effect Dependency), and how much countermeasures
cost (Countermeasure Expenditure). We have developed a set of formal rules extending the
existing calculus for risk graphs. These new rules propagated the likelihoods and conse-
quences along risk graphs thereby facilitating a quantitative countermeasure analysis on
individual risks, and a synergy analysis on all the risks. The outcome was a list of coun-
termeasure alternatives quantitatively ranked. These alternatives were represented not only
in tabular format, but also in graphical style (Decision Diagram).
We have exemplified the method to CORAS by an example of the eHealth domain to
select cost-effective treatments. Notations and rules have been adapted to comply with
CORAS. The example demonstrated that the method could work with existing defensive risk
analysis methods whose risk models could be converted to risk graphs.
We have enriched the method with the capacity of modeling on evolution in risk graph.
This is done by applying the risk-evolution approach in Chapter 9 to the method.
In the next part, we are going to evaluate how the proposed artifacts could meet the de-
sired success criteria and summarize the entire dissertation.

Part IV
Discussion and Conclusion
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This chapter discusses how the proposed artifacts and evaluation activities presented
in the previous chapters could fit the success criteria. The chapter also discusses the
relation of the proposed framework to the literature.
T
HIS chapter discusses how the proposed framework could fulfill success criteria de-
scribed in Section 2.1 (Section 11.1), and we presents a set of steps to apply the pro-
posed framework within the development of software system (Section 11.2). Addi-
tionally we discuss how the framework relates to the literature (Section 11.3).
11.1 Fulfillment of the Success Criteria
Table 11.1 summarizes the fulfillment of success criteria by evaluation activities described
in Section 2.2. In this table, “done" and “partly" mean that the evaluation activity has fully
or partly met the success criteria, respectively; “todo" means that the evaluation activity will
be considered as future work. The detailed discussion is provided in the subsequent subsec-
tions.
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Table 11.1: Summary of the success criteria fulfillment.
Modeling Reasoning
Evaluation Activity SC1.1 SC1.2 SC1.3 SC2.1 SC2.2 SC2.3
(E1) Provide model and case study done todo
(E2) Conduct empirical study done todo todo
(E3) Provide formal semantics done done done
(E5) Perform formal analysis done done
(E4) Implement CASE tool done(1) partly(2) done(3) done(3)
(E6) Run simulation partly
(E1) Adapt the framework to evolving risks done todo
SC1.1 Able to effectively capture the requirements evolution and its uncertainty.
SC1.2 Accompanied with a formal semantics of the evolution uncertainty.
SC1.3 Potentially applicable to a variety of requirements and system models.
SC2.1 To provide a set of metrics with formal semantics for reasoning about evolution uncertainty.
SC2.2 Able to automate (with formal analysis and tool-support) the reasoning that can enumerate and quantitatively assess
individual design alternatives.
SC2.3 Able to support the incremental modeling of evolution.
(1): provide GUI for modeling and reasoning.
(2): provide GUI templates for modeling.
(3): provide implementation for reasoning.
11.1.1 The Modeling Approach of the Framework
SC1.1 Able to effectively capture the requirements evolution and its uncertainty. We have
fulfilled this success criteria by carrying out two evaluation activities on the evolution rules,
which are used to model requirements evolution and its uncertainty.
• We have run a self-evaluation for these rules on a “big” requirements model taken from
an industrial project (see Section 7.5). This is an instance of Self-evaluation study (E1).
• We conducted a series of empirical studies on participants with various levels of ex-
pertise knowledge. We have analyzed artifacts produced by participants. The analysis
outcomes have revealed that the proposed framework is effective in modeling require-
ments evolutions. Moreover, the prior domain knowledge and framework knowledge
do not significantly impact the effectiveness of the framework. The details of the study
11.1. FULFILLMENT OF THE SUCCESS CRITERIA 181
settings as well as the analysis of artifacts are presented in Chapter 8 . This is the ma-
terialization of Empirical study (E2).
SC1.2 Accompanied with a formal semantics of the evolution uncertainty. We have ful-
filled this success criteria by proposing an interpretation for the evolution uncertainty. The
interpretations is based on game theory. We explain the evolution uncertainty by the game
between three different players: Domain Expert, Company, and Expert. The semantics of
evolution uncertainty is accounted by the belief of Domain Expert on the monetary value,
which he/she is willing to pay for the implementation that addresses a particular forecasted
changes. This interpretation is detailed in Section 5.2.
SC1.3 Potentially applicable to a variety of requirements and system models. We have
partially fulfilled this success criteria as follows:
• We considered requirements models by which we apply evolution rules to capture evo-
lution at a very high level of abstraction. A requirements model is treated as a col-
lection of entities and relations. This level of abstraction could present requirements
models in any graphical RE languages. The proposed evolution rules could capture
evolution in such level of abstraction of requirements models. Thus they could be able
to do so for any requirements models in any graphical RE languages. This is detailed
in Section 5.1.
• We have adapted the proposed framework to another field rather than RE – the risk
assessment realm. The adapted variant of the proposed framework could be able to
early dealing evolving risks in software systems. The adapted framework is built upon
any existing risk assessment methods, which could produce outputs that are compli-
ant with the adapted framework. The details of this adapted framework are presented
in Chapter 9 . This is an instance of Self-evaluation study (E1).
• We have proposed a generic risk assessment method to support the selection of cost-
effective risk countermeasure alternatives. The proposed risk assessment method is
built upon risk graph, thus it can represent for any risk assessment methods, which
are compliant with risk graph. We then apply the adapted framework to the proposed
risk assessment method. Thus it is an evidence that adapted framework for risk evo-
lution is also able to apply to many risk assessment methods. The detail of the risk
assessment method and the application of the adapted framework to this method are
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discussed in Chapter 10 . Moreover, we have also adapted the proposed framework
to the field of software product line engineering, in particular the evolution of feature
model. However we do not present that work here, but in a separated technical report
[TM13a].
11.1.2 The Reasoning Approach of the Framework
SC2.1 To provide a set of metrics with formal semantics for reasoning about evolution un-
certainty. We have fulfilled this success criteria by proposing three evolution metrics, namely
Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, and Max Disbelief. The formal definition of these metrics as
well as their semantics are presented in Section 5.3.
SC2.2 Able to automate (with formal analysis and tool-support) the reasoning that can
enumerate andquantitatively assess individual designalternatives. We have fulfilled this
success criteria by proposing a series of algorithms to perform the reasoning about evolution
uncertainty. We employ hypergraph as an intermediate data structure to represent require-
ments models. We do not intend to substitute any RE languages by this hypergraph, but
transform requirements models in a particular RE language to hypergraph. This transforma-
tion only preserves information about the fulfillment of top requirements. Based on hyper-
graph we develop algorithms to identify design alternatives and compute evolution metrics
for these alternatives.
We have performed a formal analysis on the soundness and complexity of the algorithms.
The details of algorithms and their formal analysis are described in Chapter 6 . Moreover,
we have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of a CASE tool in which we implement
these algorithms. The details of this prototype are described in Chapter 7 .
We have conducted a benchmark of the algorithms on a large example (of approximately
150 goals with 5 observable rules). The example yields a number of 864 design alternatives.
Such number is too large for a manual selection of alternatives. Additionally, we have run a
simulation on the performance of the algorithms, see Section 7.4
SC2.3 Able to support the incremental modeling of evolution. We have fulfilled this suc-
cess criteria by employing a caching mechanism for the calculation of proposed metrics.
We develop algorithms that handle incremental modification made to requirements models.
These algorithms will trigger different reactions corresponding to different actions of mod-
ification. These reactions will update the data for metric calculation for the only modified
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parts of the requirements models instead of redoing the computation from ground up. This
enables an efficient computation of metrics with respect to incremental modification made
to the requirements models. The details of these algorithms are discussed in Section 6.2.3.
11.2 How to Apply the Proposed Framework
In this section, we propose potential steps to apply the proposed framework. Basically these
steps are hooked into the software development process, particularly, where the require-
ments model has just been produced. Each time an alternative decision or a potential evolu-
tion is identified, they could be captured by using the techniques of the underlying method.
The detail of the steps are as follows:
INPUT. The input is a requirements model (expressing in a particular RE language), and all
possible changes to the model as well as their likelihoods of occurrences. Since there
could be many parallel and competing changes, a revision of the input requirements
model may have many variants.
STEP 1. In this step, changes are examined to revise the input requirements model to pro-
duce the future revision of requirements model for the system-to-be-next. The input
requirements model and variants of its future revisions together with the likelihoods
of occurrences changes are formulated into observable rules.
STEP 2. In this step, different design alternatives of both input requirements model and its
future variants are derived to formulate controllable rules. These design alternatives
could be automatically derived in some RE languages (e.g., i*, KAOS).
STEP 3. In this step, the proposed metrics are calculated for each of design alternatives. The
design alternatives and their metrics values are used to support the decision making
process. The following cases might happen:
STEP 3A. If decision maker could choose a design alternative, move forward to next
phase of the development process.
STEP 3B. If decision maker could not choose any design alternatives, go to either STEP
1 to elaborate more design alternatives, or STEP 2 to revise future revisions of the
input requirements model.
OUTPUT. The output includes all artifacts generated in these steps, which are an evolution-
ary requirements model of the system (i.e., the input requirements model plus variants
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of its future revision and evolution rules), and a ‘good’ design alternative by decision
maker.
Whenever a new change is identified, we might need to start over from STEP 1 to STEP 3
to select a new design alternative.
The framework will involve following actors: designer, domain expert, and decision maker.
The roles of these actors within the proposed framework are identified as follows:
• The domain expert could be a trained consultant who possesses deep knowledge about
the domain. S/he will forecast potential changes in future to the system, as well as
his/her belief about the likelihoods of occurrences of these changes.
• The designer evaluates the foreseen changes from domain expert to formulate possible
evolution possibilities of the system. For each possibility, the designer may revise the
original requirements model (i.e., the model built upon the current requirements and
the current settings of the working environment) so that the new revision could cope
with the expected new changes.
The designer is also responsible for performing the reasoning on evolution uncertainty
to aid decision maker.
• The decision maker takes different design alternatives and the reasoning output from
the designer to choose a design alternative for the next step of the system-to-be-next.
11.3 How The Proposed Framework Relates to
State-of-the-Art
11.3.1 Requirements Evolution
Among four types of change categorized by Lam and Loomes [LL98], we capture the require-
ment change and design change as observable evolution and controllable evolution. We do
not capture the environment change and viewpoint change since this work mostly focuses
on the evolution of software artifact (i.e., requirements model) rather than environment and
viewpoint changes. While they have a meta and a process model but did not go beyond that
than, we have a conceptual model supported by an automated reasoning. Among seven key
issued, the proposed framework satisfies the ‘modeling evolution’, ‘multiple change’, and ‘tool
support’; and the application of the proposed framework on risk domain partially addresses
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the ‘risk assessment’ issue. We do not address the change analysis’ not extended traceability
as we do not focus on the nature of change and we only work on the requirements model
artifact. The impact assessment approaches on other social domains would be an interesting
direction for future work.
In comparison to studies on impacts of evolution [Rus+99; Has+05; Che+09; Lin+09], the
proposed framework is different in the perspective that we assess the impact of potential
changes in advance, rather than after changes happen. However, it is not limited that one
can use the approaches in [Has+05; Che+09; Lin+09] to link the modeled requirements to
changes in specification since these work complement to the proposed framework in this
dissertation.
Fabbrini et al. [Fab+07] work on plain text requirements and use the Formal Analysis
Context to detect the requirements inconsistency between different the evolution steps. In-
stead, we work on requirements models expressed by an existing RE language. We also have
different evolution steps as they have; however, we focus on the modeling the requirements
evolution uncertainty and reason about them to aid the selection of evolution-resilient de-
sign alternative but not checking the inconsistency.
The SECMER methodology [Pro12; Ber+11] detects the violation of security properties.
Security properties in Si* requirements model are ensured on-the-fly as the modifications
are being made. We also address the ‘before-after’ evolution perspective. The methodol-
ogy however does not capture the evolution uncertainty while we do. We do not focus on
ensuring security properties but selecting evolution-resilient design alternatives in advance.
The ‘before-after’ evolution perspective that we address is similar to the idea of situa-
tion ‘before-the-change’ and situation ‘after-the-change’ mentioned by Brier et al. [Bri+06].
However, their approach only captured the part of before model that is changes, but did not
have any further specific reasoning about that. In the proposed framework, we do not only
have modeling notions to capture evolution, but also a conceptual model and a reasoning
backed up by automated algorithms.
The approach of Zowghi and Offen [ZO97] involves modeling requirements models as
theories and reasoning changes by mapping changes between models. However, this ap-
proach has a significant overhead for the encoding of requirement models into logic. In
contrast, the proposed framework can operate transparently on requirements models.
Ernst et al. [Ern+11] focus on unknown-unknown evolution, i.e., evolution that we do
not know what it is, and when it happens. Meanwhile, we focus effort on known-unknown
evolution, i.e., evolution that we know what it is, but do not know when it happens.
186 CHAPTER 11. DISCUSSION
11.3.2 Empirical Studies
Runeson and Host [RH09] propose a broader set of guidelines about how to conduct qual-
itative research. We have based the evaluation empirical studies on those guidelines. Fol-
lowing those guidelines, we have involved researchers, students, practitioners (i.e., domain
experts) with different expertise and used semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and
audio-video recordings to collect data in order to perform data triangulation. Kitchenham
[Kit96] identify screening, effects analysis, and benchmarking as classes of research methods.
We have used the screening method to evaluate the correctness of requirements produced
by students (in Section 8.2.3.6). We also employ the effects analysis method to process and
analyze the collected data.
Besides, there exist works reporting empirical studies on requirements evolution and the
one that use the ATM domain as evaluation context (see Section 3.3.2). These studies are
closely related to the empirical studies, which are described in Chapter 8.
A closely related work to the empirical evaluation studies (Chapter 8 ) is from Villela et
al. [Vil+10] who reported on a quasi-experiment to assess the adequacy and feasibility of
PLEvo-Scoping method [Vil+08]. The quasi-experiment took place in the form of two two-
days workshops with the participation of domain experts. They used both quantitative and
qualitative measures but did not have any statistical tests. Similarly, in the evaluation studies
we have adopted a workshop for evaluating with ATM domain experts the effectiveness of the
proposed framework to model requirements evolution and we have used both quantitative
and qualitative measure to assess its effectiveness. However, in the evaluation studies de-
scribed in Chapter 8 we were able to apply statistical hypothesis testing research approach
to check the statistical validity of the hypotheses related to the research questions.
Compare to the case study by McGee and Greer [MG11], we also followed the guideline
in [RH09] used hypothesis testing: we refined the research questions into a set of hypotheses
and identified quantitative metrics like the size of change and the number of evolution rules
to evaluate the effectiveness of the approach to model requirements evolution. In addition,
before testing the hypotheses, we asked an expert in the ATM domain to evaluate the quality
of the requirements models and of the requirements changes identified by the participants
of the studies (see Section 8.3).
In the quantitative analysis (see Section 8.3), we employ the idea of delta requirements
(by Herrmann et al. [Her+]) to study the complexity evolution rules where we focus on how
big the change is in each evolution rule identified. We use the notion of delta requirements
(i.e., requirements evolution) to define the quantitative metric size of requirements change
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associated with the evolution rules identified by the participants of the studies. We used this
metric to evaluate the effectiveness of the approach in modeling requirements evolution.
As claimed by Maiden et al. [Ncu+07; MR05; Mai+04], the workshop sessions can help
to set up a common understanding and facilitated the interaction among people involved.
We therefore adopt workshops with a similar structure to conduct the study with ATM ex-
perts (see Section 8.2.3.2). With respect to the creativity workshops by Maiden et al., the
workshops in Chapter 8 consists of a training and application phase. We did not have a
brainstorming phase that has been replaced with an evaluation phase where the quality of
researchers’ models was evaluated by the ATM domain experts. In addition, in the evalua-
tion studies we identified quantitative metrics and used statistical hypothesis testing to as-
sess the effectiveness of the proposed approach in modeling requirements evolution, while
in the studies by Maiden et al., qualitative data were used to evaluate the RESCUE method.
A survey of the literature on empirical studies related to requirements change shows that
there is little research that uses an empirical basis to understand the impact of requirements
evolution, why and when it happens and to assess the effectiveness of methods to manage
requirements change. As far as we are aware of, this study is one of the few studies that has
used quantitative metrics and hypothesis testing to assess possible requirements changes
and the effectiveness of the proposed framework to model such changes.
11.3.3 Selecting Countermeasure Alternatives for Evolving Risks
We are aware of few studies about evolving risks by Lund et al. [Lun+11b] and Solhaug and
Seehusen [SS13]. They proposed general techniques and guidelines for managing risk in
changing systems. However, they did not mention the uncertainty of evolutions (i.e., likeli-
hood of occurrence), and how to use this information to support the decision making pro-
cess.
Applying the proposed framework to evolving risk in Chapter 9 is a pioneer effort to fill
that gap. The basic difference between [Lun+11b; SS13] and the work reported in Chapter 9
is that they aimed to assess the changing risk on evolving systems, we aim to evaluate how
well a countermeasure alternative could resist evolution during a period of time. These are
two complementary aspects of evolving risks. Furthermore, their work only discussed the
support in the before-after evolution perspective, meanwhile, we target both the before-after
and continuous evolution perspectives. We make use of the potential changes in the current
context and their uncertainty, together with the output of the risk assessment to support
decision makers to select the most appropriate countermeasure alternative to implement.
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We have metrics (Max Belief, Residual Disbelief, Max Disbelief) to evaluate the evolution-
resilience of the risk countermeasure alternatives, which are the outputs of assessment.
Furthermore, the proposed method in Chapter 10 provides more information for the
decision makers to select cost-effective countermeasure alternatives for a target software
system within a particular context at a particular point of time. We have analyses (treat-
ment analysis, synergy analysis) and decision diagrams to provide more insights about cost-
effectiveness of countermeasure alternatives. The proposed method may be seen as a special
case or refinement of the process suggested by Mehr and Forbes [MF73].
There exist guideline and methods [Sto+02; WHO09; But02] to evaluate countermeasure
alternatives in terms of cost. However, these methods have not been designed to assess cost
of countermeasures but rather cost (or consequence) of risks. The decision methodology of
Chapman and Leng [CL04] includes analyses, methods, and framework for economic eval-
uation of countermeasure alternatives. However, it does not take into account the level of
risk reduced by different alternatives. We are different from these work [Sto+02; WHO09;
But02; CL04] since we take all information such as consequence of risks, cost of counter-
measures, and level of residual risk to assess cost-effective countermeasure alternatives. The
work of Norman [Nor10] also covers these information; however the artifacts are developed
as spreadsheets, which are complicated to implement and follow. Meanwhile, the proposed
method is a well-defined process and backed up with a reasoning; and the introduced arti-
facts are graphical. As the alternatives are more focused on the technical aspect, the output
of the proposed method could be taken as the input for Real Options Thinking based assess-
ment [Kul+99; AK99; LS07].
The SecInvest framework by Houmb et al. [Hou+12] is closely related to the method de-
scribed in Chapter 10 because it also employs existing risk assessment techniques for risk
level. It scores countermeasure alternatives with respect to their cost and effect, trade-off
parameters, and investment opportunities. While we provide a systematic way to assess the
effects of alternatives on risks, also take into account the dependency among countermea-
sures in an alternative, they however do not. The proposed method is sufficiently generic
to be integrated within many existing risk analysis methods. We have demonstrated this by
instantiating in the CORAS method for security risk analysis [Lun+11a] with concrete illus-
trative examples.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the proposed artifacts and evaluation activities conducted
in the dissertation. Based on this, the chapter discusses potential future research di-
rections based on the outcomes of the dissertation.
W
E have presented a framework to deal with evolution in requirements models.
We have also showed that the proposed framework is not only applicable in the
domain of requirements evolution, but also helpful in the realm of risk manage-
ment. This chapter summarizes the major contributions of this dissertation (Section 12.1)
and discusses potential future research based on the results (Section 12.2).
12.1 Summary
A key contribution in this dissertation is the framework for modeling and reasoning about
evolution in requirements model in long-lived software systems. The aim of this framework
is to provide a means for studying requirements evolution. The framework includes evolu-
tion rules to capture evolution in requirements model, particularly observable rules for cap-
turing potential changes and their uncertainty, and controllable rules for capturing differ-
ent reactions from the designing aspect (i.e., design choices or design alternatives) to these
changes. By incorporating evolution in requirements models, we allow designers to have a
global view about the potential evolution of the system in future.
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The evolution uncertainty is represented as evolution probability, which is the belief
about the likelihood of occurrence of evolution. The evolution probability is associated with
a semantic described by a game-theoretic approach. This game semantics provides a better
understanding of evolution probabilities.
Based on evolution probability, we propose a set of metrics enabling quantitative reason-
ing on design alternatives to understand to what extent they can resist to evolution. In other
words, we measure the belief in the game between domain expert, company, and the mar-
ket that the implementation of a design alternative could still be operational when evolution
occurs.
Moreover, the proposed reasoning is supported by a series of algorithms that automate
the calculation of metrics, and a proof-of-concept CASE tool. The algorithms not only cal-
culate metric values for a particular design alternative, but also enumerate possible design
alternatives with the best metric values, i.e., winner alternatives. Additionally the algorithms
incrementally react to every single change made to requirements models. Thus, they provide
an instant view of a list of winner alternatives. This facilitates the decision making process.
We also provide the proofs for the soundness and complexity of reasoning algorithms.
The proposed framework has been evaluated with a series of empirical studies that took
place over a year to evaluate the modeling part of the framework. The evaluation studies re-
lied scenarios taken from industrial projects in the ATM domain. The studies involve differ-
ent types of participants with different expertise in the framework and the domain. The re-
sults from the studies showed that the modeling approach is effective in capturing evolution
of complex systems. It is reasonably possible for people, if they are supplied with appropriate
knowledge (i.e., knowledge of method for domain experts, knowledge of domain for method
experts, and knowledge of both domain and method for novices), to build significantly large
models, and identify possible ways for these models to evolve. Moreover, the studies have
shown that obviously there is a difference between domain experts, method experts, and
students on the “baseline" (initial) model, but when it comes to model the changes with
evolution rules, there is no significant difference.
We have adapted the proposed framework to the realm of risk assessment. We have pro-
posed an approach to deal with evolving risks. The proposed approach operates at high level
of abstraction. It could work with many existing risk-assessment methods. To address the
representation of the evolution rules in complex risk models, we further apply the proposed
risk-evolution approach to a risk assessment method. For this purpose, we have introduced
a risk-graph-based countermeasure assessment method, then apply the risk-evolution ap-
proach to this method. The evolution rules are represented in risk graphs by tags decorated
12.2. LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK 191
directly to elements of risk graphs.
In short, the proposed framework could be able to help to improve the evolution re-
silience of long-lived framework systems in the early phase of software development. There-
fore the approach has potentially contributed to improve the sustainability of long-lived soft-
ware systems.
12.2 Limitations and Future Work
The proposed framework takes anticipated evolution and evolution uncertainty as inputs to
enrich the requirements model of a system-to-be. It is important that how evolution and its
uncertainty could be elicited. The evolution uncertainty is a kind of subjective probability.
The subjective probabilities are also exploited in other fields such as risk management. The
more precise the beliefs, the more precise the reasoning. Thus it is necessary to have a well-
defined process or guidance to achieve and evaluate these inputs. Lacking on this kind of
process is a limitation of the dissertation. Hence, a promising approach to evaluate evolution
uncertainty is based on the interpretation about uncertainty and the Analytic Hierarchical
Process (AHP), which is used in the literature to prioritize requirements.
We have evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed framework in the ATM domain with
the participation of researchers, ATM experts, and students. These studies are limited in a
single domain and a particular RE language. Further empirical studies to continue evaluate
the framework would be more interesting. In particular, future research could focus on the
following issues:
• Replicate the empirical studies in another domain rather than ATM, and with different
kinds of participants to see whether similar results could be obtained.
• Replicate the empirical studies with different RE languages rather than i*/Tropos to see
whether there is any impact to the chosen RE languages to the outcome of the studies.
• Evaluate different aspects of the framework rather that effectiveness, for example, whether
the method is easy to use (i.e., Perceived Ease Of Use), whether participants want to ap-
ply the method in practice (i.e., Intent of Use), so on and so forth. These aspects could
be obtained by performing interview (with and/or without predefined questionnaire)
with individual participants.
During the evaluation studies with ATM experts, we have suggested by users that a sim-
pler graphical representation of evolution rules would help in the cases of big and complex
192 CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSION
requirements models. This suggestion should be addressed while applying the proposed
framework to a particular RE language. The graphical representation of evolution rules ap-
parently depends on the RE language the framework applies to. For instance, in goal-based
languages the observable rules could be represented via a new construct (e.g., observable
node, see Chapter 7 ), the controllable rules are represented by the OR-decomposition; in
risk graph, the evolution rules are represented by additional tags decorated to elements of
risk graph. Therefore, it would be interesting to develop a more generic representation of
evolution rules that could be applied to different RE languages.
The proposed framework has presented artifacts to capture evolutions in requirements
models, and to facilitate the identification and assessment of design alternative. However,
the process to apply the proposed framework in the software development is still very pre-
liminary. More effort to extend the framework in this direction would be interesting.
The evolution metrics proposed by the framework is a single value for the entire period
where evolution is examined. To address this limitation, it might be more interesting to mea-
sure evolution metrics as a time series especially for the continuous evolution perspective.
By studying the evolution of evolution metrics we could provide extra information to support
the selection of design alternatives.
Moreover, the proposed evolution metrics measure the resilience of design alternatives
with respect to evolution. If the working environment of the system-to-be is too dynamic,
we might need additional metrics. For example, further research could focus on the analysis
that measures the cost to repair a design alternative.
We have proposed an adaptation of the proposed framework to address the evolution of
risks in long-lived systems. It would be interesting to conduct empirical evaluation with in-
dustry. The settings of the empirical studies described in Chapter 8 could be used at starting
points to conduct future empirical research.
We could also exploit the applicability of the proposed framework in the field of software
product line engineering. We have reported such application in a separated report [TM13a].
Another interesting direction based on this framework is to relax its input assumptions.
Currently, the framework requires all possible environment changes plus corresponding changes
in requirements models anticipated. However, in practice, we might have information about
potential changes, but not specific changes in requirements models. Thus, we need to ex-
tend and/or generalize the framework to make it able to deal with such situations.
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